Commentary
Volume Forty-nine, Number Four, April 1970

IMPERIALISM
BY GEORGE LICHTHEIM

LATIN AMERICA:
THE CHURCH MILITANT
NORMAN GALL

THIS AQUARIAN AGE
MILTON HIMMELFARB

PARANOIA AT THE MOVIES
MYRON MAGNET

DISCOURSES OF THE RABBIS
CHAIM RAPHAEL

THE TV SEASON RE-VIEWED
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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Letters from Readers

Party History

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Although *A Long Journey* has been reviewed in a number of journals, I have been tempted to comment on two reviews only: one out of pique and the second, by Mr. Maurice J. Goldbloom in the December 1969 COMMENTARY, out of interest. The review is summarized in the last sentence: " . . . *A Long Journey,* while an interesting and sometimes moving human document, is very bad history." I choose to take issue only with the latter part.

Almost everyone who has lived through the period covered by the book, from the 30's to the 50's, as an adherent of the Communist party or as its opponent, has a different view of this history. I wrote a memoir, content to let others, free of the travail of this experience, write the history. I suspect that Mr. Goldbloom was no more free than I. Much of what he says is true, including the final, shattering comment that our best impulses (for democracy and humanism) were ultimately perverted and turned into their opposites. It is why so many of us left the party following the upheaval of 1956.

At the same time, Mr. Goldbloom leaves the history in a bit of a jumble. It is so negative that one is bound to wonder why so many people joined the party in the 1930's; or remained in the difficult years of the cold war. His treatment of Earl Browder in the period of the "Peoples' Front" from 1935 to 1939 and through the war years is, in my view, one-sided. He argues, for example, that the arbitrary manner in which the party operated during its period of "prosperity," when it was active in the "mainstream," was more responsible for its subsequent isolation than the "sectarian excesses" in the postwar period under William Z. Foster.

It is a strange argument. Granting the misuse of power and the insufferable attitude toward the Trotskyists cited by the reviewer, without the 30's and the growth of the party under Browder, the extension of its influence in the trade unions and the Negro community, there would be little history to discuss for Mr. Goldbloom or myself. The Left bloc in the CIO was a formidable force. While Mr. Goldbloom is disposed to question my figures on Negro membership, the fact is that it represented the largest black constituency ever assembled under Marxist leadership in the United States. Both movements were in the main constructive and dealt with real issues. That they were subverted in later years is another matter.

Mr. Goldbloom views my choice of Browder over Foster as purely factional. The program of Americanization under the former was illusory since all policies originated in Moscow, and to buttress the point, he describes the twists and turns under Browder's leadership to conform with Kremlin policy. On the other hand, Foster is described as "too independent to be trusted." It is a fact that Browder reflected Soviet policy, in every twist and turn. And yet within the context of a general "line" dictated by Moscow, the policies pursued under Browder took on a distinctive, indigenous character. The Communist party attracted thousands of dedicated, talented people who placed a genuine American imprint on the movement.

Given the nature of the issues, a process of Americanization did take place in a unique, contradictory form—on the one hand, traditional allegiance to Moscow and on the other, the evolution of an American radicalism, almost in spite of itself. This process was subsequently aborted in 1945.

In contrast, the description of Foster as "too independent to be trusted" strains at the truth. He was utilized by Moscow in 1929 to oust Jay Lovestone; in 1945 to oust Browder; and in 1956 to meet the challenge posed by the "revisionists" in the period of upheaval. His speeches denying the existence of a crisis in the Communist movement following the 20th Congress, are a monument to his steadfast allegiance. . . . He was buried, at his own request, in the Kremlin.

The significance of the real, not imaginary or factional, differences between the leadership of Browder and Foster lies in the fact that the former, with all his limitations, is associated with the revisionist trend in the Communist world; and the latter, with his fine austere qualities, is associated with the Stalinist trend. Hence the discussion of what Mr. Goldbloom

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calls my "very bad history" is quite contemporary. It may enable one to understand how out of a history of dependence and "monolithic unity," an upheaval could occur that would split the monolith and give rise to a number of turbulent currents in the Communist parties throughout the world; the revisionism of Tito, the polycentrism of Togliatti, the independence of Rumania, and the remarkable thrust for democracy in Czechoslavakia.

Perhaps the "historical reality" is more complex than what the historians have been able to cope with. I am as concerned as Mr. Goldbloom to probe the tormenting problem of power and freedom in a revolutionary movement or society: how to achieve an organism that is effectively militant and democratic at the same time. The Communists failed and the world has had to pay a terrible price for this failure. . . .

GEORGE CHARNEY

New York City

MR. GOLDBLOOM writes:

Certainly Moscow used Foster against Lovestone and Browder, as it had used Lovestone and Browder against Foster. But Foster's role in Lovestone's ouster was a relatively minor one; *that* job was handled by Lovestone's own factional associates, notably Robert Minor, who was to tell the Executive Committee of the Comintern: "I am proud to say, and it is one of the very few things of which I still may boast, that within twenty-four hours we turned a majority of 85 per cent for Lovestone into a majority of 85 per cent against Lovestone." And when it came to choosing a new leader, the Kremlin passed over Foster, rapping him sharply over the knuckles for daring to call himself a Stalinist, in favor of Browder, who had no real support of his own and thus did not constitute the disciplinary problem that Foster did.

In the ouster of Browder, Foster's role was more important but nevertheless primarily symbolic; Moscow needed his personal prestige to make the relatively large party of 1945 reverse its course. Also, the fact that he had stood out against the ultra-Right Browder line at a time when this also meant deviating from Moscow made him more useful at the same time as it made him more suspect. The party organization was given over to others; Foster was always a bridesmaid, never a bride. As for his burial in the Kremlin, John Reed is there too; I doubt if either of them is altogether comfortable there or was when alive.

On the question of scars, I bear only the relatively minor ones that befell a democratic Socialist who found it necessary to work with the Communists as well as against them in unions and other mass organizations at various times. To be sure, some of my friends died in Spain in ways as to which I was never certain, and I knew the father of one person (Mark Rein) and the daughter of another (Camillo Berneri) who died there in ways about which there was no doubt whatsoever. Since these things happened in the Popular Front period, I am somewhat less charitably disposed toward the CP of those years than toward the CP of the Third Period. Whatever the latter's sins, it did not, at least in this country, have blood on its hands.

I still consider the "leftists" in the Communist movement as more genuinely a part of American tradition than the "rightists." To be sure, it is a minority tradition, and one deeply alienated from the mainstream of American society. But its alienation was American in origin. It is, in a sense, a tradition of out-castes; it has its roots among metal miners and loggers of the West, men who saw every man's hand against them. Russia was to them an ally against an America that oppressed them, not a workers' fatherland. And just as they had not become Communists because of events in Europe, as most of the recruits during the Popular Front and war period did, so it was not really relevant for them when Khrushchev revealed Stalin's crimes—"but that was in another country, and besides, the wench is dead." Because their concern was with America, rather than Russia, nothing that happened in Russia could break their allegiance to it—except, as in the case of Bill Dunne, a Soviet line which appeared to abandon the revolution here.

Mr. Charney may be right in saying that without the growth of the Communist party in the 30's there would be little party history for us to discuss. It is a history which I would be willing enough to dispense with, and I suspect that when Mr. Charney thinks it over, he would too. But, as the medieval theologians recognized, the power of God—who was obvi-

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

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

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ously not intended to be a Soviet historian—does not extend to causing the City of Rome never to have been. So we're stuck with it.

Speaking of Hebrew

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

When I finished reading Hillel Halkin's article ["Hebrew As She Is Spoke," December 1969] I was furious, convinced that the author had baldly misstated every fact. Careful rereading found practically no factual points with which one can disagree, but the general impression remains negative. . . . I cannot lay claim to expertise in linguistics, Semitic or otherwise, but twice in my life I have gone through the immigrant's experience of learning a new language, and like many Israelis I have a deep affection for my country's tongue. . . .

My major objection is to Mr. Halkin's lack of awareness of just how vital modern Hebrew is, and how rapidly scriptural and other roots are adapted to present-day needs. Undoubtedly one can find long passages of "Semiticized Esperanto" . . . such as *haproblema shel harevolutzia hasotzialit*, or *irgun hainjenyerim v'haarchitektim*, etc., but only the semi-literate speak in this manner. Of course, one must remember that even highly-educated persons, having to learn a new language in their forties or fifties, often remain to a certain extent semi-literate in Hebrew. This is sad, but then migration is no easy task, and learning the language of one's new home long after one's education is completed may be one of its most difficult aspects.

Some cases in point: *dachpor*, says Mr. Halkin, has been forgotten. Not so. In fact, the entire field of construction and heavy equipment may be taken to represent successful innovation in Hebrew. True, the international "tractor" has simply been transliterated, but its treads have a perfectly good Hebrew name: *sharsheraot*, chains. The dozer blade is called *sakin*, knife. Its motor is *manoa*; the gear box, *tevat hiluchim*. Of course, one must admit that "hydraulic" in Hebrew is *hidrowly*, and then there are monstrosities, such as *shooffeldozer* and *skriper* (very guttural *r*, rhymes with "wiper").

Many foreign terms, previously commonly used in Hebrew, have been replaced and are forgotten. Taxicabs, formerly hailed *taxi*!, now are called *monit*. *Posta* has be-

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come *doar*. *Telegrama* has been replaced by *mivrak*, from the root *brk*, lightning. The telegraph office is *mivraka*; to send a cable, *le'havrik*. To phone, on the other hand, is *le'talpen*. These two words are good examples of complete acclimatization, the one from scriptural, the other from present-day international roots. . . .

The major determinant, however, of the language we speak, write, breathe, is the very fact of Jewish statehood, of independent political existence and self-determination—however one wishes to characterize the revolutionary change wrought in Jewish existence in our times. In this context the language must be evaluated—and in this context it is a gladdening phenomenon. . . . This is a living tongue, the expression and means of communication of a living people. Even the greatest purist cannot ask for more than that.

ARYEH GREENFIELD
Jerusalem, Israel

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mr. Halkin's article . . . contains some misleading facts. For instance, he writes: "*Dachpor* has been all but bulldozed from sight." An Israeli reader of the mass-circulation newspaper, *Maariv*, can only smile at this: the December 23, 1969 issue carried the following headline—"*Dachpor she-huasak bechafirot*" (Bulldozer Employed in Archeological Dig). Some people in Israel still use *bulldozer*, but for the youth the term has "been all but bulldozed from sight."...

There are, of course, mistakes of usage in everyday, spoken Hebrew . . . but nowhere can one see . . . such concern for purity and enrichment of the vocabulary as in Israel. Our radio broadcasts a daily language program whose aim is to improve and correct the spoken tongue. The Academy of the Hebrew Language is making persistent efforts to exchange foreign words and expressions for Hebrew ones, and the new coinages are immediately introduced to the public via the newspapers. . . .

Mr. Halkin quotes somebody as having said that "precise analytic thinking in Hebrew is impossible." . . . There are in Israel today many institutions of higher learning where our young people, who grew up speaking Hebrew only, study solely in Hebrew and nevertheless achieve high standards of education which are internationally acknowledged. This is the generation which should be regarded as the criterion for the purity and resourcefulness of the Hebrew language and not the generation of immigrants whose Hebrew is often literally translated from their native tongues. . . .

RACHEL GENUSSOW
Netanya, Israel

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The structural changes in present-day spoken Hebrew which Hillel Halkin describes in his article have close parallels in other languages. Insofar as a reader ignorant of Hebrew can judge, the process of erosion and restructuring is much like that by which the Romance languages developed from Latin.

Mr. Halkin's sample sentence, "I wrote it to my father," may be rendered in classical Latin as *patri scripsi* ("to the father/ I have written")—with the indirect object relation incorporated into the word for "father," and with the first-person pronoun as well as the tense indication built into the word for "write," just as in the Mishnaic *k'tavtiv l'avi*. (The "it" and "my" would be left unexpressed in Latin as being obvious from the context.)

In Vulgar Latin, with the language shifting from synthetic to analytic structure, the same thought would have been expressed approximately as *ego illud habeo scriptum ad meum patrem* ("I/ it/ have/ written/ to/ my/ father")—atomized like the contemporary Hebrew *ani katavti et zeh el ha-abba sheli* ("I/ wrote/ it/ to/ the father/ of mine"). From the Vulgar Latin, a series of merely phonetic changes takes us to modern French: *je l'ai écrit à mon père*.

As Mr. Halkin points out, it is not yet a foregone conclusion that the emerging analytical Hebrew will become the standard language of Israel. Thanks to universal literacy and mass communication, it may be possible to check the erosion process, so that the language of the Bible will remain intelligible to Israelis. But if this is not to be—if the Israelis of future centuries are destined to speak a language that is to classical Hebrew as French, or Portuguese, or Rumanian is to

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

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

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Latin—then the parallel with the genesis of the Romance languages holds some long-term comfort. It suggests that whatever new idiom grows out of the present welter of unidiomatic usage will ultimately have, not only a "local style," as Mr. Halkin predicts, but an expressiveness, grace, and power of its own. This is how languages have always developed and renewed themselves. Vulgar Latin may have been a dungheap; but French is quite a flower.

GEORGE SALOMON
Great Neck, New York

MR. HALKIN writes:

The reason for Mr. Greenfield's and Mrs. Genussow's furor quite escapes me. Far from coming to malign the Hebrew that they and I speak, I had attempted, I thought, to give a reasonably objective account of it and of some of the historical and linguistic circumstances that have helped to shape it. In any case, I was glad to learn from them that the coinage *dachpor* is alive and doing well, especially as this was not my impression when I was last in Israel a year and a half ago. Its improved fortunes, however, hardly constitute a serious criticism of my article. As I went to some lengths to point out, the truly problematic aspects of modern spoken Hebrew do not have to do with individual words in themselves but with overall patterns of speech involving such things as syntax, idiom, phonetics, etc. Since neither Mr. Greenfield nor Mrs. Genussow see fit to challenge any of the many descriptive examples that I cited in these areas, it seems fair to assume that they accept the factual accuracy of the material presented (Mrs. Genussow even generously acknowledges as much). Naturally, they have every right to interpret such material as they wish. (Incidentally, the article did contain one etymological error. In the course of discussing the Hebrew loan-word *sponja,* I stated that its immediate source was English. I have since been informed by several authorities that the actual donor was Ladino, and I gladly stand corrected.)

Mr. Salomon's comparison with the Latin is instructive. Whether all synthetic languages develop increasingly analytic features over the course of time appears linguistically still to be an open question, but there can be no doubt that the tendency is widespread, or that it becomes especially strong under certain conditions of stress such as the adoption of a synthetic language by speakers of an alien tongue. Indeed, if one knew more about the languages originally spoken by the various barbarian tribes of Gaul who eventually became the French, it might be possible to draw even more illuminating analogies with the revival of modern Hebrew by speakers of a number of European languages. Certainly I share Mr. Salomon's faith that Hebrew will in time develop "an expressiveness, grace, and power of its own." It may even happen sooner than one thinks.

Agnew & Laqueur

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It is understandable that Mr. Podhoretz should be discomfited by Spiro Agnew's approval of and quotations from COMMENTARY [Letters from Readers, January]. But his discomfiture should not express itself in changing the content of a COMMENTARY article—just to be on the side opposing Mr. Agnew's.

I have reread the Walter Laqueur piece carefully and find it difficult to conclude that it in any way expresses "critical sympathy" for the current American youth movement. Rather, it is uncompromising in its recognition of the folly and destructiveness of the movement in its extreme form. As befits the work of a scholar, its tone is dispassionate and detached—very unlike the tone of the Vice President. And when Professor Laqueur conjures the vision of a guardian angel to deflect us from the abyss threatened by youthful radicalism, few would believe he intended to cast Agnew in the role of the angel.

Mr. Agnew's vulnerability is known to all. His intemperate and superficial remarks will undoubtedly do more harm than good. But that is scarcely a reason for turning somersaults—simply to avoid the charge that we are in his camp. . . .

BERNARD SHRIBER
Sharon, Massachusetts

MR. PODHORETZ writes:

I too have reread Walter Laqueur's article carefully, and I would stand by my characterization of it.

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Socialism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I suggest that Robert L. Heilbroner's article, "Socialism and the Future" [December 1969], has two serious flaws. First is his failure to assert and stress the difference between socialism with political democracy and socialism under a dictatorship, which we ordinarily call Communism. To class both Norway and Soviet Russia as socialist, as Mr. Heilbroner does, without making any distinction between them, is both politically and economically absurd. Where political democracy exists, planning failures will be far more readily detected, criticized, and corrected than under a one-party Communist dictatorship. Consequently, many of the difficulties of socialist planning which Heilbroner stresses . . are easily corrected in a democratic socialist society. . . .

Secondly, Heilbroner asserts . . . that socialists favor equality of income and believe in the principle of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need." I was a dues-paying member of the Socialist party from 1919 to 1940 . . . but I never once heard any Socialist party member advocate strict income equality. They all recognized the need and desirability of different rates of remuneration for different kinds of work. They sometimes pointed out that higher pay might have to be given for those now doing unpleasant, low-paid, or lowly-regarded work (street cleaning for example) in order to get such jobs filled and that higher pay might have to go to those who worked longer or harder, or to those whose work required greater skill or a longer period of training (like doctors).

What socialists object to and want to end in a fully realized socialist society is *effortless* income for those able to work. . . . Such effortless income is derived from private ownership of the means of production in its broad sense. The owners of industry in effect own and control the jobs of others; this gives them great economic power, and they use that power to extract property income from ownership in the form of rent, interest, dividends, profits, and capital gains. . . . It is the private ownership of the means of production which results in large unearned incomes for a comparative few that socialists seek to end; they do not seek to estab-

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To the Editor of Commentary:

Now that he has explored the peculiar difficulties of corporate capitalism and socialism, I wonder if Robert Heilbroner would go on to assay the possibility of various mixed constitutions of capitalism and socialism, including built-in sectors of small private enterprises, self-managing cooperatives, rural reconstruction, and pure communism. I know he is interested in the possibility because he favorably reviewed my book *People or Personnel*, where I speak for it.

When I was young, such mixtures played a large part in liberal theory—they were called the "Scandinavian Way." Now nobody talks about them. Can Professor Heilbroner explain why? I can't.

Paul Goodman
New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . In citing Russia, China, and Cuba as prime examples of socialism, even if only in the category of backward or underdeveloped countries, Robert Heilbroner places little or no value on the factor of democracy as a *sine qua non* of socialism. . . .

Let me also point out that socialism has shown itself to be not merely a system of government, but a part of government, or of political aspiration, in such capitalist countries as the United States, Japan, and in Western Europe. Whenever a government takes steps to help people who are disadvantaged by laissez-faire, it is employing socialist means for correcting imbalances created by capitalism: examples can be seen in social welfare, public housing, aids to home ownership, model-cities programs, and so on. . . . It is in this sense that socialism has penetrated much of the life of capitalist countries. In our own country, for example, even though a Republican administration may attempt to winnow down a socialistic gain made by a Democratic administration it is very careful not to abolish it. . . .

The socialist today, rather than ask for the overthrow of a government, presses his case for more social needs and opportunities. . . . But everything is becoming more and more complex. Capitalism cannot get along by itself, and, as Mr. Heilbroner reminds us, socialism too cannot avoid falling back upon capitalistic incentives and devices. Instead of talking about whether socialism, or the socialist impulse, has a future, we ought to talk about how to make it more fruitful for our future.

William Stern
The Workmen's Circle
New York City

Mr. Heilbroner writes:

I *am* interested in the kind of mixed system for which Paul Goodman is such an eloquent advocate. If have not made it the object of an extended essay, it is because I think such systems, in our day at least, are probably limited to those happy few nations that are small, reasonably affluent and sheltered from the international power struggle. Ten years ago, in *The Future as History*, I wrote that "With all its glaring and inexcusable failures, the United States is still probably the most favored and favorable place for a child to be born and grow up." Clearly I was wrong then, and even more so today: the place to ask the stork to drop you is Scandinavia. If interest has waned in these humane nations it must be because they seem less and less likely to provide realistic destinations for the United States, to say nothing of the USSR, China, or Cuba.

As to whether democracy is a *sine qua non* of socialism, as Mr. Stern avers, the question is definitional. Of course, if we only call those countries "socialist" that have democratic systems, then most of the so-called socialisms must be given another label. In my article I was interested in exploring the kinds of structural problems that were apt to face nations in which a planned economy and an ideology of "human transformation" were paramount. I think it is as important to isolate these peculiarly "socialist" problems as it is to identify those problems that arise from the particular economic structure and business ideology of capitalism (democratic or not).

Whether the peculiar problems of socialism will be "easily corrected" under a democratic system is a matter on which I permit myself a degree more uncertainty than does Mr. Lewis. And I did not say that socialism entailed absolute income equality, but that there was a real contradiction between the

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general egalitarian *aims* of socialism and the income differentials required as incentives in a market-run economy.

Allen Ginsberg

To the Editor of Commentary:

Morris Dickstein, in "Allen Ginsberg & the 60's" [January 1970], writes that I "glare sternly at those who wish to put aside the tragic burdens of the 20th century for a period of 'relaxed pleasures and surface hedonisms.'" The quote within his sentence is taken from my October 1968 Commentary essay, "The New York Intellectuals." What I actually wrote was this: "After all the virtuosos of torment and enigma we have known, *it would be fine* to have a period in Western culture devoted to relaxed pleasures and surface hedonism. But so far this does not seem possible . . ." (emphasis added).

Irving Howe

New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . Among all the learned pontifications on the 60's, youth, literature, and the like, Morris Dickstein's article is so refreshing—he knows what Ginsberg is all about, and, more than that, understands what young people respond to in him. In a period when our country hates the young who are striving for an inner freedom, I am moved by Dickstein's voice of compassion and sympathy.

Ann G. Wolfe

New York City

On Name-Calling

To the Editor of Commentary:

Thank you for the series of letters between Professors Schlesinger and Chomsky [Letters from Readers, December 1969 and February and March 1970]. Apart from the sad but entertaining spectacle of two scholars calling each other names in public, I have learned two things. Dr. Schlesinger thinks Dr. Chomsky is either a faker or is putting us on, while Chomsky regards Schlesinger as either a liar or insane. I am writing to express my appreciation to the two respondents for these appraisals, since they confirm a judgment I had formed independently from reading some of their published works.

Reuben Eisenstein

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

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

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The Season Re-Viewed

Neil Compton

WRITING one of these quarterly reports inevitably involves a period of intensive viewing followed by a lapse back into old-fashioned alphabetic culture, as I brood over what has been seen and try to distill the essence into an appropriate number of words. Usually, about six weeks pass between the most recent program to which I am able to refer and the moment that the magazine reaches its earliest readers. During the interim, I seldom glance at any of the programs I have dealt with —but publication week always sends me uneasily back to the TV set to see whether once-confident judgments still seem valid.

Last January, for instance, my spot check led to several revised verdicts. The authenticity of *Room 222*'s Walt Whitman High School seemed no longer to be so evident as it was in the first few weeks of the season: recent episodes involving a pop singer (Nancy Wilson) who fell in love with Pete Dixon, and a girl who started a student fad by bringing her baby brother to school, have been amusing enough but totally lacking in the kind of quasi-documentary quality that made the first two or three memorable. *Marcus Welby, M.D.* —away from the humane clutter of his general practice—was mixed up in a hospital cliché involving injury to the son of a black civil-rights leader (Ossie Davis), and behaving like any of the run-of-the-ward television doctors from whom he had once seemed a refreshing change.

Fortunately, some programs not only succeed in remaining faithful to their informing idea, but even manage to deepen and extend its reverberations. *Then Came Bronson* (NBC) still celebrates its somewhat limited myth of the motorcyclist as pastoral hero, but continues to find new ways of doing it. For instance, a recent episode featuring Buffy Sainte-Marie began with a classic Western confrontation—a lone traveler passing through the mesa country near Boise, Idaho, and being observed by half-naked, war-painted Indians perched high on a cliff. Suddenly, the braves jumped on their steeds and swooped down on him (it was Bronson) whooping and clattering and—gunning their engines! After a spirited cavalry-style chase along the highway, the plot modulated into a drama of passion, racial feeling, and cyclemania, punctuated by folkish songs by Miss Sainte-Marie. The script capitalized very effectively on the strange mixture of with-it knowingness and devotion to communal traditions that often characterizes the contemporary radical ethnic style.

Bill Cosby has also managed to sustain the air of casual, almost haphazard, informality that can make even indifferent material seem more charming than it has any right to be. When he has the support of performers like Henry Fonda and Elsa Lanchester (with whom he was stuck in an elevator throughout an entire hilarious episode) or Wally Cox (as a would-be suicide for love), Cosby comes close to establishing the status of a comic classic—by TV standards, anyway. (Incidentally, in my last column I incorrectly attributed Quincy Jones's background music to Herbie Hancock.)

By this time, some readers may be asking, who cares? There seems to be a natural conflict between typographical and electronic communication. When one adds to this the problem of writing for a monthly journal about a lot of programs which flicker briefly on the screen before disappearing into a limbo from which only daytime or

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Irving Louis Horowitz, Editor

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Arthur M. Kroll, Editor

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summer reruns return, it is not hard to see why the art of television criticism is practiced, when at all, mainly in daily or weekly journals. Theater and movie reviews serve as guides for potential audiences as well as preserving judgments and interpretation of important productions. Television reviews, on the other hand, tend to be ancient history even on the day of publication—and often concern programs which the very perpetrators themselves would be glad to forget. Film critics may have to sit through many a dismal movie, but at least they need not fear that their judgment of (say) *Putney Swope* will be tested by readers on the basis of an eighth variation on the same theme by a flagging production crew.

OF COURSE, it is absurd to expect masterpieces in a series that is expected to grind on for thirteen, twenty-six, or thirty-nine episodes a year. A rational broadcasting system organized to serve viewers rather than advertisers would allow the nature of each program concept to determine the length of its run. (That is, in fact, what happens on NET right now.) Some, like *Lucy,* would go on forever; others would run for only five or six weeks. This sounds like a utopian idea, but it may not be too long before we see a few cautious experiments on commercial TV. After all, the present system does not seem to be working too well, if falling ratings and lower advertising revenue mean anything—and they certainly do to the hard-eyed men in the network boardrooms.

Some series are already moving in this direction—though none of them is much of an advertisement for the artistic benefits of limiting the number and pace of productions. These are programs in which a number of loosely related dramatic teams share the same weekly time-slot. *Name of the Game* (ABC) pioneered the technique last year with its expensive, flashy 90-minute episodes, each centered upon one of three improbable magazines in a journalistic empire owned by Glenn Howard (played by Gene Barry), an impossible combination of Henry Luce, Howard Hughes, and George Plimpton.

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This year there are two more. *The Bold Ones* (NBC) uneasily alternates teams of physicians, policemen, and lawyers, but there is nothing bold about either them or the series as a whole. A more promising formula is that of *Love, American Style* (ABC), which features two or three playlets each week, making use of a wide variety of actors and directors. All that has been lacking so far has been a few decent scripts. Perhaps next season will see further mutations in this direction. If open-line shows and underground programming can liberate commercial radio from slavery to the clock and the exactly interchangeable program segment, there is no theoretical reason why a similar revolution cannot release television from the same kind of bondage.

IN THE meantime, those who count upon specials to provide an occasional hour of superior, unhomogenized entertainment have had a rather lean season. It appears that specials have not been showing up well in the Nielsen and Trendex ratings, so their number has been drastically reduced by all the networks. Disturbing political documentaries are nowhere in evidence (for reasons that are obvious enough), and socio-cultural material has tended to be collected together in the new magazine-type shows such as *60 Minutes* (CBS) or *First Tuesday* (NBC). (They usually compete for audiences in the same late-Tuesday-night slot, naturally.) There, the alternation between sweet and sour, and the cushioning commentaries of old pros like Harry Reasoner and Sander Vanocur help to make the intolerable seem more tolerable than it ought to be. Nevertheless, I am fond of these programs—particularly *60 Minutes* when the team of Reasoner and Mike Wallace is at work—and would like to see more of the same.

Dramatic specials have been particularly scarce this year, and most of those scheduled were so unappealing that I made no effort to watch them. The sense of waste is particularly pronounced because, presumably lacking a budget large enough to engage top stars, the producers usually choose highly

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



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competent actors of lesser celebrity —people like George C. Scott, Colleen Dewhurst, or Martin Balsam. Then they present them in vehicles of utter banality.

Both the dramas I have seen since Christmas fall into this category. *A Storm in Summer* (NBC-Hallmark; written by Rod Serling, and directed by Buzz Kulik) might win a prize for the most improbable plot of the year. Peter Ustinov's impersonation of a misanthropic old Jewish delicatessen owner was accurate and perceptive in all its details, but quite unconvincing in its entirety. No wonder, when he was called upon to develop a warm, paternal relationship with a tough anti-Semitic black ghetto kid after years of brooding over the death of his own son. Uta Hagen found herself in a similar dilemma in *The Day Before Sunday* (CBS Playhouse; written by Robert Crean, directed by Paul Bogart). The action of this play chiefly consisted in a number of humiliations meaninglessly inflicted upon a middle-aged spinster during the course of her niece's graduation from an expensive private school. Uta Hagen carried the whole thing off with style and conviction—but there was really no point to play beyond a kind of sadistic contemplation of human suffering—the revenge of those who have made it to comfortable domesticity directed against the losers who make us feel guilty and uncomfortable.

UNQUESTIONABLY the greatest drama of the season has been provided by the two hour-long episodes of the LBJ show. Those who still believe that television somehow conveys the truth about a man in a way that other media don't would do well to compare these illustrated conversations with Walter Cronkite (CBS) with Johnson's on-camera personality while he was President. It was always clear that his pious and lugubrious country-preacher's manner was no more than a mask, but I never detected even a hint of the fearsomely ebullient and aggressive character that apparently lurked behind those myopic eyes. Of course, I had *read* about Johnson's salty wit and heroic rages, but my literary preparation notwithstanding, I couldn't quite imagine them.

Well, I can now—and, in a way, I almost thank God for the illusion that prevented us from realizing the full truth about this extraordinary man while he still exercised such awesome power. Compared with their carefully stage-managed equivalents during Johnson's Presidency, these Cronkite conversations have to be called "great television." Even though neither Cronkite nor the producer tried to correct the distortions and oversimplifications of LBJ's account of recent political history, his energy, his hatreds, his jealousies, and his self-deceptions were made only too brutally apparent. It seems unlikely that Richard Nixon will ever offer us a comparably revealing glimpse of his true self when he retires from office. If he does, however, let us hope that he will not still find it necessary to explain why he too failed in the attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

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

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Latin America: The Church Militant

Norman Gall

If the Christian believes in the fertility of peace for achieving justice, he believes also that justice is an unavoidable condition for peace. He does not overlook the fact that Latin America finds itself in a situation of injustice that could be called institutionalized violence, because the present structures violate fundamental rights. This is a situation that demands wholesale, audacious, urgent, and profoundly renewing transformations. We should not be surprised if in Latin America what Pope Paul VI called the "temptation to violence" is born. One must not abuse the patience of a people who endures for years a condition that those with a greater awareness of human rights would hardly accept.
—Document on Peace,
Second General Conference of CELAM
Medellin, Colombia, 1968

ONE OF THE great religious dramas of our time is currently being enacted throughout the length and breadth of Latin America, which contains more than one-third of the world's Catholic population. In the dozen or so years since John XXIII proclaimed his *aggiornamento*, the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America has been increasingly assuming a role not unlike that of the ancient Hebrew prophets in pointing to the injustices and disorders of society; at the same time, it has been experiencing an internal ferment that has affected all levels of its hierarchical structure. To be sure, dissent and disarray—what John's successor, the more cautious Paul VI, has called "inner rebellion" and "self-demolition"—are apparent everywhere in the Church, but in Latin America they have assumed a particular relevance. There, the papal social encyclicals are being put to ideological use as guides for a fundamental reorganization of society; and the dogmatic definition by Vatican II of the Church as "the People of God"—the effect of which was to limit the traditional predominance of the clerical hierarchy—has paved the way for a democratization of Church life in nearly all its forms. Moreover, in Latin America the Church has been generating a "theology of revolution"—disseminated in pastoral letters and bishops' orations, in the writings of theologians, and in official pronouncements—which condemns in no uncertain terms the "institutionalized violence" of a society that confines from one-third to one-half of its population to backwardness and marginality.

Indeed, the formal Church hierarchy, in many instances, is the main voice of this new concern with social problems, and this, too, is a "revolutionary" development. The Latin American bishops, who heretofore were known for their conservatism, have become increasingly radical in rhetoric. This development is reflected in the documents issued by CELAM (Latin American Bishops' Council), which began life in 1955 as a rather conservative body but which, under the influence of Pope John's encyclicals, *Pacem in Terris* and *Mater et Magistra*, and of Vatican II, has been transformed into a progressive body, pronouncing itself on such questions as economic integration, agrarian reform, university problems, and violence. Of course, ideological divisions still remain within some of the Latin American hierarchies, but pressures from both priests and laymen have had a modifying effect on all but the most rigid attitudes. Thus, while Chile and the Brazilian Northeast have been the main centers of clerical innovation in recent years, the progressive currents within Catholicism have become a major factor in the politics of virtually every Latin American republic. In smaller countries like Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, the *aggiornamento* has been largely in the hands of foreign missionaries, mostly Spaniards and North Americans, many of whom have been acting much more boldly, politically speaking, than they would have been permitted to act at home.

The changes within Catholicism over the past decade have been so swift and varied that some observers feel that something akin to the Protestant Reformation, with its elements of both social and religious revolution, is presently taking place. The Chilean Jesuit magazine *Mensaje*, the most widely read and respected Church publication in Latin America, has editorially compared the changes in the Church today with the historic role of Martin Luther:

> In Vatican II, the Roman Catholic Church recognizes as its patrimony many of the points made by Luther in his time: the primacy of the Word of God in the Scripture; the reality of a living tradition and not merely mechanical and verbal; the role of servant of the Word and of men that corresponds to the Teacher; the

NORMAN GALL, currently on a Guggenheim Fellowship in Caracas, is working on a book on Latin America. Mr. Gall's last previous article, "The Legacy of Che Guevara," appeared in our issue of December 1967.

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prophetic and priestly function of the laity and the "equality of all [hierarchy and laity] with reference to dignity and common mission"; the assertion of the liberty with reality of the Spirit that animates all in the People of God, giving them charisma; the subordination of ceremony and institution to the faith of Christians. . . .

Like the Lutheran Reformation of the 16th century, the present *aggiornamento* of the Roman Catholic Church has been rooted liturgically in a shift from Latin into the vernacular language and in the assumption by "the People of God" of a central role in the simpler and more direct celebration of the ritual. To obtain a sense of how powerful the traditional fusion between social and religious elements of rebellion can be, one might look beyond the contemporary examples of Gandhi and Martin Luther King to Luther's own time; in the decades before the great Peasants' War of 1525, the German peasantry was chafing against the new taxes imposed to support the swelling bureaucracies of the German principalities, and against the hardships caused, in that time of growth of towns and trade, by the need to pay in cash instead of kind. This peasant unrest found vindication in the Reformation, according to Professor Roland Bainton, since "Luther's freedom of the Christian man was purely religious but could very readily be given a social turn. . . . Luther certainly had blasted usury and in 1524 came out with another tract on the subject, in which he scored also the subterfuge of annuities. . . . His attitude on monasticism likewise suited peasant covetousness for the spoliation of cloisters. The peasants with good reason felt themselves strongly drawn to Luther."* Luther was a miner's son, and miners in the world's revolutionary traditions have served in many instances as leaders in the transformation of the peasantry into a social force. This association between social and religious protest has continued since Luther's time, and is abundantly evident in Latin America today.

I

The Catholic Church has been at the heart of political controversy throughout most of Latin America's history, and this conflict has left it weak. Until the 19th century, the Church was an arm not only of the Spanish conquest but of the colonial government as well. Under the *Patronato Real* (Royal Patronage) granted by Popes Alexander VI and Julius II, the Spanish monarchy was given total control of the Church in the New World, except in matters of doctrine and religious discipline, in exchange for a promise by Ferdinand and Isabella to spread the faith in the unknown lands coming under their temporal power. A series of papal bulls issued between 1493 and 1508 in effect gave the Spanish crown the power to collect tithes and to nominate bishops, priests, and abbots; further, no cleric could go to the Indies and no monastery, church, or hospital could be built without specific royal authorization. No papal bull or decree could be circulated or enforced in the New World without prior approval of the Council of the Indies. Thus the life of the Church became thoroughly intertwined with the political interests of the crown. (By the early 17th century one-tenth of the population of Lima, for example, consisted of priests, friars, canons, and nuns, with nineteen churches and monasteries serving a population of 26,500. In the Vice-royalty of New Spain—Mexico—the Church became the principal lending institution, controlling roughly half the colony's landed wealth through either outright ownership or heavy mortgages.)

At the same time that thousands of missionary-priests, especially Jesuits and Franciscans, were penetrating deep into the back country, advancing the frontier and the king's control into mountains and jungles, religious life in many big-city monasteries was becoming engulfed in concubinage, fraud, speculation, and commerce. The New World was so vast, and the means of colonization so slim, that Western ways, especially Christianity, could form at best a thin and patchy veneer on local customs. Since few European women accompanied the early colonizers, concubinage and miscegenation became everywhere the norm, to the degree that even today roughly half of all births in most countries of Latin America are illegitimate. The ritual and symbols of Catholicism were grafted onto the surfaces of a thousand different bodies of traditional belief; the resulting hybrid practices are still in evidence today. On the *altiplano* of Peru and Bolivia, for example, the image of the Virgin Mary is fused in the minds of the Quechua and Aymara Indians with that of their traditional earth goddess, the *Pacha Mama*, to whom animal victims are burned in ritual sacrifice. In Haiti, the traditional African *vodun* dances are tinged with recognizable elements of the Catholic Mass, while the *loa* or spirits worshiped in the ritual derive from the local deities of Dahomey and the Congo. Among the highland *municipios* of Guatemala, where in some Indian villages the Mayan calendar is still in use, the Catholic Church is merely one of several holy places in the neighborhood to which *brujos* (sorcerers) come with small groups of worshipers to perform rites to a local deity. And in Brazil, formal Catholicism is colored by survivals of West African folk religions, especially the Gêge-Nagô cult of the Yoruba people of Nigeria, preserved for centuries by the descendants of Negro slaves.

The prelates of the New World presided serenely over this mosaic of practice and belief until the breakup of the Spanish empire toward the end of the 18th century. Until then the privileges

* *Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther*, p. 209.

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of the Church in Mexico, for example, were not less than those of the French clergy before 1789, although when the Society of Jesus was expelled from the Spanish empire in 1767 its 128 plantations in New Spain were expropriated by the Crown. By the time of the Napoleonic Wars, Freemasonry spread from England, France, and Spain to the American possessions. In the Spanish colonies not only did Freemasonry help lay the groundwork for independence, but—although priests were members of many lodges—it also set the pattern of Church-State conflict for the next hundred years. In the period immediately following independence, twenty-eight of thirty-eight episcopal sees in Latin America were vacated because of the exile or voluntary departure of their bishops. The successors of these bishops now plunged into republican politics, encouraged by a papacy desperately engaged in Church-State controversy all over Europe.

Following the pattern of the times, a series of Liberal-Conservative conflicts began in Latin America over such questions as clerical control of education, confiscation of Church property, the legality of divorce, immunity of the clergy from criminal prosecution, and the prohibition of tithes. These conflicts, which were often ultimately decided by bitter civil war, usually resulted in a severe drubbing of clerical interests. In Mexico, for example, the Church's fortunes declined to such a degree that today it is left without property (it does not even own its churches and cathedrals) and without the right to conduct public processions; Mexican priests are legally prohibited from wearing clerical garb in the streets. In Paraguay, Dr. José Gaspar Rodriguez Francia, who ruled as dictator for the first thirty years following independence, "took all the Church's property into his own hands, deprived it of all ceremonials which were wont to impress the populace . . . and in the end made himself head of the Church after the example of Henry VIII of England. . . ."* In Guatemala, under a Liberal dictatorship lasting from 1871 to 1885, the Jesuits and the Archbishop of Guatemala City were expelled, Church lands were seized, convents and monasteries closed, cemeteries secularized, and priests forbidden to wear collars and cassocks outside of church. (Most of these provisions remained in effect until 1954.) The same thing occurred in Venezuela under Antonio Guzman Blanco's long dictatorship (1870-88). And in Colombia, the conflict generated by more than a century of recurrent Liberal-Conservative religious strife was climaxed by the *violencia* of 1948-58, when Conservative gangs dressed as police brought Liberal peasants before the local priest, who made them kiss a crucifix and swear allegiance to the Conservative party; later these "professions of faith" were announced in the provincial press. Today, only four of the twenty-one Latin American republics—Colombia, Peru, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic—preserve the "protected" status of the Church that prevailed during the Spanish empire.

* From J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America*, p. 191.

THE DECADES of fanaticism and holy war were followed by the modernization of politics (in most cases this has taken place only within the past fifty years), a period marked by the abandonment of Church-State controversy in favor of debate by a new generation of political parties over "the social question." This development corresponded to a change in the life of the Church itself. Until Pius XI and Mussolini concluded the Lateran Pacts in 1929, successive Popes had remained in seclusion as self-styled "prisoners in the Vatican," in piqued response to the loss of the papal lands, in 1870, to Garibaldi's armies—the Papacy's final prostration in European politics. (Italian troops marched into Rome just as the First Vatican Ecumenical Council, still in session, had finished proclaiming the doctrine of Papal Infallibility.) For almost sixty years following, Catholics were forbidden under papal injunction from participating in Italian politics; the interdiction was abrogated when Mussolini and Pius XI agreed to the creation of an independent Vatican State with the Pope's absolute sovereignty over a 100-acre enclave within Rome. During that time little attention was paid to Pope Leo XIII's great social encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, which in 1891 called the world's attention to workers' rights and sketched one of the clearest outlines ever formulated of social democracy as practiced today in Western Europe and the United States. For most of the seventy years between *Rerum Novarum* and the proclamation in 1961 of John XXIII's *Mater et Magistra*, the Catholic hierarchy in Latin America remained largely silent on social questions. In 1937 the Archbishop of Lima, Msgr. Pedro Pascual Farfan, was still able to say: "Poverty is the most certain road to eternal felicity. Only the state which succeeds in making the poor appreciate the spiritual treasures of poverty can solve its social problems."

The social awakening of Catholicism in Latin America began to pick up speed in the mid-1950's with the start of a new era in hemispheric affairs, one in which electoral democracy showed signs of replacing dictatorship as the political norm. The Church has played an active role in this process. The angry opposition of Argentina's conservative hierarchy led to the fall of Juan Domingo Perón (1945-55), despite his announcement in 1945 that "my social policy will be inspired by the papal encyclicals," and despite the alliance between Perón and the Church that lasted through most of the dictatorship. Following Perón's fall, clerical opposition helped pave the way for the overthrow of other dictators, including Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia (1957),

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Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela (1958), Fulgencio Batista of Cuba (1959), and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic (1961). The Church's hand in these developments was indicated in October 1959, when a new Papal Nuncio, Msgr. Lino Zanini, arrived in Ciudad Trujillo, to the shock and surprise of Perón, then living in exile there as Trujillo's guest. Perón remembered that Zanini had come to Buenos Aires as Papal Nuncio shortly before his own fall from power; Perón made immediate preparations to leave the country, and in his farewell visit to his host cautioned: "It was that man who caused my downfall. Wherever that man puts his foot, he causes disturbances. Watch yourself carefully." Four months later, following a wave of arrests after a plot against Trujillo was discovered, Zanini prodded the Dominican bishops into issuing two pastoral letters attacking the dictatorship, as a result of which the Nuncio was expelled. Before his departure, in discussing Trujillo's violent reaction to the pastoral letters, Zanini told a high Dominican official: "That man doesn't know whom he's getting mixed up with. Everyone who has opposed me has died." Fifteen months later Trujillo was assassinated.* By that time, Pope John had issued *Mater et Magistra* and had summoned the world's Catholic bishops to the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council.

II

THE NEW TREND in the Church toward disengagement from—if not active opposition to—the conservative power structure is most evident in Brazil, which, with its ninety-five million people, is the world's largest and most populous Catholic nation. There the Roman Catholic hierarchy is engaged with the six-year-old military dictatorship in the gravest Church-State conflict of the hemisphere. The factionalism of the Brazilian hierarchy notwithstanding—there are some two hundred bishops with widely varying points of view—the Church, over the past six years, has become the main focus of opposition to the country's military-dominated government. Leading prelates and the former Papal Nuncio, Msgr. Sebastiao Baggio, have been accused frequently of Communist sympathies by army generals and other government supporters. Many priests and bishops have come under severe attack as a result of a campaign by a right-wing organization called the "Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property," which enjoys government and military support. In December 1968 President Costa e Silva disbanded the Brazilian Congress because it refused to waive the parliamentary immunity of a young deputy (a former Catholic Action student leader) who had offended the army; he called particular attention to "the anti-government campaign in the schools, with participation of the so-called progressive clergy and of certain organs of communication in deforming the facts, which demonstrate the existence of a revolutionary movement."

Typical of the Church-State conflict of recent years in Brazil was the incident involving Dom Valdir Calheiros, bishop of the steel-making city of Volta Redonda, near Rio de Janeiro. Although he developed a personal following among younger priests in his previous position as auxiliary bishop of Copacabana in Rio, Dom Valdir is known as a quiet, even-minded cleric with more of a pastoral than a social-revolutionary bent. In December 1967 four students (two of whom were living in the bishop's house) borrowed his station-wagon and used it to hand out leaflets denouncing the government. A few hours later, four soldiers brandishing machine-guns broke into the bishop's home, ransacked it for more "subversive material," and threatened Dom Valdir with arrest.† The bishop responded by printing a list of Brazil's "seven capital sins," which included low wages, unemployment, discrimination, hunger, and disease. After the army seized all copies of the handbills and jailed two priests who were distributing them, the Brazilian Bishops' Conference issued a public protest which, characteristically, emphasized social issues. Citing the "painful picture" of social inequality and injustice inherited by Brazil, the bishops stressed that "we must do our duty toward forming the conscience of our congregation, so they shall rise to an apostolic activity producing the necessary changes. . . . The preparing of laymen to accomplish this mission with courage, according to the insistent appeals of the Pope, is not a subversive activity. On the contrary, it is a contribution to true peace, which is unobtainable without a just social order. . . . We are conscious that a large part of our population regards the Church as one of their last hopes. We are anguished by the limited means at our disposal. It is not within our province to make certain decisions, which are urgent and unavoidable. . . . We do not have the resources to reduce poverty. But we are willing to cooperate, chiefly through laymen, in projects of human development, so that in a short time all paternalistic aid may be replaced."**

Partly as a result of statements like this one, the bishops have served to fill the political vacuum created by the rise of a right-wing military dictatorship and by the failure and near-disappearance of the country's traditional politicians. (The political role of an intelligent and publicly-active Brazilian bishop may be compared with that of a key U.S. Senator, except that the latter is elected

* This story is told in Robert D. Crassweller's excellent biography, *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator*, pp. 382-83.

† On December 4, 1969, Dom Valdir was indicted for subversion by a military court after he had charged that a labor leader at the government steel mill in Volta Redonda had been tortured during interrogation.

** From "Bispos Apóiam Padres contra Acao Militar," in *Correio da Manha*, Rio de Janeiro, December 1, 1967.

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for six years while a bishop is appointed for life and is removable only by the Pope.) Although fewer than forty of Brazil's two-hundred bishops are spokesmen for the most "advanced" Church views, the progressive bishops include in their ranks many of the more educated clerics and have therefore, despite their small numbers, been able to exert a powerful influence over the broad, uncommitted majority; they have exercised a similar influence in the councils of CELAM, whose current President is a Brazilian, Dom Avelar Brandao of Teresina.

The rhetorical radicalism of the Brazilian hierarchy reached a peak of sorts in the pastoral letters of 1962-63, issued just prior to the 1964 military coup that ousted President Joao Goulart. At that time both the lay and clerical Catholic leadership reflected, in addition to the instruction of Pope John's social encyclicals, the teaching of French Catholic philosophers like Jacques Maritain, whose *humanisme intégral* profoundly influenced the writings of Alceu Amoroso Lima, Brazil's foremost Catholic thinker and for many years the leader of Catholic Action. The younger generation of Brazilian Catholics also developed a strong interest in the personalist philosophy of Emmanuel Mounier, founder and editor of the French journal *Esprit*, who, like Maritain, elaborated upon and to some extent influenced the social teaching of the Church. At the same time, the Brazilian hierarchy was being swept along by the powerful and radical lay movements that became a major force in the somewhat chaotic social effervescence of the Goulart years (1961-64). This radical thrust was concentrated in the elite youth sections of Catholic Action—known by their initials: JUC (university students), JEC (secondary students), and JOC (young workers)—which were strongly influenced by the young, progressive priests (many of them French, Dutch, and German missionaries) who served as their advisers. Many of these young people came under the intellectual persuasion of a Brazilian Jesuit theologian, Padre Henrique C. de Lima Vaz, who has produced widely-read commentaries on Hegel and Marx as well as on Pope John's encyclicals. In 1968 the Catholic university movement, JUC, decided to enter student politics; prior to 1964 the last four presidents of the National Student Union (UNE) were Catholic Action leaders, working with the Communists in a coalition in which the Catholics were the stronger and more radical partner.

Emanuel de Kadt, a British sociologist studying Brazilian Catholicism, reported that during the early 60's "most bishops were simply overwhelmed by the political and social happenings, leaving the hierarchy divided and unable to come down forcefully on one side or the other. It had something to do with the fear, quite widespread among Catholics, of being left behind in the overall trend toward reform. As a result, even some of the less wholeheartedly progressive Catholic leaders were willing to let a section of the Church get implicated in the wider radical movement. They regretted, certainly more than the young people themselves, the ideological weakness of those jumping on the bandwagon. These middle-of-the road churchmen gave warning of the dangers of naiveté, but had few, if any, positive and concretely helpful suggestions."* In 1962, after the militant Catholic Action leaders were finally warned by the bishops that their more aggressive political activities were compromising the Church as a whole, a new political organization, Açao Popular, was formed with many of its militants retaining membership in their respective Catholic Action groups. After the 1964 coup, many Catholics involved in UNE and Açao Popular, including priests, were imprisoned or forced to leave the country. The military regime's inquiry into subversion in UNE produced an indictment of 712 students and two priests, Padre Vaz and Frei Matteus Rocha, former head of the Dominican Order. Padre Francisco Lage, a priest accused of organizing labor unions and advising Açao Popular, was sentenced to twenty-eight years in jail and then allowed to escape to Mexico.

Since 1964 the principal theater of the Church-State conflict has been the Brazilian Northeast, which, with a population of about thirty million, is the most extensive and populous area of extreme poverty in Latin America. The Northeast consists of the so-called drought polygon of the semi-desert *sertao*, as well as the coastal strip, *zona de mata*, inhabited by descendants of both indigenous peoples and African slaves imported to work the region's sugar plantations. The social structure is still that of the 400-year-old sugar economy, though the industry has declined steadily since the abolition of slavery a century ago. Although the scarcity of arable land forced most of the freed slaves to remain on the plantations as subsistence-wage peons, some were drawn away by the 19th-century rubber boom in the Amazon, and others in recent years have migrated to the more prosperous and industrialized areas of southern Brazil around Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In the Northeast, roughly three-fourths of the population cannot read or write. In this primitive region the average church parish is 300 square miles, with more than 16,000 inhabitants for each priest: it is no wonder that the area abounds in magical folk religions with African roots and in messianic cults built around legendary revivalist preachers who have roamed the *sertao*.

The luxuriant growth of revivalist cults in the Northeast, together with the violent, chronic al-

* From "Religion, the Church, and Social Change in Brazil," reprinted as CIDOC Document 68/73 (Cuernavaca, 1968), p. 73/21.

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ternations of rain and drought, have contributed to a kind of lyric extremism in both politics and religion.* In the Pernambuco revolution of 1817, local priests were the revolutionary leaders and champions of social reform. In 1874 a civil war swept the *sertao* in protest against the new metric system of weights and measures. In November 1935 the Brazilian Communist party engineered barracks revolts in the Northeastern garrisons of Natal and Recife; the revolt failed for lack of coordination with other plotters in the south.

Under the primitive conditions that prevail in the Northeast, perhaps any proposal for meaningful change might smack of "extremism," which may be why the imaginative Church-sponsored radio literacy campaign, the Basic Education Movement (MEB), has come under severe attack for combining literacy education with a novel program of *conscientizacao*: instilling in the peasant a consciousness of his condition and rights. Just prior to the 1964 military takeover, the MEB—financed by the Ministry of Education—had 470 full-time employees providing daily broadcast lessons to some 180,000 peasants over 25 radio stations. Although it was organized and supervised by a Council of Bishops, MEB was run entirely by laymen, many of whom had been involved in the Catholic Action youth movements. Even before the 1964 coup, however, MEB's literacy manuals—stored in Rio de Janeiro for distribution in the Northeast—were confiscated because of their objectionable content, under orders of Carlos Lacerda, the right-wing Governor of Guanabara state. Since the coup, MEB has been limping along without federal support; the inventor of its *conscientizacao* techniques, Paulo Freire, has been forced into exile in Chile, where he has developed an international reputation in adult education. The Church-sponsored peasant *sindicato* movement in the Northeast has likewise been paralyzed since 1964 due to opposition by the army and harrassment by landlords' private gangs, though the priests who advise the peasant movement have remained as the only leadership available for the past six years. The Church clearly has been involved in a holding operation in the Northeast since 1964, a position which has become increasingly difficult to maintain as Church-State conflicts have sharpened.

The principal figure in this holding operation is Dom Helder Camara, the Archbishop of Recife and Olinda, who is Latin America's best-known cleric and probably the most popular public figure in Brazil. A small, wispy Northeasterner, he held the key post of Secretary-General of the National Council of Brazilian Bishops during the 1962-63 period when, it will be recalled, the bishops produced their most dramatic statements on social questions. Dom Helder assumed his present position—which amounts, in effect, to acting as Primate of the Northeast—a few days after the April 1964 coup. Shortly thereafter he was denounced by General Itebere Gouvea do Amaral as being "on the side of leftism" and for "taking pleasure in appearing on TV with excesses of histrionics and clownish attitudes." The general also charged that "the analysis of Communist organizations on the balance of forces opposing the [military] power seizure considers the disorganized Catholic Church in Pernambuco [the state forming Dom Helder's archdiocese] ripe for infiltration." During my visit to Recife not long ago, Dom Helder was being sued for libel by a labor lawyer who was offended at a speech the Archbishop had made before a *sindicato* of sugar peons in the nearby town of Cabo, in which he urged the peasants to "repel as traitors the union leaders who receive money from bosses to make the worker accept unjust and immoral contracts. If the workers opened their eyes, they would discover that, besides honest lawyers, there are parasites enriching themselves from the tears, blood, and sweat of the workers, receiving money from worker and employer, endorsing contracts so unjust that they draw the curse of God."

Despite his flair for publicity, Dom Helder appears in some ways to be a very traditional churchman: thus, he paternalistically dispenses charity to the poor through personal contacts, whereas other progressive bishops favor social-mobilization programs. A leader of the avant-garde at the Vatican Council, Dom Helder has been a personal friend of Pope Paul since 1950 when, still an ordinary priest, he approached the then Msgr. Giovanni Montini with a bold reorganization plan for the Brazilian Church; he has since been careful to remain publicly on the correct side of the Pope on the critical issues of celibacy and birth control. At the Pope's request, Dom Helder has recently been urging the adoption by Brazilian Catholics of the techniques of non-violent rebellion developed by Dr. Martin Luther King.

DURING MY visit to Recife I had an opportunity to put some questions to Dom Helder and to obtain an elaboration of his widely-discussed views on the Church and revolution. "Within the effort for creation of a theology

* Euclides da Cunha's literary classic, *O Sertao*, quotes this description from 1877 of the most famous of the backland preachers: "There has appeared in the northern backlands an individual who goes by the name of Antonio Conselheiro, and who exerts a great influence over the minds of the lower classes, making use of his mysterious trappings and ascetic habits to impose upon their ignorance and simplicity. He lets his beard and hair grow long, wears a cotton tunic, and eats sparingly, being almost a mummy in aspect. Accompanied by a couple of women followers, he lives by reciting beads and litanies, by preaching, and by giving counsel to the multitudes that come to hear him when the local Church authorities permit it. Appealing to their religious sentiments, he draws them after him in throngs and moves them at his will."

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of development, one must mold a long chapter for the theology of revolution," he told me. "What I have read until today is not easy to apply to the enormous diversity of worlds in which an apparently unitary Latin America is unfolding. The presence of the Church in social movements is very old. What is really new is the angle in which the Church places itself. Christianity in Latin America recognizes its great part of responsibility for situations of injustice in which a great part of the human masses find themselves, in a state of internal colonialism, in infra-human conditions. What looks like a mixture of political mysticism and religious mysticism, what reminds us of our social leadership, is a thirst to recuperate lost time and pay for the sin of omission."

When I asked what he considered the most important work of the Church in his archdiocese, Dom Helder copied out for me in his small handwriting an excerpt from an article by a Spanish theologian, Padre José Maria Gonzalez Ruiz of Málaga:

> We Christians have important tasks in the construction of a world being born and which is heading for a socialist solution. In this construction of socialism we Christians have no concrete technical solution: the experience of 2,000 years teaches us that the *civitas humana* should not be absorbed by the Church. The Church does not have the mission of creating its own *civitas* in which the Gospel is converted into an economic, social, and political code. The *civitas* should be built with its own autonomous means. . . . The Christian should commit himself to the socialist revolution without technical misconceptions and without stressing his role as a believer, but giving at the same time his notable contribution of mystique for universal brotherhood and total hope. Because—and this must be known—socialism never will be built with a sectarian call to the blind fatalism of a mechanically-conceived history. Socialism is an option of the free creative will of man and, for the realization of this option, the Gospel has served and continues to serve as an impulse of immense efficacy.

Dom Helder apologized for the length of the citation—"but it faithfully relates the thought that illuminates the work of the Church in our archdiocese," he concluded.

These views, which enjoy considerable support among younger laymen, bishops, and priests, in Brazil and the rest of Latin America, give such primacy to the achievements of social justice as to undermine seriously the Church's more traditional associations and alliances in temporal society. For this reason, moreover, the Brazilian Church has been undergoing an internal crisis in its confrontation with the current military dictatorship, one that is curiously analogous to the inner stresses within the dictatorship itself. The situation, too, has been aggravated by the increase of political terrorism over the past year. On May 27, 1969 the body of Padre Antonio Henrique Pereira Netto was found hanging from a tree on the campus of the University of Recife, with three bullet wounds in his head and deep slashes in his throat from a *faca peixeira*, a long knife used by fishermen in the Northeast. The young priest was a professor of sociology at the university and director of Catholic youth movements in the state of Pernambuco, and his murder was preceded by the slaying a month before of a Catholic student leader, Candido Pinto. Both killings were attributed to a right-wing terrorist group called the Communist-Hunting Commandos, which began operating around Recife in early 1969 and whose list of thirty-two Catholic leaders marked for death included the names of Padre Pereira, Dom Helder, and the auxiliary bishop of Recife, Dom José de Lamartine. Also in 1969 the residences of Dom Helder and Angelo Cardinal Rossi, Archbishop of Sao Paulo, were twice shot up.

In November 1969 several priests and friars were implicated in the leftist violence during the investigations that followed the kidnapping of the U.S. Ambassador two months earlier. (Ambassador Elbrick was freed after a few days, when Brazilian authorities gave in to the kidnappers' demand that fifteen specified political prisoners be flown into exile in Mexico.) The man sought as the kidnappers' ringleader, a former Communist Deputy named Carlos Marighela, was killed in a gun battle with police November 4, after authorities used two Dominican priests, arrested a week before, as the bait to draw Marighela into a police trap. Since then, the government has charged that religious seminaries and monasteries are being used to prepare subversive literature and to provide hiding places for terrorists seeking to escape to neighboring countries. In response, Church authorities have criticized the involvement of priests in political violence and terrorism as "anti-evangelical," while at the same time denouncing arrests and tortures by the government.

These developments show how deeply the Church is being drawn into the conflict that has been polarizing Brazilian society. Despite its hesitations and internal divisions, the Church provides the only institutional opposition to the increasingly unpopular military regime. Growing political instability—the armed forces on several occasions have set aside their own constitution in order to accommodate internal pressures—has strengthened the hand of a leftist-nationalist military faction that is influenced, in part, by the progressive wing of the Church. The Brazilian case, although not unique, is the outstanding example in Latin America of the way in which the Church, by putting the social doctrines issuing from the *aggiornamento* to an immediate and dangerous test, has assumed a central role in a conflict whose end cannot be seen.

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III

QUITE PROBABLY there would be no Catholic renewal in many countries of Latin America today without the Jesuits, whose famous energies are now being directed almost exclusively toward achieving social justice. Their chief instrument for this purpose are the centers for research and social action—Centro de Investigación y Acción (CIAS)—which the Society of Jesus has established in all of its Latin American provinces. The social-action effort has gained further impetus from the leadership in Rome of Padre Pedro Arrupe, a Spaniard who in 1964 became the Society's Father-General. (The Jesuits' new activity, it should be noted, has been promoted at the expense of the order's more traditional educational activities oriented toward the training of elites: some Jesuit schools and colleges in Europe have been closed to free staffs for missionary work in Latin America.) At a meeting in Rio de Janeiro in May 1968, after reviewing the entire Jesuit operation in Latin America, Padre Arrupe and the Society's seventeen Latin American province-heads sent a letter to the nearly 5,000 Jesuits working in the region, which proclaimed in part: "We wish to conceive the totality of our apostolic mission as focusing on the social problem. We wish to avoid any attitude of exclusiveness or domination. We wish to adopt an attitude of service in the Church and Society, rejecting the image of power that frequently is attributed to us. . . ."

For the greater part of this century, the Chilean Jesuits were identified with an aristocratic secondary school in Santiago, the Colegio San Ignacio. About ten years ago, however, several Jesuits concerned with social problems broke away to form, within the CIAS framework, the Centro Bellarmino, which has since become the most influential Jesuit institution in Chile and is a striking example of what a small group of highly-trained Jesuits can accomplish. This community of eighteen priests has generated sufficient influence in the Chilean Catholic hierarchy to make it the most progressive in Latin America. Moreover, they have critically influenced the growth of the Christian Democratic party, helping to transform it from a tiny splinter faction into the ruling party it has been under President Eduardo Frei (his term expires later this year). The members of the Centro Bellarmino form a battery of specialists in sociology, trade unionism, theology, communications, housing, and land reform, and over the years they have served as advisors to the Chilean bishops on social questions. Besides publishing the influential magazine *Mensaje*, the Centro Bellarmino operates an impressive variety of social and research programs.

The impact of the CIAS social-action program is also strong in the smaller, more backward republics. In Paraguay, for example, where the dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner has remained virtually unchallenged for fifteen years, a major Church-State conflict has developed over the regime's efforts to extend its control over the Jesuit-run Catholic University, which had become a center of anti-government opposition, and to expel from the country five Spanish Jesuits holding key professional and administrative positions. One of these was Padre José Miguel Munárriz, managing editor of the Church's official weekly newspaper, *Comunidad*, which occasionally printed editorials critical of the regime and which had been closed by government order while most of the Paraguayan hierarchy was away attending the 1968 CELAM Latin American bishops' conference in Medellin, Colombia.

The Spanish Jesuits in Paraguay have been a major force in the *aggiornamento* of the traditionally weak and submissive Paraguayan hierarchy; they have also organized Catholic peasant leagues and advised in the formation of a small but vigorous Christian Democratic opposition party. While the Stroessner regime was pressuring diplomatically in Rome for the transfer of the five Jesuits mentioned above, the Paraguayan bishops opened a public campaign for the release or trial of political prisoners who had been held for several years without formal charges. The Paraguayan hierarchy then issued a pastoral letter bluntly attacking a newly promulgated security law for its "consecration of a form of absolute totalitarianism that has been condemned many times by the Supreme Pontiffs in the name of social morality." These maneuvers continued until a climax was reached on October 22, 1969, when Padre Francisco de Paula Oliva, one of the more influential Jesuit professors, was called to police headquarters and summarily deported from the country; police then beat up and dispersed a number of students, priests, and professors who had gathered on university grounds to protest the expulsion. Three priests were injured. The Archbishop of Asunción responded with an announcement that, according to canon law, "the authorities that ordered the beatings given the priests have been excommunicated."

IV

AS I HAVE noted, dissent and disarray are threatening the future of the Latin American priesthood. One of the more dramatic examples of clerical rebellion is the case of Padre Camilo Torres, who was killed in February 1966 in a clash with an army patrol in the mountains of eastern Colombia, where he was leading a Castroite guerrilla band. The story of young Torres, a son of one of Bogotá's socially prominent families, also serves to point up the continuing crisis in Colombian society, the most clerically-oriented in Latin America today. Torres's death occurred just a few months after he had been released (at his own request) from all

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priestly vows, save that of celibacy, following an ugly public dispute over social doctrine with the aged Archbishop of Bogotá, Luis Cardinal Concha Cordova. This was also shortly after the conclusion of Vatican II, whose liberating effects led, in Bogotá, to a rebellion of the younger members of lower clergy against the reactionary Cardinal, which in turn prompted an inspection visit from a representative of the Roman Curia and Cardinal Concha's retirement a few months later.

Meanwhile, Colombia was passing through difficult times. A sharp decline in coffee export earnings had cut in half the dollar value of the Colombian peso; political insiders were speculating in cheap official dollars, while factories were closing for lack of foreign exchange to finance imports of raw materials; a number of sensational kidnap murders of wealthy citizens had occurred during the year, and a Castroite guerrilla insurrection had begun in the mountains of eastern Colombia; electoral abstentions had reached as high as 70 per cent of the eligible voters in the previous election; the Liberal-Conservative "National Front" pact to end the *violencia* (the tribal warfare between the two parties that from 1948 and 1958 had cost an estimated 200,000 lives) threatened to come apart as powerful splinter groups developed in both parties. The government showed little capacity to stop the downward slide, and in the middle of 1965 Torres's political appeals began to catch on. "The revolutionary struggle is a Christian and priestly struggle," he declared. "I am a revolutionary because I am a priest and because I am a Catholic. The Colombian Church is one of the most backward in the world."

While traveling through Colombia on a reporting trip in August 1965, I accompanied Camilo Torres on one of his speaking tours to Cali, a tropical city near the Pacific coast, which has become an industrial mecca and refuge from the *violencia* for hundreds of thousands of peasants from Colombia's western departments. "For me there was no possibility of compromise with the Church, because the Church has always been with the oligarchy, and continues that way," he told me. "Believe me, many young priests feel as I do, but cannot express themselves. We are forming a United Front with the Communists, the Christian Democrats, and the left-wing of the Movimiento Liberal Revolucionario (MRL). They have accepted my platform of agrarian reform, of urban reform that will convert all tenants into homeowners, and nationalization of hospitals, radio and television stations, and the country's natural resources. We would agree to a plebiscite to end the National Front;* but we would abstain from any other election because in Colombia there is no free vote."

The thirty-six-year-old suspended priest, who had been immensely popular as a chaplain and professor of sociology at the National University in Bogotá, was to speak in a small plaza near the newly-created slum of El Rodeo. Torres's meetings had been drawing consistently larger attendance than either of the major parties had been able to attract in many years, and although he arrived two hours late, a big crowd was waiting patiently for him. The crowd began to drift away, however, as his speech dragged on. Torres's oratory was full of Marxist cant—"masses," "revolution," "oligarchy," "agrarian reform"—which often tends more to bore and irritate an audience of poor people than to win their involvement and support. By the time he finished speaking half the crowd had dispersed.

Within a month after this appearance, Torres's United Front showed clear signs of falling apart. Under pressure from the Church hierarchy, the tiny Christian Democratic party and the radical Catholic trade-unionists who had supported him began publicly to condemn his alliance with the Communists, the only organized party not to deny him its support. Torres's public appearances became less and less frequent until they stopped altogether toward the end of 1965. After he disappeared entirely from public view, it was rumored that he had gone to Cuba; another report had him resting "for reasons of health" in some remote *hacienda*. In early 1966 a communiqué signed by Torres circulated in Bogotá: "I have joined the armed struggle. From these Colombian mountains I intend to continue the struggle with weapons in hand, until power is conquered for my people. I have joined the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) because I have found in the ELN the same ideals as the United Front." He died a month later in the *municipio* of San Vicente de Chucurí, a primitive region deeply scarred by years of the *violencia*, where ELN guerrillas are still operating.

SINCE HIS DEATH Torres has come to be venerated by many Latin American Catholics as a martyred saint who fell in the struggle for social justice; a cult has grown up around his memory very much like the one around the memory of Che Guevara. To others, however, the death of Camilo Torres has become symbolic of the general process of dissolution in the Latin American priesthood after the Vatican Council. The future of the priesthood in virtually every republic is threatened by numerous resignations from the clergy and the near-total lack of priestly vocations among the young. Beyond this the various hierarchies are hard-pressed to handle the many rebellions issuing from the ranks of the younger priests. In Cali not long ago a group of priests organized marches to protest the "extortion

* Under the 1958 agreement the Liberals and Conservatives have undertaken to share equally for sixteen years the Presidency, governmental appointments, and parliamentary representation, to the exclusion of all other parties.

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against the people" represented by an increase in bus fares. During 1969 four Spanish priests and an American nun were expelled from Colombia for allegedly inciting student disturbances; some of them were associated with a group of thirty-nine priests and the young bishop of Buenaventura, known as the Golconda Group, which had issued a document calling for a "socialist society" in Colombia and "an increase in revolutionary action against imperialism and the neo-colonial bourgeoise."* About this time Church authorities also closed the Colegio Marymount, a fashionable girls' school run by American nuns, because of Marxist tendencies among its student and faculty.

In Argentina, where another conservative Church hierarchy presides, 283 clergymen belonging to a group called "Priests of the Third World" signed a document last April, proclaiming their support of the twenty-eight priests in Rosario, Argentina's second city, who had resigned their posts in protest against the "insensitivity" of Archbishop Guillermo Bolatti, who had dismissed a priest in a workers' district for implementing one of the liturgical innovations of Vatican II. In another protest in Rosario, 4,500 parishioners signed a letter to Pope Paul backing the dissident priests, whom the Archbishop had called "Marxists" and "subversives." In July five persons suffered bullet wounds when police broke up a demonstration protesting the arrival of a replacement for the dismissed priest. Earlier, the Archbishop of Cordoba was forced to resign his post following a similar conflict. Faced with intransigent young priests citing the papal encylicals and the documents of CELAM and the Vatican Council, conservative national hierarchies, such as those of Colombia and Argentina, have often been forced to yield.

THE RADICALIZATION of large numbers of priests has led in turn to some radical innovations in the symbolic language of the Church. For example, the Chilean Jesuit magazine *Mensaje*, in an editorial published on the eve of Pope Paul's 1968 Latin American journey, compared the death of Che Guevara with that of Christ. This much-discussed editorial attempted to deal with the moral problem of revolutionary violence by turning "martyred" guerrilla leaders such as Che Guevara or Camilo Torres into Christ-figures, who "died for men" while struggling against the injustices and cruelties of Latin American society. Another example of this sanctification of violence is afforded by the "manifesto" issued by a group of priests in Higüey, one of the poorest rural dioceses of the Dominican Republic: "The violence (so much feared) is already among us. When a peasant with many children who are hungry and naked, without house or school, looks at his children, he must turn to violence; when he looks at the great extensions of pangola grass, he must turn to violence; when he sees the well-tended pastures, where the animals are better-fed than his own children, this peasant must turn to violence. . . ."†

Both the *Mensaje* editorial and the Higüey manifesto appeared around the time of the 1968 Medellin conference of CELAM, sometimes called Latin America's own Vatican Council, which went on record as saying that "Latin America finds itself in a situation of injustice that could be called institutional violence, because the present structures violate fundamental rights." The same position was articulated somewhat more graphically by a former Maryknoll priest, Thomas Melville, after he and three other American missionaries (including a Maryknoll nun whom he later married) were expelled from Guatemala, after fifteen years' work among the highland Indians, for having provided assistance to a Castroite guerrilla movement. Melville wrote: "Having come to the conclusion that the actual state of violence, composed of the malnutrition, ignorance, sickness and hunger of the vast majority of the Guatemalan population, is the direct result of a capitalist system that makes the defenseless Indian compete against the powerful and well-armed landowner, my brother** and I decided not to be silent accomplices of the mass murder that this system generates. We began teaching the Indians that no one will defend their rights, if they do not defend themselves. If the government and the oligarchy are using arms to maintain them in their position of misery, then they have the obligation to take up arms and defend their God-given rights to be men."‡

Most of the recent Catholic discussion regarding the necessity and legitimacy of revolutionary violence hinges on the following paragraph from Pope Paul's 1967 encyclical, *Populorum Progressio* (On the Development of Peoples):

> There are certainly situations whose injustice cries out to heaven. When whole populations destitute of necessities live in a state of dependence barring them from all initiative and responsibility, and from all opportunity to advance culturally and share in social and political life, recourse to violence, as a means to right these wrongs to human dignity, is a grave temptation. We know, however, that a revolutionary uprising—*save where there is manifest, long-standing tyranny which would do great damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good of the country*—produces new injustices, throws more elements out of balance and brings on new disasters. A real

* From "Segundo Encuentro del Grupo Sacerdotal de Golconda," in *SIC*, No. 312, Caracas, February 1969.

† From "Manifiesto de los Curas de Higüey," in *SIC*, No. 315, May 1969.

** Arthur Melville, also a former Maryknoll missionary, who was expelled from Guatemala with Sister Marion Peter Bradford (whom Thomas Melville married) and Father Blase Bonpane.

‡ From "Revolution Is Guatemala's Only Solution," in the *National Catholic Reporter*, January 31, 1968, p. 5.

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evil should not be fought against at the cost of greater misery. We want to be clearly understood: the present situation must be faced with courage and the injustices linked with it must be fought against and overcome. Development demands bold transformations, innovations that go deep. Urgent reforms should be undertaken without delay. (Italics added.)

The key words, of course, are contained in the italicized clause, which repeats a concept that can trace its theological lineage back to St. Thomas Aquinas, who formulated the Church's classic position on revolution.* The Pope's pronouncement has been welcomed by progressive priests and bishops who, while not advocating violence, believe it may be inescapable in achieving the sweeping social changes advocated in the encyclical. Consequently, however, there has been sufficient speculation on the advisability of violence to cause Pope Paul to express some reservations on the subject, and three of the four speeches he delivered in Bogotá in 1968 contained pointed warnings against revolutionary violence.

V

The Church's social involvement of recent years, for all the hope it holds out to Latin America, is nevertheless proving to be a mixed blessing for the hierarchical authority. A good case in point is the situation in Chile, where the national hierarchy published in 1962 a momentous pastoral letter, "On Social and Political Responsibility in the Present Hour," which was credited with helping pave the way for the triumph of the Christian Democratic party over a Communist-Socialist coalition in the 1964 Presidential election. But after this triumph, and after having changed its popular image by donating all its lands for distribution among the peasants, the hierarchy yet finds itself losing traditional ground—to an extent where the Chilean bishops were recently constrained to speak out against the effects and consequences of liberalization: "weakened feeling for God, deterioration of the spiritual life and abandonment of the sacraments, arbitrary acts introduced into the liturgy, . . . ideological confusion, and in particular a 'secularization' that is ill-understood and built on a doctrine that substitutes the evangelizing mission for a mere strategy of social promotion with vocabulary and method taken from an openly atheistic ideology." This lament of the Chilean bishops brings into question the role of ecclesiastical authority in a situation of inevitable change; indeed, it is the opinion of many that the shrinking celibate priesthood cannot for long resist the transfer of responsibility to leaders emerging from the lay community of the faithful, since in many areas of Latin America there is simply no other alternative if the Church is to survive. Moreover, some signs indicate that the new popular sovereignty will increasingly be associated with a spontaneous "prophetism" that will challenge the intercession of an ecclesiastical bureaucracy in matters of interpreting divine revelation. These certain eventualities are inherent in the insistent demands being voiced today—that the Pope share power with the bishops, that "the People of God" as a whole participate in the choice of bishops (who are now appointed by Rome), and that the priesthood be opened to exemplary married believers whose authority derives from the community they serve.

Whatever new forms may evolve, it is abundantly clear that the present ecclesiastical structures have been considerably weakened. Indeed, the Church is quite visibly shaken, and one would be hard-pressed to say what arouses Rome's greater inquietude, the crisis in religious discipline or the social-revolutionary spirit that has been unleashed by the *aggiornamento*. Be that as it may, sometimes the two tendencies—they are undoubtedly complementary—unite in the person of a powerful advocate. Such a person is Ivan Illich, a forty-three-year-old, Vienna-born American Monsignor of Jewish-Croatian parentage. In 1961, Illich founded the Centro Intercultural de Documentacion (CIDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexico, an institute for the training of missionaries bound for Latin America, for the publication of books and pamphlets on Latin American society, and for conferences of intellectuals concerned with hemispheric affairs. Prior to this, Illich had obtained a PhD in history at Salzburg, studied theology at the Gregorian University in Rome, and was apparently headed for a career in the Vatican diplomatic service when, rather abruptly, he turned up as a priest in a Puerto Rican parish of the Washington Heights section of Manhattan. Here he became a protégé of the late Francis Cardinal Spellman, who supported him in his subsequent troubles with the Vatican Curia. At the age of thirty-one, Illich became a Monsignor and, leaving New York, was appointed Vice-Rector of the Catholic University in Puerto Rico, where he remained for five years until he quarreled with Bishop James MacManus of Ponce over the Church's intervention in the 1960 Puerto Rican election.

Illich's reputation as an iconoclast—it is this that aroused the wrath of the Curia—derives primarily, however, from two magazine articles he published in 1967. In "The Seamy Side of Charity" (*America*, January 21, 1967), he wrote with unconcealed scorn: "If North America and Eu-

* "The tyrannical regime is not just, for not orienting itself toward the common good, but toward the private good of the ruler, as one reads in the Philosopher [Aristotle]. For this reason, the disturbance of such a regime cannot be called sedition, if it is not disturbed in such a disorderly way that the tyrannized multitude suffers more injury with the uprising than with the tyrannical regime." St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 2-2-42.

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rope send enough priests [to Latin America] to fill the vacant parishes, there is no need to consider laymen—unpaid for part-time work—to fulfill most evangelical tasks; no need to re-examine the structure of the parish, the function of the priest, the Sunday obligation and clerical sermon; no need for exploring the use of the married deaconate, new forms of celebration of the Word and Eucharist and intimate familiar celebrations of conversion to the Gospel in the milieu of the home." In "The Vanishing Clergyman" (the *Critic*, June-July 1967), Illich's contribution to the celibacy debate, he drew this unpromising picture:

> . . . A large segment of the thinking Church questions the tie between the celibacy and the priesthood. The Pope insists on their connection. Neither doctrine nor tradition give definitive support to his position. I believe that the emergence of a new pastoral Church depends largely on compliance with his directive during our generation. His position helps assure the speedy death of the clergy. . . . Thousands of priests now reject celibacy, and present the painful spectacle of men trained for sexual abstinence groping belatedly into big-risk marriage. The Church dispenses of them secretly, arbitrarily, and awkwardly. They are forbidden further exercise of their orders. Having chosen marriage, they *could* still exercise priestly functions, but they would cease to be models—except perhaps to others like themselves.

What happened thereafter has been widely reported. First, CIDOC became the object of various ecclesiastical investigations as a suspected center of dangerous leftist and heterodox activities. Then, in June 1968 Illich was summoned to Rome for a secret appearance before the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (the former Holy Office), where he was interrogated by Franjo Cardinal Seper, the Congregation's head and a fellow Croatian. This was followed by Illich's refusal to take a secrecy vow or to answer any questions unless given a written copy of all the charges against him. Illich was then handed a bizarre list of 85 inquisitorial charges put as questions.* He responded by writing a letter to Cardinal Seper, stating that he refused to answer because "a questionnaire of this type seems designed to wreck any hope of a human and Christian dialogue between the one judging and the one being judged." The curtain on the drama rang down with Seper's dismissal of Illich, in Croatian, with a line that echoed the words of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor: "Get thee hence, get thee hence, and do not come back." Despite a series of subsequent maneuvers by Illich to exempt himself and CIDOC from ecclesiastical control and the sanctions of canon law, the Vatican, in January 1969, forbade all bishops to send priests or nuns to CIDOC for missionary training; Illich then appealed his case directly to Pope Paul.†

THE PROSECUTION of Ivan Illich by the former Holy Office of the Vatican Curia cannot be separated from the general crisis in papal authority—which in practice also means the authority of the Roman Curia—that has agitated the Church since Vatican II, and that reached a climax at the Synod of Bishops which met in Rome last autumn. The growing impression is that the Vatican has now become afraid of the more radical effects of *aggiornamento*. Paul's image is no longer that of the winged Pope, making jet-age visits to India and Africa, Bogotá and New York, but of a quietly determined old man trying, in a last-ditch effort, to save the Church from the tumult it has generated within itself. During Easter Week of 1969, for instance, he warned of "a practically schismatic ferment that divides and subdivides the Church." On June 24, while commemorating the sixth anniversary of his reign, he spoke of the "grave dangers to the Church of God" posed by two key problems: "A diminished sense of doctrinal orthodoxy toward the repository of faith that the Church has inherited from its apostolic origin . . . [and] a certain diffuse lack of confidence toward the exercise of Our ministry which, under the mandate of Christ, united and guided the People of God on several levels." And on his visit to Bogotá in 1968, as we have seen, Pope Paul was pointedly reserved in his social utterances, avoiding repetition of the attacks on neo-colonialism, "liberal capitalism," and the "international imperialism of money" that he had made a year before in *Populorum Progressio*, and warning his Latin American audience against using the encyclical as a justification for violent revolution.

Nevertheless, for all his public agonizing over

* See Edward B. Fiske's interview with Illich in the New York *Times*, February 4, 1969, and texts of the Congregation's 85 questions and Illich's letter to Cardinal Seper in the *National Catholic Reporter*, February 12, 1969. Here are two samples from the 85 questions: "3: What do you say about those who say you are 'petulant, adventurous, imprudent, fanatical, and hypnotizing, a rebel to any authority, disposed to accept and recognize only that of the Bishop of Cuernavaca'? . . . 5: Is it true that by articles, interviews, and ambiguous theoretical and practical positions, by personal sympathies toward the political and social Left and a morbid understanding of ex-religious and ex-priests, you have fomented grave confusion in the souls and consciences of others, especially by assimilating Marxism to Christianity and by equating the celibate parochial clergy with the married deaconate?"

† A Vatican document reported in *Le Monde*, June 14, 1969 and in the *National Catholic Reporter*, June 25, 1969 said that "the Holy See . . . does not oppose attendance on an experimental basis, by priests and religious, at courses organized by CIDOC," but urged that Illich leave CIDOC and place the center under the control of CELAM and the Mexican Bishops' Conference. In a statement Illich referred to a March 15, 1969 letter to Cardinal Terrence J. Cooke of New York, saying: "In this letter I expressed what must continue to be my firm intention to govern all the decisions and actions of my life completely independently of any canonical authority, legislative or otherwise, special to the clergy."

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some of the directions in which the *aggiornamento* is taking the Church, Paul VI has been careful in most instances not to associate himself with the reactionary party in Vatican politics. Moreover, he cannot be unaware that, with the consolidation of social democracy in most of Western Europe and North America since World War II, Latin America is now the only Catholic region of the world where the Church's newly enunciated social teachings are being put to a serious test. Certainly the Vatican cannot turn its back on the public pressure for social justice generated in nation after nation by Latin American laymen, priests, and bishops. Despite instances of extremism, this development has issued in a fertile enrichment of Christian tradition in an area where it has been conspicuously weak. Although only about 10 per cent of the population attends Mass with any regularity, the Church in Latin America has returned to the center of public life with a social doctrine that has given it a prophetic role, and sometimes a polarizing role, in what remains an unjust and highly volatile society. The hierarchical Church remains too weak and poor to bring about by itself the changes it preaches. Nevertheless, it has learned over the years that its institutional charisma and solidarity can be greatest where its temporal pretensions are least. In the words of Ivan Illich, "I believe the specific task of the Church in the modern world is the Christian celebration of the experience of change." But, with or without this celebration, no one can be sure in what form the Church will survive. The agony of Catholicism seems likely to continue, with the Church caught between surrendering itself to a religious revolution of its own making, or fortifying itself in the traditional forms and usages that these days show diminishing power to sustain a living faith.

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

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This Aquarian Age

Milton Himmelfarb

A Pole in Denmark

THE INFLUENCE of wrong texts and interpretations: Magna Carta. Now we are taught that in its time Magna Carta was a defense of feudal powers and privileges against necessary central government, but the Englishmen who overthrew Stuart absolutism appealed in good conscience to the precedent of the Great Charter of liberty under law. Or Shakespeare: for the authorities, the last time I looked, Hamlet's too, too solid flesh was too, too sullied. And so with that verse in Job, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him." Bible scholars now prefer "let Him slay me, I will not quail" (reading *lo'* "not" with the *kethibh* rather than *lo'* "to him" with the *qere* and transposing *'yhl* to *'hyl*).

Job affirms God's justice. At a burial a mourner recites the *zidduq ha-din*, the justification of the Judgment, beginning with Deuteronomy 32:4: "The Rock, His doing is perfect;/Indeed, all His ways are justice." When the mourner goes home he must not *lern*: learning Torah—which of course is not only Pentateuch, and not only Bible, but also the whole corpus of Rabbinical literature—is a delight (Ps. 119:70: "I delight in Thy Torah") and therefore forbidden to him, together with less recondite delights. But there is a way out. Since it would be cruel to withhold Torah from a Jew altogether, a distinction is made between studying Torah, which remains forbidden, and merely reading in the Bible, which is permitted, provided the reading is appropriately somber: Job, for instance. Job, after rejecting conventional theodicy, ends by affirming a divine justice invisible to human eyes.

"Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him" has always been understood to teach the faithfulness unto death. Its rhythm has affected even Juliusz Katz-Suchy's thought and speech. Banished by the Communist government of Poland as a Zionist—i.e., as a Jew—Katz-Suchy is now teaching at a Danish university. In Warsaw he was a professor of international relations. Earlier he had been Polish representative at the United Nations, where he was the consummate Stalinist. Then the order against Stalinism was passed down, and he dutifully became a liberal: what's in a name? What he could not become was a non-Jew, though the only thing Jewish about him was what he thought to be an irrelevant genealogical datum.

In Denmark Katz-Suchy has told a reporter that the anti-Jewish campaign in Poland, of which he is one of many victims, is used to "exploit presumed [!] anti-Semitism among Poles," but that "the presumption is an error. . . ." According to Freud, it is not when an intelligent man says an intelligent thing that he most reveals himself: what else should he say? He most reveals himself when he says a silly thing. A UN representative and university professor may be expected to have an IQ above rather than below 100. Yet not only does Katz-Suchy speak of presumed Polish anti-Semitism, he also says: "I am still a Pole and Poland will always be my country"; and, "Even if some of my ideas have let me down, I still believe in socialism. . . ."

For Katz-Suchy, socialism—that heavenly word, Mesopotamia—must mean Marxism. (Surely it cannot mean what Harold Wilson represents.) Among other things, Marxism means atheism. Marxist atheism is more than the philosophical negation of God. It is also the insistence on men's practical duty to negate God if they are to be men not babies, active not passive, autonomous not heteronomous, rational not irrational. If we are looking for theodicy, usually we do not go to a Marxist. Nevertheless, theodicy is the Marxist Katz-Suchy's matter and manner. Let us put the two affirmations side by side:

JOB	KATZ-SUCHY
concessive clause	
Though He slay me . . .	Even if some of my ideas have let me down . . .
apodosis	
. . . yet will I trust in Him. . . .	. . . I still believe in socialism. . . .

The structure is the same—with some slight literary superiority in Job—and so is the thought: above all, "trust in Him"="believe in socialism." And not the least of the irony is that Katz-Suchy's confession of faith corresponds not to the modern but to the traditional reading of that verse. The Marxist reveals himself as a pious, submissive believer—far more submissive, far less Promethean, than Job himself. (Marx was a Promethean.) Traditionalists and moderns agree

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that Job's verse ends, ". . . but I will argue my ways to His face." Katz-Suchy's sentence ends, ". . . the future is socialism."

How do you reason with a man who, in despite of all the evidence, wills himself to believe? Not the capitalist countries and, aside from the Arab states, not even the all but fascist ones are expelling and persecuting Jews. Some people deny that the Soviet Union and Poland are really socialist, but we have not heard Katz-Suchy deny it. A country that this socialist accepts as socialist persecutes and banishes him, and others like him, on racial grounds alone—for under his socialism, "Zionist" again means what "non-Aryan" meant under Nazism. One may almost say that the willfulness of Katz-Suchy's belief is Christian. It was from a Church Father and not a Rabbi that our stock of quotations received *credo quia absurdum*, "because it is absurd, I believe." Jewish believers have tried to be more reasonable than that. The Rabbis know of a foolish piety, and do not like it.

As for Katz-Suchy's pledge of allegiance—"I am still a Pole and Poland will always be my country"—two jokes are current:

1) The 8,000 Jews remaining in Poland have stood firm against successive opportunities, inducements, and pressures to emigrate. They are as Polish as Katz-Suchy, if that were possible, and as little Jewish. If tomorrow the borders of Poland were opened wide, all 32 million Poles would run—except those 8,000.

When Hitler came to power, Erich-Maria Remarque was one of the few German writers neither of the Left nor non-Aryan to go into exile. The Nazi Ministry of Culture cared not a whit about the non-Aryans or about Aryans like Heinrich and even Thomas Mann, distinguished though they were. Because the culture bureaucrats did care about Remarque, whose self-exile they thought damaging to the reputation of the New Germany, they sent an emissary to persuade him to return. The emissary warned Remarque that away from the German landscape—the literal, physical landscape and the figurative one of German speech and habit—a German, especially a German writer, must be homeless. "That would bring tears to my eyes," Remarque is said to have answered, "if I were a Jew."

2) Someone much like Katz-Suchy went to Israel. In Israel he would be a Polish Communist. In Poland he would be a dirty Jew.

A Very Troublesome Thing

A REPORT by Sidney E. Zion in the New York *Times* some months ago is too good to go the way of most newspaper reports:

> . . . the Law Center for Constitutional Rights [is] a coalition of experienced lawyers and young staff counsel who represent people and organizations in The Movement.

The Movement, of course, is the generic term covering antiwar protesters, Black Panthers, Students for a Democratic Society, the Student National Coordinating Committee, and antidraft groups and radicals in general. . . .

Since many of the law center's clients are Negroes who have expressed strong anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiment, the lawyers, most of whom are Jews, were asked how they felt about representing them.

"I find black anti-Semitism a very troublesome thing, it disturbs me very much," Mr. [So-and-so] said. "But we're lawyers, and we don't need to identify with the positions of our clients."

He said, however, that he would not want to represent white segregationists. . . .

Power to the People

TYPICALLY, Black Panthers and other black nationalists, or asserters of *négritude*, are not impressed by advice from Jews offered as success-story lessons from Jewish history—for example, the advantages of mutual aid. When our advice is not greeted with the respect or gratitude we know it deserves, we are hurt. Like the Gilbert and Sullivan character, we complain: "And yet everybody says I'm such a disagreeable man!/And I can't think why!" Maybe they would listen if we spoke of Jewish mistakes and failures.

"Power to the people!" the Panthers cry. If the slogan is meant to be taken literally, they are asking for trouble. An American referendum, the voice of the people, will be anti-black. Those least unfriendly to black men and women are not the people but the Constitution, the courts, the elites. Imagine the power of the American people not hedged about by the Constitution and all the rest, and imagine no impediments to a nationwide referendum about deporting blacks to Africa. A bettor might hesitate to offer even money on its defeat.

Since the Panthers know that as well as anyone, their slogan is not to be taken literally. The "people" of the slogan must be like the "people" in "people's democracy," a small fraction of the people. "Power to the people" means power for those who rule over the people to keep power from the people.

Why should revolutionaries want a government that keeps power from the people? Reword the question: why should they want "socialism"? Socialism is the remedy for a disease, capitalism. The ravages of capitalism are exploitation, poverty, inequality. Transparently opposed to the needs of the people, capitalism preserves itself by dividing the people, inciting national, religious, and racial hatreds. Only socialism will cure exploitation, poverty, and inequality, and only socialism has an interest not in cultivating but in uprooting national, religious, and racial hatreds.

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At the start, the wisest, most trustworthy part of the people see to it that the rest of the people shall not have power to indulge the depraved tastes they were seduced into by the capitalists in the bad old days; but soon, soon the masses, now temporarily being coerced toward virtue, will no longer need coercion. Made into new men by socialism, they will not be tempted by archaic vices. They will be immune both to selfish individualism and to national, religious, and racial hatred. Then they will be given their power. Soon, soon. In the meanwhile, to hasten the reign of virtue, the wise and trustworthy are busy in the jails and execution cellars.

What more piteous than a vigorous theory done in by an insensate fact? As Mr. Katz-Suchy's experience testifies, if not his words, the people in the people's democracies are so bossed around by "the people," so enraged by haughtiness and yammer and mess and cruelty, that they solace themselves by turning upon old enemies. Jews become doubly hateful, because conspicuous in the service of "the people." And "the people" do not mind if the masses blow off steam so harmlessly. After all, "the people" calculate—Stalin taught them—we can spare those Jews; they have served their purpose; you don't have to be Jewish to like being in the secret police, we can find replacements. If the masses do not themselves think of their old sport, we can give them a signal.

If "power to the people" ever happens in America, most Americans will hate more intensely than ever. To invert an expression of the civil-rights days, "there will be too many black faces": too many associated with intolerable reminders of "socialism" and "power to the people," too many —it is inevitable—beneath the helmets of "the people's" police (*Volkspolizei*). What better bone for the rulers of the American people's democracy to throw the masses, what better distraction, than to put the blame for everything on the blacks, to encourage a hatred of them that hardly needs encouragement, and finally to kick them out—but not all at once, because as whipping boys they are too valuable to let go of completely?

That is a Jewish lesson that Katz-Suchy and the 8,000 can teach.

Say this for the Panthers: it is not easy to picture one of *them*, hounded out by "the people" he had served, telling a Brazilian or Indonesian reporter, "I am still an American and America will always be my country"; or saying that the purpose of the anti-black campaign in "socialist" America was to exploit presumed racism among American whites, and that the presumption was an error.

Heaven and Hell

THE GALLUP organization has made public a poll it took in ten countries on what people believe will happen by 1990. Nine of the twelve things they were asked to prophesy about are good, like a cure for cancer, an end to the manufacture of atomic weapons, a doubling in the standard of living, and a life expectancy of a hundred years. ("Russian Communism will have vanished" may be ambiguous.) Three are bad: atomic war between Russia and America, civilization in ruins, and (again maybe ambiguously) "capitalism and the Western way of life . . . vanished." The ten countries that were polled were Canada, Colombia, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Spain, and the United States.

Startlingly, the most optimistic countries tend also to be the most pessimistic. But this need not be an inconsistency. It may be a consistency of *intensity* rather than *direction* of response.

There are further surprises. The stiff-upper-lip countries are among the most intense: in Canada and Great Britain expectations of both good and bad are higher than the international averages. The United States turns out to be quite matter-of-fact, close to the international averages in both kinds of expectation.

The countries with the soberest expectations are a strange pair, Spain and Israel. For Spain the explanation may be that while in the past generation most of the world has been turned topsy-turvy, in Spain nothing much has happened. That is, a great deal has happened, but at a pace so controlled as to blunt Spaniards' feeling for mutability: most of them have never known anyone in power but Franco. I will not say one could have predicted Gallup's findings for Spain, but when one sees them, one need not feel they are inexplicable. Where there has been slow change for more than thirty years, people may not expect fast change in the next twenty.

Then how account for Israel's cool? In the past thirty years the Israelis have known measureless change: the Destruction in Europe; the State and three victories. They have seen their enemies, and the enemies of the Jews, move from Right (led by Hitler) to Left (led by Stalin and his successors). Formerly, as Jews, accused of craven cunning, now they hear themselves accused of prepotent rashness.

In relation to Spain the Israelis seem to be saying: "Others may not expect change because they have had no experience of it. As for us, we have had plenty, thank you. In exchange for preferring to believe that hell will not come upon us in the next twenty years, we are prepared to believe also that heaven will not come upon us." In relation to Canada and Great Britain the Israelis seem to be saying: "It is easy for prosperous and unthreatened people to be jaded. They can be more than normally eager for heaven, and failing that—or perhaps even in lieu of that—for hell. Not so with us. Still beset, we are thankful for life, and hope, and daily bread."

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East Side, West Side

GALLUP's "Western way of life" reminds me of something in Donald Nugent's "City of God Revisited," in *Cross Currents.*

For ex-Jewish moderns the alternative to Jewish tradition has nearly always been one or the other of the legitimate children of the Enlightenment: science, Culture and Art, or some variant of left-of-center politics. Of ex-Christian moderns, most seem to have gone in the same direction politically, but the proportion has been somewhat lower than among Jews. Among ex-Christians there has been a good deal of cultural elitism joined with reactionary politics: Yeats, Maurras, Pound. There has also been some turning to the wisdom or religions of the East: Schopenhauer, Aldous Huxley, Toynbee. (T. S. Eliot, a Christian and of the Right, was also pro-East.)

Now Nugent writes:

> Several years ago I was at a gathering where Allen Ginsberg, the patriarch of the hippies, was the center of attraction as he ecstatically chanted a mantra to the accompaniment of his finger-cymbals. The atmosphere was exotic and Oriental. The author asked him what seemed an appropriate question: "Have you completely repudiated Western civilization?" I was astonished when, without hesitation and with a look of perfect candor, he replied in a manner so strangely reminiscent of Augustine: "No. The Sacred Heart is enough." I will never forget his answer.

Once I said that when we view some of the family histories of modern Jews—Mendelssohns, Ehrenbergs, Bergsons, Weils, Pasternaks—we must conclude that other things being equal, for Jews occidental secularism is a propaedeutic to Christianity. Today Ginsberg tells us that for Jews even a turn to the Orient can be a propaedeutic to Christianity. What else can it mean that a man called Ginsberg, no less, the author of a *Kaddish,* no less, ecstatic chanter of mantras yet man of the Left, answers, so memorably, that the Sacred Heart is enough?

The Cunning of Reason: to make Judaism attractive, the Jewish modernizers tried to make it more occidental and less oriental. That is why Reform did away with chanting (as of Pentateuch and Prophets).

Zodiacal Signs

WHEN PEOPLE stop being religious they become superstitious, or their children or grandchildren do. Near my office is a bookshop that has a section for paperback science fiction—or rather, had. You can still find a little science fiction there, but most of the section is for books about the occult; about sorcerers, sorceresses, warlocks, wizards; about witches. Some of the books are *by* witches.

The shop is mod and young, fin de siècle, like the people who staff it and most of its customers. The ear is never ungratified by any lack of rock music, or the eye by any lack of the standard daring posters. That all assorts well with another prominently displayed line of best-sellers—books zodiacal, horoscopical, astrological. Once shabby and cheap for a market of the old, poor, and ignorant, now these are handsome and dear for the young, prosperous, and educated. Not far away from the bookshop is Grand Central Station, where the young and mod line up at the counters of a thriving business called Astroflash to pay over fistfuls of money for the advertised product, "horoscopes by IBM computer."

What this may mean was suggested nearly 25 years ago in a comment about another time—obviously—and another country, by a Christian believer, a great archeologist and Bible scholar. Soon after the Second World War the University of Chicago Press published a kind of state-of-the-art symposium on Bible scholarship, the *Study of the Bible Today and Tomorrow,* edited by Harold R. Willoughby. In a chapter on the "War in Europe and the Future of Biblical Studies," W. F. Albright naturally had to think about Germany:

> Because German scholarship ruled the world of learning with undisputed authority . . . from the 1830's to the 1930's, it will be hard for us of the older generation to become accustomed to a new world of the spirit in which there is no organized German intellectual élite to set the pace and to impose standards of accomplishment. . . .
>
> During the Weimar Republic . . . anthroposophy and all kinds of quack philosophies grew apace; spiritism won multitudes of adherents; the Deutsche Astrologische Gesellschaft had more members and a longer list of publications than . . . half-a-dozen scientific societies. . . . Germany was perhaps the land most affected by the spiritual malaise which swept around the world in that period. . . . the power of the university élite in Germany was just as illusory as the power of the French aristocracy of birth on the eve of the French Revolution.

Now the newspapers report that Leslie Campbell has opened for black students in Brooklyn, with the support of the African-American Students Association, a "liberated" high school. In Swahili its name is Freedom Now, and "its curriculum will include courses in martial arts, Swahili, and astrology."

Poor people who need education cannot afford the extravagances of richer people educated beyond desire, and possibly beyond capacity. One can see the point of martial arts and Swahili. What is the point of astrology?

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Can the involvement of the United States in the political and economic life of other nations, particularly in Latin America and the "Third World," properly be characterized as imperialist—either in effect or in intention? A good deal of the answer one gives to this question will depend upon one's definition of imperialism, a word that in recent political rhetoric has at any rate become so charged with moral and emotional overtones as to have lost much of its purely descriptive force. In an effort to establish an intellectually coherent account of the theory and practice of imperialism, GEORGE LICHTHEIM, *a contributing editor of* COMMENTARY, *here explores the genesis and growth of those political structures that have called themselves, or have come to be known as, empires, and offers a critical analysis of the specific ideologies which have provided those structures with a sense of value and purpose. The essay is presented in two parts. The first part, given below, begins with the Roman Empire and traces the course of imperialism up to the eve of World War I; the second part, which will appear in our May number, deals with the phenomenon of imperialism in this century. Mr. Lichtheim, the distinguished historian and political analyst, is the author of* Marxism: A Historical and Critical Study; The Concept of Ideology; *and* The Origins of Socialism. *The present essay, in somewhat different form, will be published as a book later this year by Praeger.*

Imperialism: I

George Lichtheim

THE ESSAY presented here is not intended as an intellectual exercise, but as a contribution to an ongoing political discussion. It starts, however, from the definition of a term and must therefore begin by trying to clarify what we mean when we talk about the phenomenon known as imperialism.

Theorists employ concepts as a kind of intellectual shorthand, though this is not alway apparent to their readers. They use words to designate more or less complex intellectual models which have no precise equivalent in empirical reality. In this sense all theorizing is necessarily abstract and needs to be undertaken with some care, lest the unwary be misled into believing that the model employed in discourse can be encountered in the flesh outside the library or the classroom. This is never the case, for reasons which must be apparent to anyone who has thought seriously about the matter. There have been thinkers who held that to every concept there corresponds an entity properly designated by some name; but they never supposed that such entities walk about on two legs. It is only people unfamiliar with elementary logic who believe that an abstraction like "capitalism" or "imperialism" is a descriptive term to which there corresponds a slice of life which can be seen, or shown, or pointed out to bystanders, as though it were a creature or an organism of some kind.

But while imperialism is not a visible thing—any more than is "the state," or "the nation," or "the commonwealth"—neither is it a mere word or an empty sound. It is indeed perfectly possible for writers to deal in verbal counters denoting nothing at all, and in some areas of literature the practice is so common that language itself tends to be devalued. But it so happens that the term "imperialism" describes a particular kind of reality, even though it is not the kind that can be statistically weighed and measured. What it denotes is a relationship: specifically, the relationship of a ruling or controlling power to those under its dominion. Empire is a state of affairs even when the imperial power is not formally constituted as such. For practical purposes, however, we can neglect tribal society, even though there have been primitive slave empires ruled by nomadic tribes. What we mean when we speak of empire or imperialism is the relationship of a hegemonial state to peoples or nations under its control.

The introduction of the terms "people" and "nation" points to another difficulty. When we speak loosely we tend to identify these two concepts, but in strict political logic only a sovereign people can be called a nation. Sovereignty normally rests on armed force sufficient to repel invaders, and armed force commonly takes the form of centralized state power, but it need not always do so. The primitive Swiss peasant communities which repulsed the Hapsburgs were armed and sovereign before they entered into the sort of political confederation that could legally be called a state. Inversely, sovereignty or independence may be internationally recognized where there is no significant military power to speak of. The present-day Swiss Confederation is undoubtedly a sovereign state, although the time is long past when its armed forces were adequate to insure its freedom from invasion.

The purpose of these remarks is to make it

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clear that terms such as "empire," "state," "nation," or "sovereignty," are descriptive of something real, although there are no simple entities to which they refer. Whether or not a state is sovereign depends on its relation to other states, and the term "state" itself is applicable only under given historical conditions. There are people who lack statehood, states not founded on nationality, nation-states which either do not possess or have lost their independence, and empires not described as such in their official proclamations. In general, what people think they are doing matters considerably less than what they are in fact doing, but thought enters into the matter inasmuch as it makes possible or impossible the kind of tacit consensus which is the foundation of every durable political arrangement.

People who do not think of themselves as forming a nation, but rather a congeries of tribes, do not become a nation by having legal independence and a flag bestowed on them by a former colonial power, or by the United Nations Secretariat. In this sense, the existence of a nation presupposes that intangible something known as "national consciousness." But the reverse is likewise true: national awareness may grow out of an armed struggle begun by a simple revolt against occupants or colonizers. Such a revolt may fail. The records of history are littered with examples of unsuccessful attempts to achieve independence, gain sovereignty, or develop a sense of nationhood. This interplay between being and consciousness, reality and ideology, affects the consideration of our topic, for an empire is not complete without an imperial creed held by its governing class, and a corresponding sense of dependence on the part of its subjects. The development of the imperial creed or mystique commonly occurs after the event, and its ultimate perfection may actually coincide with the empire's decline from its pinnacle of power and glory; but at some stage the tacit assumptions of the ruling stratum must be made explicit. Were it otherwise, the empire would have no compass by which to steer. What the Romans thought of their *imperium* was not irrelevant. It was, among other things, an unconscious means of cementing the structure they had built.

THEORIES DIFFER from poetic fabrications in that they set out to give a rational and logically consistent account of some aspect of reality. But whatever may be the case in the natural sciences, no political theory is ever purely descriptive. It always includes norms and valuations as well as factual analysis. In this respect a theory of imperialism cannot escape the rule governing social and political theorizing generally. However closely it sticks to the facts—or rather to the available empirical evidence about them—it carries a built-in reference to the general philosophy of the theorist. If he adheres to the tenets of Enlightenment rationalism and to the kind of democratic faith commonly associated with the American and French Revolutions, his view of the topic will be colored by assumptions which are by no means universally shared. He will assume, for example, that there is something unnatural or immoral about the mere existence of an empire, since it implies subordination to a hegemonial power, whereas in principle all nations ought to be free and equal, their internal affairs at least not being subject to the veto power of an imperial government.

The very term "imperialism" nowadays carries unflattering connotations, but it did not do so for the ruling classes of the Roman Empire, or for the rulers of the nominally Christian kingdoms which succeeded it. During the lengthy epoch of the European Middle Ages, the term "Holy Roman Empire" was applied inconsistently, and sometimes absurdly, but always in a laudatory sense, to a large and ramshackle political structure which in practice enabled the German Emperor with the connivance of the Pope to lord it over German vassals and Italian city-states. The empires of the Ottoman Turks, the Hapsburgs, and the Romanovs all gloried in their real or fancied magnificence, and so at a later date did the British Empire. A *theory* of how these political structures came into being need not, and normally does not, reflect the values incorporated in the *ideologies* which helped to keep them going. But in subjecting these ideologies to critical analysis, the historian commits himself to a different set of valuations.

This is true even if the theory affirms no more than the inevitability of some sort of power balance among rival empires, for to do so is to ascribe a rational purpose to what in other circumstances might appear irrational—notably the act of going to war. *A fortiori*, if the historian asserts, for example, that for its time the Hapsburg Empire performed a useful service in keeping the Turks out of Central Europe, he is clearly committed to a value judgment. This is also the case if he affirms the opposite, or if he judges that as between the Turks and the Hapsburgs there was little to choose. A historian who retrospectively approves the despotic unification of India or China, on the grounds that it was preferable to constant warfare, is clearly making an evaluative claim. But suppose he merely describes the process as inevitable? It will then be necessary to inquire into his grounds for holding such a belief, and normally it will turn out that he is able to back his conviction by theoretical arguments only because he already carries in his mind a notion of historical inevitability according to which the unification of a large territory by its rulers is both necessary and "progressive": that is, beneficial to mankind in general and the inhabitants of one particular area in particular.

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But what if the writer is an anarchist who on principle dislikes the establishment of states, small or great, although he may concede that it cannot be prevented? In that case, the "progressive" aspect of the phenomenon will not be apparent to him, and the argument will be deprived of its prescriptive nature. It will resume itself into a bare rehearsal of what actually took place.

To grasp what is at stake in political debates having to do with the conflicting claims of nationalism and imperialism one must be clear as to the difference between sovereignty and authority. All sorts of public bodies, from churches and political parties to trade unions and professional organizations, lay claim to some degree of authority, whether legal or moral. But authority is one thing, sovereignty is another. A state is sovereign in the measure in which it disposes of a political center whose decisions override the will of all subordinate authorities; it is sovereign in respect of the outside world to the degree in which it can enforce its legal authority. If it is invaded by armed force and fails to resist, its authority vanishes together with its sovereignty, and this is the case whatever its social structure, legal fabric, constitutional façade, or political regime. It is pointless to inquire whether it is "in the nature" of this or that form of social organization—feudalism, capitalism, socialism, or whatever—to encourage or permit external aggression against weaker states. The only thing that matters to those concerned is the actual possession or loss of their freedom. If a country is invaded by a stronger power and its political institutions are destroyed or remolded, that country is under imperial domination, whatever the political circumstances of the case, and whether or not the whole transaction is classifiable as "progressive" or "reactionary," according to some canon of historical interpretation. Likewise, sovereignty may be infringed by diplomatic means, by treaty, or by economic pressure. A backward country legally prevented from developing its industries suffers a loss of sovereignty no less real because it may be invisible to the naked eye of the beholder. What counts is the relationship of domination and subjection which is the essence of every imperial regime.

The word "essence" conjures up the dismaying prospect of a scholastic debate of the existence or nonexistence of entities not observable in ordinary experience. But we are not obliged to involve ourselves in such a disputation. To say that it is "of the essence" of imperialism to infringe the sovereignty of lesser political bodies is not to engage in metaphysics, but to define the proper use of a term commonly employed by everyone who thinks about public affairs. We do not thereby commit ourselves to the notion that there is a disembodied entity called "imperialism" which moves mysteriously behind the scenes of history. We simply specify the minimal criteria for the use of language when dealing with a particular reality familiar to historians, and indeed to millions of ordinary people who have the misfortune to be involved in imperialist rivalries. At the same time we avoid the intellectual dishonesty which marks the propagandistic employment of the term by one side or the other in what is vulgarly known as the cold war (itself a propaganda term invented to describe the Soviet-American rivalry consequent upon the Yalta and Potsdam settlements of 1945). We specify criteria for the use of language which cannot be misused because they cut across the quarrel between the nuclear super-powers. Propagandists use words like flags. In what follows we shall abstain from this familiar custom. Instead we shall concentrate upon the actual relationships that give rise to the spectacle of hegemonial power. For a start, let us inquire into the genesis of the term "empire." It will then become apparent that in so doing we are laying bare some at least of the historical roots of the phenomenon known as imperialism.

THIS TOPIC inevitably entails a reconsideration of both the liberal and the socialist heritage, since both schools attempted from about 1900 to grapple with the theory and practice of modern imperialism. The inadequacy of liberal theorizing in this field is now pretty generally recognized, not least by the surviving liberals, some of whom have in consequence helped themselves to large slices of socialist theorizing in an effort to buttress their own position. With the socialist theory of imperialism one runs into a different problem. Historically, modern imperialism and modern socialism gained prominence from the 1880's onward in response to the evident decline of liberalism in general and Anglo-American liberalism in particular. Stemming as they did from opposite poles of the political compass—imperialism from the ruling class, socialism from its enemies—they reached different conclusions but they also overlapped in an area where conservatives and socialists alike came to challenge the liberal consensus originally established during the mid-Victorian era. Hence the peculiar phenomenon of social imperialism, an ideology which sought to combine protectionist defense of the "national interest" with social reformist attempts to improve the conditions of the working class in the imperial metropolis. The eventual fusion of social imperialism with Social Darwinism, in the theory and practice of European fascism during the 1930's and 1940's, has discredited this experiment so far as the labor movement and the historic Left are concerned. It has done little to lessen its attraction for non-European aspirants to the imperial succession, and it has even infected the ideology of nationalist movements stemming from the Third World of underdeveloped countries.

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A DIFFERENT sort of problem arises in connection with the Marxist tradition properly so described. Down to the Russian Revolution this was primarily a West European and Central European school. Its adherents already possessed a theory of imperialism before 1917, but were unable to relate it to the ongoing practice of the parties affiliated to the Second International founded in 1889. The overriding fact for most socialists during the pre-1914 age was the persistence of the ancient dynastic empires in Central and Eastern Europe: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Czarist Russia, to which Ottoman Turkey might be added. In consequence, anti-imperialism came to be identified with the cause of national liberation from archaic political constraints, whereas the specifically Marxist analysis of capitalist imperialism remained the preoccupation of a few theorists. This situation altered radically with the Russian Revolution, the Bolshevik triumph, and the emergence of what is still officially known as Marxism-Leninism. As a result of Lenin's intervention, imperialism became a major concern for Communist writers, i.e., for Marxists who associated themselves with the Third International and its Trotskyist or Maoist offsprings. The consequences of this realignment will be examined at some length in the later sections of this study. Here let it simply be said that the identification of Marxism with Leninism has become untenable, not least because the Sino-Soviet conflict cannot be explained in Leninist terms. Fifty years after Lenin it is increasingly evident that theoretical explanations put forward around 1920 to account for the genesis of the 1914-18 war do not help anyone to make sense of the contemporary world scene. This is no reason for casting the Marxist apparatus overboard in favor of earlier and simpler conceptualizations, but neither does it permit the unmediated use of notions which possessed some relevance half a century ago but have now been turned into empty slogans. Marxism is too important to be left to the post-Leninist sects —tiny ferocious creatures devouring each other in a drop of water.

What remains of the fragile synthesis known as Marxism-Leninism, now that the USSR has joined the ranks of the nuclear super-powers and seems bent on playing the "imperial" game at the expense of the Third World, is the general perspective of an age of revolutionary convulsions set off by inter-imperialist conflicts. In principle this outlook is not incompatible with parallel notions emanating from the political Right. The earlier convergence of Social Darwinism and social imperialism has found a modern successor in the technocratic vision of a planetary economy controlled by a unified ruling elite of scientifically-trained managers who have left the national state behind and merged their separate identities in the formation of a global cartel linking all the industrially-advanced centers of the world: "ultra-imperialism," to employ Kautsky's phrase. This gloomy vision, first formulated in 1914 by the principal theorist of the Second International, looks remarkably modern today, more so than the productions of the rival Leninist school. Whether it is going to be validated by experience, no one can say. What should be emphasized is that we have no theoretical grounds for dismissing this hypothesis as an aberration. More generally, it needs to be said that the train called "history" is never going to deposit its passengers at the destination of their choice unless they themselves take over the controls. Faith in automatic progress ought to have died in 1914. Where it still persists it does so as a carry-over from the genial optimism of the 19th century—an optimism Marx did not share. Those who consider themselves his disciples can do no better, in view of what this generation has experienced and what is still to come, than to arm themselves with the motto of those ancient warriors, the French Huguenots: *"Point n'est besoin d'espoir pour entreprendre, ni de succès pour persévérer."*

I

"CICERO'S COMMENTS on the *Imperium populi Romani* never swerved from the intrinsic meaning of 'imperium' to which he paid emphatic tribute in *De Legibus*—the legal power to enforce the law."[1*] This observation by the distinguished historian Richard Koebner illustrates some of the difficulties of our theme. In itself the remark just quoted is enlightening, inasmuch as it bears upon the mentality of the Roman oligarchy and the characteristic features of the ideology it had built up. At the same time it is plain that we are not really being told anything about the actuality of the Empire which Cicero helped to govern while it was still a Republic, and whose control was subsequently inherited by Caesar. From the standpoint of either Caesar or Cicero, the fact that the "Empire of the Roman People" was a slave state whose economy rested upon servile labor did not enter into consideration when they sought to define the political entity known to them and their contemporaries as the *Imperium populi Romani*. Not that they were unaware of the circumstance: it simply did not occur to them that any other form of social organization was possible, let alone desirable. Similarly, they took it for granted that the Roman people—or to be exact, its governing class—ruled over subject populations which had once been free, but had now come under the political sway of the Roman Senate. Cicero's writings are indeed full of warnings about the dangers of moral decay threaten-

* All notes appear at the end of the article.

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ing the Republic from the uncontrolled extension of imperial dominance over other peoples; but what concerned him was the political health of the *res publica,* the public body to which he belonged and of which he was such a distinguished ornament. That it was Rome's destiny to rule the lesser breeds went without saying. A generation later, in the age of Augustus, there had arisen a group of poets who poured the new imperial faith into the ancient bottle of rhetoric. Horace, Virgil, and Ovid sang the glories of Augustus and the Empire. Horace composed a hymn to "The Age of Caesar," Ovid described Rome as the seat of immortal gods, and Virgil opened his epic, the *Aeneid,* with a divine prophecy assuring the refugees fleeing from the ruins of Troy that from them would descend a people destined for boundless expansion and endowed with "unending empire."

IF THIS sounds remarkably modern, the reason is that in the West we have all been brought up on the Greek and Roman classics, so that our own poets inevitably fall into similar strains when they feel like celebrating the glories of whatever empire happens to be on top at the moment. In studying the historian's account of our predecessors we cannot fail to be struck by certain similarities, alongside differences attributable to the rise of Christianity and the consequent abandonment of certain mental traits which went unchallenged in antiquity. No modern writer would be so naive as to attribute eternity—in the literal sense of the term —to the empire of which he happened to be a citizen. On the other hand, those Roman historians and poets who worked the theme of moral earnestness have had their modern successors. "Livy, in his Preface, expresses anxieties even more sombre than those of the early Horace concerning the moral adequacy of his contemporaries to meet their imperial duties. The nations of the world still stand in awe of the Romans. They have resigned themselves to the *imperium.* But the purpose of the historian must be to show the contrast between the Romans of yore and those of the latest generation."[2]

The Empire—no longer a republican *Imperium populi Romani,* but converted by the Augustans into a distinctly monarchical *Imperium Romanum*—needed conscientious governors, but in the new post-Republican era such citizens were hard to find. The *imperium* had been created during the heroic age of the Republic, and then had killed its parent. It was now governed by the *Princeps* and his officials, but these men lacked the austere virtues of their forefathers: or so at least Livy thought, and his gloomy forebodings later found an echo in the writings of Seneca—not accidentally a convert to Stoicism. Tacitus too had his doubts as to the permanence of the Empire, and took no trouble to hide them. The Augustan Principate after all had arisen from an act of usurpation, and Tacitus knew that the constitutional façade concealed the reality of military power. If the army could make an Emperor, it could also unmake him: *"evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri"*: the secret was out that an Emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome and constitutionally by the Senate. And what was the imperial Senate anyway? For the most part no longer an assembly of proud and independent aristocrats, but a collection of officeholders whose tenure depended in large part on the grace and favor of the *Princeps.* Yet the great historian was himself a Roman Senator, Consul and Proconsul of Asia. More important, he formed part of the ruling oligarchy whose deeds he described in language at once stately and eloquent. "Oligarchy is the supreme, central, and enduring theme in Roman history. Across the revolutionary age it links the aristocratic Republic to the monarchy of the Caesars; and the process of change in the governing order has its sequel in the century between Caesar Augustus and Trajan."[3]

Oligarchy is the secret, too, of the *Imperium Romanum,* earlier miscalled the *Imperium populi Romani,* for the people—as distinct from the governing class—had little to do with its inception. They fought and bled in the wars that transformed the landlocked Roman Republic into an Empire, but to them these were wars against foreign invaders. It was the ruling class of great families who converted it into something else: hegemonial power centered upon control of the Mediterranean. Having created an empire, the oligarchy gave birth to a culture which simultaneously reflected and shaped the norms and values that went into the constitution of the *imperium.* These values were in the first place military and patriotic, but in due course they were reshaped and redefined so as to make room for the new emotion of imperialism.

The emotive significance of the term *"imperium"* had originally been derived from Rome's long struggle against foreign enemies, the Carthaginians above all. In the course of these protracted wars, the Roman peasantry, which bore the chief burden of conscription, was ruined economically, and in consequence weakened politically, to such a degree that the Senatorial nobility became for practical purposes all-powerful. The only constraint upon it arose from the necessity of feeding and flattering an urban mob which was kept quiet with the help of plunder extorted from the conquered provinces. The *Imperium populi Romani* thus paid off so far as the mob of the capital city was concerned, and it threw open tremendous avenues of prestige and wealth for the ruling aristocracy, both in Republican days and after the advent of Caesarism. The Caesars still had to feed the Roman mob—mainly with foodstuffs collected from North Africa—and

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they also had to keep the Praetorian Guard happy by constant pay rises. But their chief concern was the permanent state of war on the Empire's frontiers: in Spain and Africa, on the Danube and in Germany, as well as in Syria and along the border with Persia. Contrary to legend, Rome was not seriously bothered by slave revolts. No slave rising in antiquity was permanently successful, and none shook the power of the governing class. The free-born Roman mob was not a major problem either, since it had been disarmed and deprived of political power. The real threat to stability arose from the army and from the foreign barbarians it was holding down.

THE IMPERIUM was thus at once the creation and the plaything of a self-perpetuating oligarchy, and the latter—like every ruling class in history—had its great men: Scipio, the victor in the long war against Hannibal which at one point threatened Rome's very existence; Julius Caesar; Cicero, orator and statesman; Livy and Tacitus among historians; Horace and Virgil among poets; Seneca, more remarkable perhaps for the dignified manner of his death under Nero than for his attempt to acclimatize Greek Stoicism in Rome; and a host of lesser figures. Together they embodied the values of their culture and created the first successful imperial ideology in history. The special mark of this ideology was moral earnestness, allied to a strong distaste for Greek frippery and Oriental self-abasement. The Roman virtues of courage, patriotism, family piety, a certain rustic honesty, and contempt for slaves and tyrants, were real values, and the *imperium* was sustained by them no less than by the constant exercise of armed force. Indeed, the army retained its superiority only to the extent that it embodied the traditional Roman outlook, originally the outcrop of a rural culture uncorrupted by wealth and sophistication. Even after the old rustic simplicity was gone, Rome continued to be governed by men and women who believed in the ancestral virtues and for whom the *imperium* signified moral as well as military superiority over cowardly Orientals and uncouth Greeks. The reader of Livy and Tacitus can discover for himself what the Roman oligarchy thought itself to be defending. Livy and Tacitus did not create the *imperium,* but they enable us, two thousand years later, to perceive what kept it going. Just as Beethoven's music cannot be understood without taking account of the French Revolution—or for that matter the French Revolution without taking account of Beethoven's music—the greatness of Tacitus as a historian reflects the greatness of the *imperium* created by the class to which he belonged and whose virtues he extolled.

These virtues were in their origin the real or idealized traits of a landed gentry which had become the effective ruling class of a rather simply structured commonwealth of patrician nobles and rural or urban plebeians: free-born, but hampered in the exercise of their political rights until in due course they attained formal equality. The Republic thus constituted had only one serious business: war against hostile city-states, and later against rival powers in the Mediterranean. By the time these wars were concluded, the original meaning of *"imperium"* had been transformed. It no longer signified the authority bestowed by the Roman people upon civilian or military magistrates, but the dominion of Rome over others. This was a development of the highest significance, for it colored the whole subsequent course of Western political history, and more especially the coinage of Western political terminology. That a Roman commander was *"cum imperio"* originally meant that he had been entrusted by the Senate and the popular assembly with supreme military responsibility. By the time the Republic had become an Empire the term signified something quite different: that the Roman people as a whole—which by then had surrendered effective power to its governing oligarchy—was, as a collective entity, entrusted with the responsibility for ruling other peoples. The transformation was so gradual that it never occurred to anyone to question its legitimacy. Least of all did it occur to those luckless revolutionaries, the Gracchi: liberal aristocrats who appealed to the Roman people against the Senatorial oligarchy and duly paid with their lives for their illusions. "Tiberius Gracchus, trying to make the Roman masses conscious of social injustice, reminded them that they were always called 'the victorious people possessed of the world.' "[4]

It was the greatness of Rome that rendered the poverty of so many Roman citizens scandalous: thus ran the litany of the popular party founded by the Gracchi, continued by Marius, and ultimately inherited by Caesar: by which time the party's populist demagogy had become wholly meaningless and its mass following the willing claque of an ambitious aristocrat aiming at dictatorial power. It is not wholly useless to be reminded that Caesar won power with the aid of the *populares,* themselves the inheritors of a party founded a century earlier by the Gracchi, whose appeal to the land-hungry Roman peasantry so frightened the Senatorial oligarchy that it had them murdered. The ensuing civil wars and internal convulsions, which destroyed the ancient aristocratic Republic of the *nobiles,* made the army supreme. But the army was commanded by men who had amassed fame and fortune through their rule over conquered lands. Hence the fraudulent rhetoric of the *populares,* which paved the way for Caesar and his party, invoked the theme of imperial greatness no less than did the solemn oratory of Cicero, chief apologist of the Senatorial aristocracy. In the end both parties, after shedding torrents of blood in a succession of civil

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wars lasting a century, were joined in a common ruin, and on the wreckage of the Republic there arose the new imperial structure—sociologically speaking the creation of a unified and irremovable governing class. Aristocracy and democracy having vacated the scene, despotism took over, but it still clothed itself in republican forms. The Caesars needed an ideology to legitimize their rule, and they found it in the *imperium*. No ruling class can function without a creed. That of the new imperial oligarchy lay ready to hand, inherited from the republican past: it was only necessary to ground the effective power of the *Princeps* and his officials in the heritage of the *Imperium populi Romani*, and the Empire could be proclaimed the legitimate successor of the Republic.

So far as the constitutional powers of the *Princeps* went, they were in large part derived from the older magistracy of the Republic. The term *"princeps"* in itself did not imply monarchy; it merely stood for a particular combination of magisterial powers: governmental, judicial, military. The essential basis of the principate, the *"imperium proconsulare,"* was likewise derived from republican antiquity. The *"imperium,"* commonly described as *"proconsulare,"* had originally denoted the supremacy of the elected Consuls over all authorities at home or abroad. Under Augustus and his successors, it was normally coupled with the assignment of a *"Provincia"* embracing some portion of the Empire. The formal definition of *"imperium"* thereafter went beyond the traditional proconsular authority in that it assigned to the *"Imperator"* an *"Imperium maius"* over all governors of provinces (including those appointed by the Senate rather than by himself) and the retention of his own *"imperium"* in Italy even after the *"princeps"* had laid down the consular powers originally bestowed by popular or Senatorial election. The *"Princeps-Imperator* has now in point of fact become a military autocrat, although *pro forma* he is still held accountable to the Senate (the popular assembly having vanished from the scene). He no longer needs the consular power, although the office continues to exist, so as to provide a career for loyal supporters drawn from the new Senatorial bureaucracy. For all practical purposes the *Princeps* has become the uncontrolled governor of the state. "He has supreme command over all troops wheresoever stationed, with him rest all ordinances respecting their levy payment and dismissal, the appointment of officers and regulation of the military hierarchy; Senatorial proconsuls had not power over the life of a soldier; and even in their provinces he has the right to collect fiscal revenue. He levies war, makes peace or treaty and represents the state in relation to all foreign or dependent powers. Again, he is the high admiral of the empire, with fleets near at hand; and, besides the troops attached to these, not only the praetorian guard his proper household brigade, but even the police and night-watch of the city, owned no allegiance to any magistrate of the republic, but only to Caesar and his prefects, and formed no insignificant force at his disposal on the spot . . . and he is so far the *'imperator'* of the whole Roman world, that the whole senate and people, and even the provinces take the *'sacramentum'* in his name, binding themselves in the most solemn terms to maintain his authority against all enemies, and not to hold even their own children dearer. Naturally, in time the *'imperator'* and *'princeps'* became synonymous."[5]

An Empire has to be administered, and the administration must be military and bureaucratic: to collect taxes and defend the frontiers against hostile tribes and rival powers. It must also display a minimum of efficiency. The old oligarchic Republic was too corrupt and faction-ridden to provide the sort of bureaucratic tidiness the constantly expanding Empire required. In the end the burden grew too heavy for the rival factions at Rome and they were obliged to hand over power to a military dictator who in turn became a hereditary ruler. Yet the ancient forms were observed so far as possible. The victorious Caesarian party having killed the Republic, its leaders enlisted traditional verbiage to furnish themselves with a title to legitimacy. The *imperium* came in handy. It was a link with the past, and the more talk there was of it, the less did the Roman people perceive that effective power had been usurped by a new oligarchy. Nor was it all a matter of calculation and conscious hypocrisy. Augustus doubtless knew what he was doing when he described his assumption of despotic power as the "Restoration of the Republic," but his court poets who first put the myth of "eternal Rome" into circulation, and the great historians of the next reign, may be supposed to have been sincere when they sought comfort in the notion that the *Princeps*—successor of the ancient Republican dignitaries, whose empty titles were kept up—stood at the head of something that might be termed the *Imperium populi Romani*. Men have to believe in something, and most Romans doubtless felt that being the putative rulers of an Empire on which (to cite a later phrase) the sun never set, was some compensation for being no longer citizens of a Republic.[6]

Yet all this does not quite explain the ease with which the *Princeps* slipped into the role of *Imperator*. In the civil wars there had been an issue at stake which went back to the foundation of the Republic itself. When Cicero staked his life on the proposition that control of the highest *imperia* should be vested in the Senate and People of Rome, he was siding with the Senatorial oligarchy against the Caesarians, but he was also making a gesture toward the past. The Republican party had in its origins been a confederation of great family clans whose power and authority antedated the

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foundation of the Roman state. Thereafter for centuries they *were* the state, and the Republic possessed meaning for them only to the extent that they were its rulers, recognized as such by the people. When these traditional assumptions collided with the claims of popular democracy and the realities of Empire, a new coalition was formed by provincial military leaders and urban demagogues, the *populares*. The coalition eventually triumphed and its leaders thereupon purged the Senate and created a new governing class. Yet in preserving the ancient republican forms—or as many of them as they could fit into the new structure—they paid homage to the ancestral virtues that had cemented the early Republic. These virtues rested upon family and clan loyalty, military discipline, and the defense of Rome against all comers. The *Imperium populi Romani* could be transmuted into the *Imperium orbis terrarum* only because its ruler, the *Imperator*, from time to time rendered account for his services in war and peace to his nominal sovereign, the Roman people. The ancestral traditions had been primarily military, and their preservation was a condition for the very existence of the Empire, if it was not to be overrun by foreigners. In this sense the ancient republican patriotism remained to the end the ideological sanction of what had become an empire over other people. National pride was enlisted in the service of imperialism, as it always must be if the empire is to endure. Not accidentally, the *imperium* passed from the Romans when they ceased to hold the simple faith of their rustic forefathers.

II

If the Romans invented the concept of Empire they did not invent its reality. Dominion over other people had been the rule rather than the exception in the age of the despotic Oriental monarchies whose power antedated the rise of the Hellenic thalassocracy and its successor, the *Imperium Romanum*. The ancient Egyptian, Babylonian, and Hindu despotisms centered upon the river-valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Indus. Greece and Rome extended their sway around the Mediterranean. Byzantium and Islam, who between them divided the Roman heritage in the East, were as imperial as their respective rulers could make them. In the West, the Catholic Church transmitted the Roman heritage to the point of investing the barbaric Germanic kings with a spurious claim to rule over the ancient *Imperium orbis terrarum* of the Caesars. The Roman Church thus became the principal link between the *Imperium Romanum* and the Holy Roman Empire of the European Middle Ages—so called, to cite the well-known jest, because it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. The gibe is tediously familiar. It is also misleading. The Empire of Charlemagne and his Germanic successors was certainly not holy, and only doubtfully Roman (some of the early rulers were illiterate), but its imperial claims were tested in warfare against rival powers and survived the exposure. "The original Latin word conveyed the general meanings of command and power. It specifically denoted the legal power of command. Its purport was extended to include the territories and populations subject to a dominant power."[7] We have seen in the previous section how this process was mediated by the real or fancied interests of the ruling class which had originally created the Roman Republic and then transformed it into the Roman Empire. We must now ask ourselves whether there is something in the notion of "empire" that is independent of the conceptualizations undertaken, at different times and for different purposes, by republican orators, court poets, clerical scribes, or other propagandists.

The simplest way of tackling this subject is to ask what sort of "empire" the Pharoahs, or their Hellenistic and Roman successors, could have called their own had they not been able to levy tribute from subject populations. If the matter is approached in this crude but realistic fashion, one immediately sees that at least *one* answer to our question has to do with the manner in which surplus wealth was pumped out of conquered regions for the benefit of the imperial metropolis. Nor was this circumstance ever concealed or denied until the official adoption of Christianity by the increasingly desperate rulers of the declining Roman Empire imposed a certain degree of hypocrisy upon the last of the Caesars.

On the other hand, it is arguable that the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation—to give it its official title—came into existence not because its rulers were intent on exploiting other people, but rather as a defensive reaction on the part of the Catholic Church and the Frankish kingdom with which it had allied itself in the 8th century of the Christian era. The principal enemy then was Islam, at least from the standpoint of the Church, and the issue to that extent was "ideological," to employ the vocabulary of a later age. But it was also highly practical, for the rise of Islam had disrupted the ancient unity of the Mediterranean civilization, including its economic infrastructure. The Empire founded at Rome, and then in part inherited by Byzantium, depended for its material existence upon naval control of the seas linking its scattered dominions.[8] The Arab conquest on the one hand, the Germanic inroads in the West on the other, posed a twofold problem. If these invaders were converted to some species of the Christian faith, they could be integrated into the crumbling fabric of what had once been the Roman Empire. By the same token they would cease to be a standing menace to the Pope at Rome and the Emperor at Byzantium. The experiment succeeded with the Germans, but failed with the Arabs who possessed a rival faith—Islam.

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The Romano-Germanic kingdoms in the West were gradually brought under Papal control and thus became the basis of a new European civilization which retained Latin as its official language, but was economically primitive and thus for many years not vitally dependent upon the ancient Mediterranean trade routes. Byzantium and Islam, on the contrary, entered upon a prolonged course of warfare because the Arabs, unlike the Germans, would not give up their faith. Had they done so, they could have been integrated into the Empire, as the Slavic peoples were. Their adherence to Islam made this impossible, and the endless succession of religious wars resulting from this mutual hostility brought about the eventual collapse of Byzantium. They also ruined the Arabs and the Persians by making them dependent upon the Turks, who thereupon started a fresh round of hostilities by engaging in permanent warfare against the Christian Empires of the Hapsburgs and Romanovs.

The compressed recital of these familiar facts is intended to bring out a point often lost from sight in contemporary discussions of imperialism: the interplay of "practical" and "ideological" factors, or to employ less foolish language, the dialectic of being and consciousness. *Prima facie* there was no reason why the Church should have succeeded with the Slavs and Germans and failed with the Arabs. The difference lay in the fact that the Arabs possessed a national religion which they were unwilling to give up. This circumstance determined the course of ten centuries of history. Specifically, it resulted in the Holy Roman Empire becoming the ally of the Papacy, while Byzantium was thrown on the defensive and finally went down before the Turkish assault. Unless this historical dialectic is taken into account, the whole subsequent course of European history must remain mysterious.[9]

WHEN WE ask what the word "Europe" means, we do not, in the first place, inquire into geography. Greece has, by some historians, been called "the first Europe," for reasons clearly having nothing to do with its location. Inversely, what is nowadays called Europe did not suggest anything remotely civilized to either the Greeks or the Romans. They associated it not with the beautiful Europa of Greek mythology—the lady carried away by Zeus to Crete, where she bore him children—but with barbarous tribes somewhere north of the Danube. The Roman Empire was never European in the later sense of the word. It was Mediterranean, and its civilized rulers entertained the utmost contempt for the savage tribesmen who battered against its frontiers on the Rhine, the Danube, and in Britain. The Byzantine Emperors, heirs to ancient Hellas, inherited this attitude, and so did their Moslem successors—to their ultimate undoing when "Europe" had become powerful and civilized. For centuries it was neither, even though its medieval rulers eventually taught themselves to read Latin. Nor was there any territorial entity which could at first glance have been perceived as European. Geographically, Europe is simply a peninsula of Asia. Historically, it was a latecomer which arrived on the scene when the Roman Church entered into a symbiosis with the Germanic tribes, especially the Franks. France is the true heart of Europe and always has been. Its conversion to Roman Catholicism in the 6th century made possible the subsequent rise of the Carolingian Empire and thus set the course of what in later ages was called European history. In Roman times there was no such thing. ". . . Europe, in any other sense than an area of land and water, of hills and valleys, plains, mountains, rivers, lakes and forests, did not exist at the beginning of what we usually call European history—that is to say, the history of post-classical times."[10]

The relevance of these circumstances to our theme is once again determined by the peculiar inheritance of Rome, as transmitted by the Roman Church to the post-imperial age of European medievalism. In the transition from the *Imperium Romanum* to the Holy Roman Empire of the European Middle Ages, the crucial fact was the alliance between the Papacy and the kings of France and Germany. The head of the Roman Empire, the *Imperator*, had in late Roman times become the patron of the Church, and the latter returned the compliment by sanctifying the Empire as "eternal." When the barbarian invasions put an end to Rome's eminence, its residual claims to glory were transferred by the Popes to the Carolingian Empire, whose barbarian rulers now came to rival the Byzantines as claimants to the succession of the city from which the Empire had once taken its origin. "It is in this double meaning that the *imperium* was eulogized as an eternal institution by the Christian Church. And it is in this institutional meaning that the concept was reinterpreted when kings from the North were crowned emperors by the popes in Rome."[11]

Having survived the ancient *imperium*, whose culture and traditions it embodied—albeit in a barbarized form—the Church now gave birth to a new imperial structure, different from the old in its social composition and shifted from the Mediterranean to northern Europe, but no less extensive in its claims. So far from being merely, in Hobbes's well-known phrase, "the ghost of the Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof," the Church was the active begetter of an entirely new and highly original construction: the *sacrum imperium* of the (imperfectly Romanized) Franks, with its political capital strung out along the Rhine, and its spiritual center in Rome. This new Christian Empire validated its claims to legitimacy by fighting heretics and unbelievers—the Scandinavian Vikings and the Moslems above all, but eventually the Byzantines and their Greek Or-

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thodox supporters as well. The Papacy was a European power, and a pioneer of what in later ages was termed "European colonialism." Having converted the Normans and conquered Sicily with their help, it tried to recover Syria and Palestine from the Moslems, and it sponsored the first phase of the lengthy *Reconquista* which won back Spain for Catholicism. It also supervised the more or less forcible Christianization of the Slavs in Central Europe, which in turn became a factor in the Germanization of these lands.

All in all, the *sacrum imperium* deserves a place in any consideration of what is meant by "imperialism," especially if one employs the German term *Kaiserreich* to denote the "Roman Empire of the Germans." Hitler was merely the last in a long succession of German-Austrian rulers whose political ambitions centered upon the *Kaiseridee* —the idea of reviving the Carolingian Empire: at the expense of Germany's neighbors, needless to say. But the Russian Czars entertained similar ambitions, although they inherited them from Byzantium. The French and Spanish kings, too, at times toyed with the notion of turning the *sacrum imperium* into a legitimation of *their* imperial ambitions: with Papal help if possible, without the Pope's assistance if necessary. Nor did the Protestant Reformation put an end to these imperial enterprises. On the contrary, one of its indirect but important consequences was a prolonged conflict between Spain and England for predominance in America, and the consequent rise of the British Empire.

AT FIRST GLANCE this imperial procession may look rather arbitrary. When some Anglo-Saxon scribes in the earlier Middle Ages first hit upon the idea "that their kings deserved imperial honors, apparently because they had triumphed over the Danes and unified Britain"[12] they were surely doing no more than might be expected from patriotic writers with vague notions of what the term *imperium* had once portended. But the ease with which republics and kingdoms laid claim to the imperial title, upon every suitable and unsuitable occasion, ought to give one a little pause. Clearly there was something in the dignity that appealed to the imagination of men brought up on Latin literature, but there was also a sound political reason for styling oneself emperor: it diminished the claims of rival aspirants. Germany was unified by kings who were crowned emperor by the Pope, and in all probability it could not have been unified in any other manner. The Pope in turn, by offering the imperial crown to a German ruler, struck an alliance with that ruler against the Emperor in Byzantium, whose successors would then turn to the Slavs as a counterweight to the Germans. In this manner, imperial, national, and clerical rivalries all intermingled. Or one may say that the imperial title became the legitimation of what purported to be a Christian Empire. In a later age, after the religious division brought about by the Reformation, the Protestant rulers of England stood out against the Catholic King of Spain who by sheer coincidence also happened to be Emperor of Germany and chief claimant to the riches of America. When Elizabeth confronted Philip and the Armada she was hailed as the defender of the faith by Protestants unaware of her lukewarmness in theological matters, but she also stood forth as a good English patriot and a patron of Francis Drake's successful raids on the Spanish Empire. Less than a century later, Oliver Cromwell fought the Catholic Irish in the name of religion, and the Spaniards in the interest of Britain's growing overseas trade. He did not style himself king, let alone emperor, but he inaugurated modern imperialism all the same.

The Elizabethan interlude is of interest for our theme because it represents a link between the older and the newer significations of the term "empire." The *sacrum imperium* of the Germanic Middle Ages rested upon political arrangements ultimately designed to provide the Church with a political armature. In the post-medieval age the Holy Roman Empire began to look antiquated just because it was more than a purely political contrivance reducible to nation-state exclusiveness and the championship of commercial interests. It raised theological issues, had the See of Rome for its real center, and laid implicit claim not merely to greatness but to quasi-eternity. When the Pope on a celebrated occasion invoked his right to depose the Emperor, he instructed the German princes that it was their duty to elect a king who would do "what was necessary for the Christian creed and for the salvation of the whole *Imperium*."[18] After the Renaissance and the Reformation had done their respective work, such claims were no longer admitted even in those parts of Europe that remained Catholic. The kings of France and Spain took good care to make sure that no Pope could depose them as long as they stayed nominally within the faith. In Britain, where the *sacrum imperium* of the Germans had always been something of a joke, Protestantism rendered Papal claims wholly illusory and even made it treasonable for British subjects to take guidance from Rome.

In this respect, at least, the Renaissance prepared the way for the Reformation.

The Italian humanists had already secularized the meaning of "*imperium*" to signify no more than the power to rule, which was what it had originally meant to the Romans before the Church lawyers went to work on it. From this it followed that any state with an extended territory might call itself an *imperium* if its rulers so desired. The Italian city-states, where Renaissance humanism flourished, were in no position to make use of this discovery, but the new European nation-states had fewer inhibitions. Their kings stood ready to call

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themselves emperors at the merest drop of a crown.

If *imperium* signified no more than sovereign authority to rule, then why should the king of England not style himself *Imperator*? This was just what Henry VIII did when in 1532 he entered upon his celebrated quarrel with the Pope. His crown, inherited from no less a dignitary than Constantine, was "imperial." So at least his lawyers affirmed, on the authority of the noted historian, Polydore Vergil, and his parliaments dutifully agreed. Scholars might differ on the topic, especially if they were Continentals. "The English Imperial Crown won firm recognition, indeed, in England—and later on in Great Britain—but it was by no means 'accepted in the world.' "[14] No matter. Once the English had been won over to the idea, Elizabethan patriotism in the next generation rallied behind the Protestant Queen who inherited Henry's titles as well as his dominions. For good measure Shakespeare popularized the notion for all time: his England, like his France, was "an Empery."

Ideological delusion? But what force other than patriotism could keep England going during the long years of war against the mighty Spanish Empire? And if the new nationalism clothed itself in ideological forms, political realism raised its head in the writings of Bacon, whose essay *Of Empire* implicitly foreshadowed England's coming "imperial" greatness by its stress on the importance of sea power.[15] The term *l'empire de la mer* was familiar to his French contemporaries, who may have borrowed it from Virgil's *Aeneid*. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius laid it down that no state could lay claim to dominion of the seas—there was none *"qui mari imperaret."* His French contemporaries were uncertain whether Louis XIV ruled an *empire* or a mere *royaume*, but the French Academy eventually laid down the law on this as on most other subjects. Their linguists had originally defined an *empire* as a state composed of many peoples, a *royaume* as connoting a political entity expressive of *"l'unité de la nation dont il est formé."* But in 1718 pride got the better of them, although by then the Sun King had departed and been replaced by a mere Regent. If a kingdom was sufficiently great, it might be called an empire: there was, they affirmed in the third edition of their dictionary, an *Empire François*.[10]

ALL THIS may appear trivial by comparison with what was "really" happening: the rise of the nation-state and the concurrent spread of European power overseas, to Africa, Asia, and America. In fact, all these changes were interlinked, for the new absolute monarchy was the principal vehicle of "imperial" conquest. This circumstance was veiled by the internecine conflicts among the European states, which made it difficult to grasp the essential uniformity of what was happening to all of them. Since the *sacrum imperium* had failed to unify Europe—had in fact never seriously tried—it would have seemed absurd to Europeans to identify the acquisition of colonies abroad with "empire" in the Roman sense. European unity, such as it was, appeared as a precarious balance of rival states.[17] Most of them were constantly at war with each other and they also excluded one another from their respective shares in the lucrative African slave trade which they shared with the Moslems. Yet from a different viewpoint European power was flowing into regions hitherto untouched by the traditional struggle between the multi-national *Respublica Christiana* and the rival "empire" of the Turkish Sultans, successors to the Byzantine Emperors as well as to the earlier Arab rulers of the Islamic community. It all depended on the meaning one gave to *imperium*. If it simply denoted political sovereignty, then the world was full of kingdoms which might style themselves empires if they had attained a certain magnitude. If the term stood for the more or less forcible unification of different lands, or "crowns," then some kingdoms were empires, others not. Was Britain an Empire? The Crown lawyers, trying hard to uphold the dignity of their king against Rome, had made such an affirmation even before England acquired colonies outside Europe. In the 17th century the term was to acquire its modern meaning.

The gradual emergence of what in later years was to be known as the British Empire had its roots in domestic affairs, if the subjugation of the native Irish can be included under this head. For Henry VIII, the affirmation that "this realm of England is an Empire" constituted part of his struggle for making himself independent of the Pope. Under Elizabeth, who succeeded him after a brief Catholic interregnum, England's power was solidly implanted in Ireland—the first English colony—but the union with Scotland had not yet taken place. Its gradual accomplishment through the vicissitudes of the 17th century—dramatized by the Civil War between king and parliament, and the Cromwellian dictatorship that succeeded it—gave rise to the concept of "Britain," as distinct from "England." That is to say, the "British Empire" was originally perceived as denoting the union of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, the last-named by conquest and colonization, since the native Irish obstinately refused to abandon their Catholic faith and took every opportunity to massacre the English and Scottish colonists forcibly implanted on their soil.

The dual signification of "Empire"—as the union of different nations under one sovereign, and as the armed subjugation of conquered peoples—was present from the start, just as it had been in the days of the *imperium*. Overseas conquest in the newly discovered regions of Asia, Africa, and America was the next step. Pioneered by Elizabeth and continued under Cromwell, this

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mercantile expansion later became the special province of the Whig aristocracy which gained power in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688. But the decisive step had already been taken by Cromwell: another Protestant hero, conqueror of the Irish and mortal foe of Catholic Spain. Thus, at every step, political and ideological motivations intermingled; or rather, religion became the prime vehicle of imperial expansion. It was not a matter of making the natives part with their land in exchange for the Bible: this kind of cynicism belongs to a later age, when religion was no longer taken seriously and had become the province of missionaries.

To the contemporaries of Elizabeth the struggle against Catholic Spain was a life-and-death matter, for defeat would have signaled the extinction of England as an independent entity. Hence the naive patriotism of Anglican divines who sanctioned wars of conquest in the name of religion. Hence, too, the ease with which, from the Reformation to the Civil War and the Whig revolution of 1688, the idea of a distinctive British Empire fused with the claims of nationhood and Protestantism, to the point where the English came to think of themselves as successors to the lost tribes of Israel. The constitutional quarrel between the Stuart kings and their parliaments, which makes up most of the political history of the century after James VI of Scotland had been proclaimed Elizabeth's heir in 1603, never seriously threatened the fusion of Protestant English nationalism with British imperialism. The folly of the last Stuart, who tried to reverse this process, cost him his throne, for by then the oligarchy was already sufficiently powerful to make and unmake kings. This oligarchy had survived Cromwell, who in 1654 officially established the "Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging."

Cromwell did not create the British Empire: he fused an already existing imperial sentiment with the republican principles of the victorious Puritan party. The subsequent defeat of this party and its later revival on American soil form part of the history of Anglo-American politics and religion. The process of imperial expansion went on steadily all along, under Monarchy and Republic alike. The urge for "promoting the Glory of God and the Gospel" was indeed peculiarly Cromwellian, but when Puritanism had faded out, other motivations took its place—patriotism above all. They were no less sincerely felt for being in large measure self-serving.[18]

CROMWELL made the decisive break, for it was during his rule that the popular ferment let loose by the events of 1640-60 was transformed into the ideology of a new ruling stratum. He did for Puritanism and the English Revolution what Stalin three centuries later accomplished for Bolshevism and the Russian Revolution: he nationalized them. It was not merely that he broke with the Levellers and other radicals who took republican democracy seriously. He transformed his military dictatorship into imperialism in the classical sense of the term.[19] The sanguinary reconquest of Ireland from its native "Papists" (who had been solidly royalists during the civil war of 1642-49, and hence deserved to be massacred by English Protestants) was still in the traditional manner, comparable perhaps to Russia's subjugation of Poland. What really made a difference internationally was the Navigation Act of 1651, whereby the new republican government laid the principle down "that the colonies . . . should be subordinated to Parliament, thus making a coherent imperial policy possible; and that trade to the colonies should be monopolized by English shipping. As modified in 1660, the act laid the basis for England's policy during the next century and a half."[20]

The Act led straight to the wars against Protestant Holland, the first of which in 1652 broke out while Cromwell was at the height of his power. That is to say, English Protestant republicans, recently victorious in a civil war against the Stuart king and his Irish Catholic allies, fought Dutch Protestant republicans for the sake of Britain's overseas trade. Of course, that was not how the matter was put by the men in charge of the regicide Republic who in 1649-51 embarked upon the military conquest of Scotland and Ireland. As they saw it, the Republic needed a navy to protect itself from the royalist fleet commanded by Prince Rupert, and from Spain. Having assembled a fleet, and then discovered in Admiral Blake a naval commander who was a match for the royalists, they next proceeded to settle accounts with England's Dutch competitors. In private, Cromwell regretted the disagreeable necessity of fighting fellow-Protestants. He would have preferred to fight Spain instead, and did so on the first suitable occasion, to the great delight of the godly. But the Dutch were in the way. The Navigation Act had hit them hard, and war followed in the wake of commercial rivalry. The Anglo-Dutch struggle continued after Charles II had returned from exile in 1660 under the distinguished patronage of Louis XIV. Religion was still an important consideration, but only one among others. Empire counted for at least as much. "The Dutch wars (1652-74) broke the Dutch hold on trade in tobacco, sugar, furs, slaves, and codfish, and laid the foundation for the establishment of English territorial power in India. English trade to China also dates from these years."[21]

This was not quite the end of the matter. James, who succeeded Charles, in 1688 forfeited the throne by his religious folly and the Whig oligarchy imported William of Orange from Holland to replace him, thereby incidentally inaugurating a hundred-years-war against France for

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control of America and India. For the Dutch, who made possible the Glorious Revolution of 1688, this was a notable revenge, but the triumph was symbolic rather than real. "Dutch William" might style himself king of England, but Holland had for all practical purposes become a British protectorate, and the prolonged struggle waged by the Whig oligarchy against Louis XIV and his successors witnessed the steady decline of Dutch power and independence. Yet the Anglo-Dutch alliance held until the French Revolution a century later introduced a totally new line-up and even transformed Dutch republicans into ardent admirers of France. As long as the Versailles of the Bourbons was associated with absolutism and bloody persecution of Protestants, Holland could not well do anything but seek shelter under the protective shield of British sea power—even at the cost of losing much of its former empire to its successful rival. Protestantism had become the faith of the Dutch burghers, and the burgher class looked to the England of Whig parliaments and German-Protestant kings to protect it from the French menace. If New Amsterdam became New York, that was too bad, but bigger interests were at stake: the survival of Holland as an independent country and the physical existence of the Dutch bourgeoisie, a class which had reason to fear the triumph of Catholic absolutism. It took the French Revolution to lay this particular ghost. During the century preceding it the Whig oligarchy had an easy time: England stood for Protestantism, parliamentary government, and progress. Could anyone deny it? Voltaire and Montesquieu could not, and their nagging criticism heralded the demise of the *Ancien Régime*. But it was the Seven Years War (1756-63) that really turned the scales. In the course of this epic conflict the British swept the French out of India and North America, while Protestant Prussia victoriously stood off the assaults of the mighty Austrian and Russian Empires. Truly, Protestantism and progress marched together.[22]

SUCH NOTIONS, needless to say, were unwelcome to the Catholic rulers of the great continental European monarchies, but they were not confined to Whig oligarchs and Dutch republicans: Charles XII of Sweden and Frederick of Prussia emphatically concurred. Generally speaking, the fashionable identification of Protestantism with capitalism—especially plausible, for good reason, to Americans—runs up against the stubborn facts of history. Lutheran Sweden and Prussia (the latter admittedly long governed by Calvinist rulers) were military monarchies, not merchant republics, and foreign trade was marginal to their survival as distinctive entities during the wars that marked their existence. Sweden acquired an empire of *sorts* in the Baltic *after* it had come to the forefront thanks to the efficiency of its army, and engaged in constant warfare with rival powers, some of them fellow-Protestants. Prussia under Frederick never bothered about maritime claims—he left all such matters to his allies, the British. What he wanted and got was Austrian and Polish territory, not colonies overseas. Yet the rise of these absolute monarchies in northwestern Europe, in an age when Spain and Portugal sank into decadence, does seem to have been correlated to the after-effects of the Reformation. Conversely, the territorial spread of the rival Austrian and Russian Empires in the 18th century was evidently a function of their superior military efficiency when compared with the declining Ottoman Turkish Empire at whose expense Vienna and Petersburg systematically embarked upon conquest.

Thus the imperial mystique once associated with the ancient concept of Christendom continued to furnish a justification for the great continental Empires of the Hapsburgs and the Romanovs, while to the west an "Empire of the Sea" was slowly taking shape: pioneered by the Dutch, later taken over by the British, ultimately inherited by their American colonies. France was somewhere in between, uneasily perched between two stools, being both an absolute military monarchy ruled by Catholic kings and a maritime power with extensive possessions overseas, ultimately lost because the *Ancien Régime* had fallen into decrepitude, thereby bringing on the Revolution which was to change the face of politics. Speaking generally, absolutism acted as the pacemaker of nationalism at home, imperialism abroad. Although hampered by its feudal origins, it gradually evolved something like a modern consciousness, the centralized state conferring upon its subjects not merely the unsought benefits of taxation and conscription, but also the awareness of forming a separate nationhood. The "forty kings who in a thousand years made France" were no mere figment of royalist imagination. They, and their fellow-rulers, did lay the basis of the nation-state.[23]

Did they also pioneer the growth of "imperialism" in the modern sense of the term? Since they mostly presided over pre-capitalist economies, they cannot well be supposed to have done so. Yet, as we have seen, the Hapsburg "Empire" and the Russian "Empire" grew steadily at the expense of Turkey, and the rulers of Moscow also began that systematic encroachment upon Chinese territory which was later continued from St. Petersburg (and still later, if we are to believe the literature currently issuing from Peking, by the post-revolutionary successors of the Czars). In the end, the answer to our question depends upon the meaning we are prepared to give to our key term. If empire signifies domination over conquered peoples, then the notable differences between Protestant Europe and Counter-Reforma-

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tion Europe shrink into insignificance. If one is determined to make imperialism rhyme with capitalism, one will have to ignore all empires save those that were built overseas by the nation-states of Western Europe in the age of their maritime predominance. Empire, then, denotes what was undertaken by the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the French, the Dutch, the British, and finally the Americans. This is the currently fashionable use of the term. It has never made much sense to Germans or East Europeans, and all the evidence suggests that it no longer makes sense to the Chinese either.

III

No ADEQUATE historical or theoretical arguments can be adduced for limiting the terms "empire" and "imperialism" to one particular form of domination over conquered peoples, let alone to overseas colonization prompted by mercantile interests. Nonetheless, the present section will for convenience be concerned with the British Empire and its American successor. We therefore take as our starting point the "Empire of the Sea" built up during the 18th century by the Whig oligarchy which had taken over from the Puritan Commonwealth and the Stuart kings. This approach makes it possible to integrate the principal socioeconomic features of the age—mercantilism and colonialism—within the familiar historical perspective which opens with the Whig Revolution of 1688-89 and terminates with the French Revolution a century later. The American War of Independence, toward the close of this period, exhibits all the features of a national rising, with the obvious proviso that the revolutionaries were not "under-privileged" helots, but the ruling class of a society largely sustained by slave labor, and for the rest free farmers owning their land. The revolution was in this sense a "bourgeois" one, and its aims did not call into question the Whig doctrines elaborated in England a century earlier: an elementary verity adequately attested to by the fact that the official philosopher of Whiggery, John Locke, could be quoted in support of the principles invoked against the imperial British government in 1776.

In adopting this approach we follow the logic of the economic historians, and this circumstance itself constitutes a novelty. The preceding section dealt largely with the tension between medieval and modern forms of political rule, Protestantism being enlisted on the side of modernity, albeit with a few backslidings. The conflicts which determined the rise of England and the decline of Spain were fought out "in ideological forms," the two parties respectively championing the principles of Reformation and Counter Reformation. During the mercantilist age, which for our purpose begins with Cromwell's Navigation Act of 1651, the rivalries among the European powers are no longer determined by religious antagonisms, although these do not disappear. Political alignments increasingly cut across religious barriers, a circumstance already noticeable during the later stages of the Thirty Years War (1618-48), when Catholic France and Protestant Sweden allied themselves against the Hapsburg Empire. The "end of ideology" aspect of mercantilism is important for our theme, but one must beware of supposing that what became true then had always been the case. We have already seen that neither the medieval nor the early modern period can be satisfactorily explained on the assumption that all parties were concealing crude material interests behind religious professions. What actually happened in medieval Europe was that the nations constituted themselves with the aid of religious cultures to which they gave their allegiance because religious belief defined national identity. When the nation-state emerged, it became possible to do without religious uniformity, but this was promptly replaced by a newcomer: patritoism, the affirmation of unquestioning faith in one's country. Ideology never dies, it merely changes its shape. No major society can get on without it.

A related misunderstanding to be avoided is the notion that in passing beyond feudalism and absolutism we simply exchange one form of interest conflict for another: war over colonial spoils for war over territory. It is true that the typical mercantilist conflict had to do with overseas trade and colonies, the latter furnishing raw materials (and slave labor) for the benefit of the former. But the ability to discriminate clearly between economic and non-economic goals was just what made this new age so different from the one it succeeded. Feudalism as a system of government knew no such clear-cut distinction. Its wars—when not fought against religious heretics or unbelievers—were primarily waged for the purpose of bringing territorial barons under the control of the central power. The absolutist state which grew out of this struggle was in the first place an instrument for enabling the king to keep his barons in check, and secondly a means of keeping rival kingdoms at bay. So far as its rulers had economic aims, they were subordinated to the overriding need for instituting the modern state with its claims to sovereignty and popular loyalty. A fairly typical alignment during the medieval epoch enlisted the urban agglomeration, the *bourg*, on the king's side against rebellious nobles. Alternatively, the city fought for freedom from feudal and monarchical oppression. These medieval class-conflicts gave rise to the city-state, perhaps Europe's most distinctive contribution to political history. The Orient never saw anything like it, for the theocratic monarchies of the East strangled civic autonomy along with security of private property. For the same reason the Orient never developed a genuine capitalism.[24]

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On the assumptions common to theorists since the age of absolutism—Hobbes being the classic case—the politics of the mercantilist era offer no particular problem, but this is because we now take it for granted that there is such a thing as a sovereign state acting primarily in the interest of an economically dominant class. To medieval rulers and theologians such a statement would have seemed outrageous nonsense, and as late as the middle of the 17th century Hobbes's contemporaries were duly shocked by his *Leviathan* (1651), whose publication date, by an agreeable irony, coincided with the Navigation Act. Hobbes made explicit what both Cromwell and Charles II were busy teaching their contemporaries: religion had been divorced from statecraft. This separation was not the fruit of intellectual enlightenment alone. It had come about because the sovereign state had at long last emerged from the ruins of feudalism. "The states of the Middle Ages had not been sovereign states in the modern sense of the word; indeed sovereignty in its classical conception had almost completely vanished, except insofar as it survived in the Papal claim to *plenitudo potestatis*. It has been said, with some justice if the term is used in its modern connotation, that the only state in the Middle Ages was the Church. The idea of secular sovereignty only reappeared when the Middle Ages were drawing to their close."[25] The Italian city-states were the first modern political entities to escape from the joint tutelage of the Holy Roman Empire and the Church, but they were too small to bring their sea-power to bear in waters other than those of the Mediterranean. The city-states of Venice and Genoa never evolved into "nations." Spain, France, Holland, and England did and it was in these new nation-states that absolutism found its intellectual defenders.[26]

WHAT IS the link, though, between absolutism and mercantilism, other than the obvious fact that the sovereign nation-state could and did intervene to protect its traders and incidentally to expand its own "sphere of influence" at the expense of commercial rivals? To call the 1651 Navigation Act a mercantilist measure is after all to say more than that it had something to do with trade and the interest of merchants. It is to specify a structural whole to which the name "mercantilism" can be given, at any rate retrospectively, for the 17th century did not employ the term. The "mercantile system," as described by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations* published in 1776—another historic date terminating one era and inaugurating another—differed from the laissez-faire system favored by the early liberals and their successors in that it involved all governments in the ruinous pursuit of an absurd goal: the unending accumulation of gold and silver. The supply of money, like the supply of any other commodity, ought to be regulated by the laws of the market. That at any rate was Smith's view, and his opinion carried weight. But if it was only a matter of government imbecility, why had the system endured for 125 years in Smith's own Britain, and why was it now about to become the prime issue in the revolt of Britain's American colonies? For an answer to this question one must take a look at the "Empire of the Sea" which the Whig oligarchy had built up in the course of its strenuous wars against the France of Louis XIV and Louis XV.

The main question is how far the mercantilist system inaugurated in 1650-60 can be invoked to account for the evolution of the British Empire in the century and a half following this date. English foreign trade almost doubled between 1700 and 1780, and then trebled during the next twenty years. That is to say, it grew relatively slowly until the American colonies had been lost, and a good deal more rapidly thereafter. At first sight this seems to bear out Smith's contention that mercantilism was not merely immoral but senseless. But one must remember that the Industrial Revolution got into its stride only after 1780. It has also been observed by economic historians that between 1700 and 1780 there occurred a marked shift away from trade with continental Europe to trade with the colonies. Since the essence of mercantilism lay in the systematic preference extended to British merchants and shippers, it would be hazardous to assert that government policy had nothing to do with the growth of exports. It must also be borne in mind that British control of the seas dated from the successful conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713. "Rule Britannia" was composed, not accidentally, in 1740, when England once more had entered upon war against Spain, soon to be aided by France.

Altogether, it seems safe to conclude that the Navigation Act laid the foundation for the very lucrative trade with the West Indies in the next century; while the War of the Spanish Succession, by securing for England the *Asiento*—that is to say, the monopoly of supplying black slaves to the Spanish American Empire—speeded the accumulation of commercial capital in England and Jamaica. This capital accumulation in turn fed the early Industrial Revolution which had England for its center. In due course, the profits from industrialization made it unnecessary to lean so heavily on trade with the colonies. It also became possible for Britain to abolish the slave trade without ruinous consequences. All told, *The Wealth of Nations* deserved its success: its publication marked the point when mercanitalism had outlived its usefulness. The system then began to look odious and stupid, but that is the usual fate of socioeconomic formations which have lost their rationale.

Although Smith specifically excepted the original Navigation Act from his strictures, on the

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grounds that it had been necessary for England's defense, the general tendency of his argument was to make "the commercial or mercantile system" seem absurd. Its authors, he thought, had confused material wealth with money. The protectionist rejoinder to Smith, inaugurated by Friedrich List and other German economists in the following century, stressed the political aspect of mercantilism: the system, they held, was perfectly rational, even though some of the arguments employed in its defense were fallacious. Its purpose was not to maximize welfare, but to promote the economic and political independence of the nation-state. We shall return to this quarrel when we reach the threshold of the Anglo-German conflict which came to overshadow the first half of the 20th century. In our present context we may agree that mercantilism did help to provoke the revolt of the American colonies, but it did so in the context of a debate among Americans over the advantages to be derived from the existence of a British Empire on American soil. In the course of this debate, leading American spokesmen like Benjamin Franklin at first made the Empire the symbol of their faith in the future of British America.[27] Anglo-American relations were disrupted because the imperial government clung to its antiquated behavior, and the parting of the ways became inevitable. The emotional driving forces were imperial arrogance on the British side, national sentiment on the American. There was no insurmountable clash of interest, rather a political quarrel exacerbated by the British government's failure to take American patriotism seriously. That the economist conflict need not have escalated to the point of national separation is evident from the fact that Britain in the next century avoided a similar confrontation with Canada.

This is not to deny that mercantilism worked to the disadvantage of the North American colonies, once their internal development had reached the point where they could compete with the imperial metropolis. Between 1700 and 1770 their population grew tenfold—from 200,000 to two million. The market they provided for English industries was important, and it was obviously to the interest of English manufacturers not to allow the growth of American competition. Hence the destruction of the American cloth industry in 1719, and the prohibition in 1750 of new iron works on American soil. Even Chatham, otherwise inclined to make concessions to American wishes, declared that he would not allow a nail to be made in the colonies without the express permission of the British Parliament. In practice all this was disregarded, not only by American smugglers and manufacturers, but by the British government, for in 1774 one-third of the British merchant navy was being built in America.

But the assertion of sovereignty rankled, and in the end it was this, rather than plain discrimination, which drove the Americans into rebellion. The Irish had worse grievances, but had to bear them because British rule over Ireland could be enforced. In America it had for all practical purposes been rendered ineffective even before the war started, and the proclamations of the British Parliament were resented for their absurdity as much as for the regulations they were trying to enforce. In this sense the mercantile system had already broken down before it was destroyed in the course of the American Revolution.

In turning the tables on their former British overlords, the Americans made use of an argument Smith had been among the first to expound in 1776. The gravamen of the charge he brought against the ruling class of his day was this: the mercantile system, professedly designed to insure a favorable balance of trade, was in reality advantageous only to a narrow group which carried undue weight in Parliament. Governmental interference did not benefit the nation as a whole: it only benefited the merchant oligarchs at the expense of all the rest, including those industries which were positively damaged by the favors bestowed upon shippers and exporters. Mercantilism in fact was a conspiracy got up for the benefit of monopolists determined to keep foreigners out of the home market, damage Britain's European competitors, and reserve the benefits of colonial trade for themselves. Smith's indignation went so far as to denounce the system as contrary to "nature"—the ultimate sanction available to a philosopher of the Enlightenment. His American readers naturally concurred, since it was one of their aims to break the imperial stranglehold upon the lucrative trade with the Dutch, French, and Spanish possessions in the West Indies. Yet, having won their independence, the Americans displayed a marked reluctance to adopt the core of Smith's program: universal free trade. Industries were necessary for the United States, and these industries had to be built up behind protective tariff walls if they were to survive foreign competition. America's conversion to economic liberalism occurred only after the United States had become the world's leading industrial producer and was on the way to becoming its leading exporter as well—in part at least at the expense of the British. History has an odd way of repeating itself.[28]

Here a parallel strikes the eye of the beholder writing in the year 1970: the comparison between Holland's place in the scheme of things once the British Empire had been constituted, and Britain's very similar position vis-à-vis America two or three centuries later. Reference has already been made to the manner in which the Whig oligarchy employed its Dutch allies in the struggle against France. In British historical literature, the hero of this particular episode is William of Orange, thanks to whom the Protestant alliance against

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Louis XIV got under way in 1688 (with Papal blessing, incidentally, although this fact is seldom mentioned). Dutch historians have on occasion come to different conclusions. The most distinguished of them all in recent times, Geyl, had this to say about the Anglo-Dutch alliance formalized in 1688:

> At the end of the day the close ties which bound Orange to England . . . proved fatal to the internal politics of the Republic and placed her in bondage to England. The dynastic element of the alliance and the intensification of party strife increasingly paralyzed the hand of the Dutch state and led to the total collapse of the old Republic.[29]

Mutatis mutandis, a similar judgment might have been delivered in 1970 by a British historian pondering the results of his country's growing dependence upon the United States ever since the German menace began to materialize around 1900, and more especially in the desperate years after 1940. The British, like the Dutch before them, had no real option, but to concede this is not to say that the alliance was uniformly beneficial for the weaker party. Alliances rarely are.

But how did this reversal of roles come about? Why was the British Empire at the close of the 18th century unable to accommodate the American colonies? Or, failing an accommodation beyond a certain point in time, why did the separation—instead of being peaceful, as in the later stages of British imperial history—take the form of a ruinous war? The moment one raises this question, the debate shifts to the political plane. There simply is no way of demonstrating that the economic interests of the British government and the North American colonies had become irreconcilable by 1775. What had become intolerable was the state of their political relations. To deduce this circumstance from an underlying clash of material interests is to fall into the crudest kind of economism. Nor does the personal factor explain much. George III notwithstanding, a prolonged war with the American colonies, which gave France an opportunity for revenge after the loss of Canada in 1763, was the last thing the British government wanted. If it drifted into the very situation it was anxious to avoid—another round in the great Anglo-French duel, with the Americans this time enlisted on the French side—the outcome arose from miscalculation. But to concede this is to make nonsense of the argument from necessity. It was *hubris* that drove the British ministers to the point of overstraining the patience of their American friends, Franklin among them. But *hubris,* although fairly common, is not measurable or calculable. As a matter of ordinary common-sense, the imperial government—as Burke did not fail to point out—ought to have abstained from the follies that brought about the war and the separation.

So far as the functioning of the British parliamentary system in that age is concerned, few people would dispute the statement that the definitive study of this topic is to be found in the work of L. B. Namier, notably in the volume first published in 1930 under the title *England in the Age of the American Revolution.*[30] However, two qualifications impose themselves. First, Namier's fondness for the parliamentary oligarchy he described with such loving care led him to underrate the importance of the Whig-Tory cleavage, and to neglect altogether those plebeian undercurrents which were to surface in the course of the long war against the colonies. His bias also accounts for utterances such as the following: "It is to the honor of British statesmen that they did not heed the warnings of those who looked upon the presence of the French in North America as a useful check on the Colonies—although the view was widely canvassed, and ultimately proved correct. For with the removal of the French, the road to independence, and even to a French alliance against Great Britain, was opened for the Colonies."[31] London really had no choice in the matter if it wanted to clear the French out of Canada; and the colonies turned to France only when their leaders discovered that there was no way of obtaining autonomy within the British Empire. In this matter Benjamin Franklin is a better guide than L. B. Namier. In the pamphlet already mentioned he predicted that the population of the colonies would double every quarter century, and admonished the British goverment to secure additional living space for these newcomers, on the grounds that a prince who "acquires new Territory, if he finds it vacant, or removes the Natives to give his own People Room" deserves the gratitude of posterity.[32] This expansion was in the interest of the mother country and her daughters alike. "What an Accession of Power to the *British* Empire by Sea as well as by Land! What Increase of Trade and Navigation. . . . How important an Affair then to *Britain* . . . and how careful should she be to secure Room enough, since on the Room depends so much the increase of her People."[33]

At a conference of governors and colonial representatives held at Albany in 1754, Franklin submitted plans for a federalized Empire and in 1761, toward the close of the Seven Years War, he sided with Pitt in urging that the British acquire control of Canada. For this was the key to the Mississippi valley, which in turn could be used for "raising a strength . . . which, on occasions of a future war, might easily be poured down upon the lower country [presumably Florida] and into the Bay of Mexico, to be used against Cuba, the French islands, or Mexico itself."[34] All told, Franklin had a fairly realistic view of the future. This of course did not prevent the Founding Fathers of the Republic—or the worthy Thomas Paine, who believed all they told him—from af-

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firming after 1776 that the "French and Indian wars" of 1689-1763 had been exclusively the work of the sinful British government, but for whose constant meddling the American settlers would have lived in perfect peace with their neighbors and never coveted an inch of their soil. In the words of the American historian already cited, "they wished to forget the dimly-formed principle of empire solidarity for which both Pitt and Franklin stood in 1761, and to chart a new course of empire unhampered by a distant government."[35]

YET THE idea of a federalized British Empire took a long time a-dying. It had influential spokesmen in the Continental Congress of 1774, and was resolutely championed by the leaders of the Whig oligarchy in Britain—Chatham, Fox, and Shelburne among them. But for the imbecility of George III and the Tory squires who backed his Ministers, it would probably have been adopted as a compromise solution before French intervention, and the growing radicalization of the colonies, had rendered all such schemes illusory. For that matter, the immediate effect of the French alliance in 1778 was to stimulate Congress into an unsuccessful attempt to wrest Canada from the British. America had been launched on its imperial path, from which in two centuries it has never swerved.

Nor is there anything surprising about it. The notion that imperial expansion was "natural" formed part of the stock equipment of the Enlightenment. On this point it is unnecessary to go back to Hobbes, let alone Machiavelli, whose primitive schemes for the aggrandizement of his native Florence belong to the city-state era. By the time of the American Revolution the concept of "empire" had been redefined to embrace the notion of "civilization." When Alexander Hamilton talked of acquiring control of the Caribbean, he did not shock his opponents. "To both of the political parties—Federalists and Republicans—the new federal union was an empire. The two terms were equivalents in the vocabularies of Washington, Adams, Hamilton, and Jefferson."[36] It was not until the Civil War that public men learned to talk of the "American nation" instead. And of course by the time this nation had completed its purely territorial expansion, it was no longer politic to speak of "empire," a concept now associated with the effete British and the European monarchies generally. American democracy would have no truck with the notion of lording it over subject people—until the Spanish-American war of 1898 suddenly precipitated what could no longer be described as anything but "imperialism" in the classical meaning of the term. But it was liberal imperialism—the imperialism of "progress." The United States did not wish to annex foreign countries; it merely desired to improve them for their own good. The aim was no longer continental expansion and the acquisition of territory, but political penetration in the interest of economic development. But then the British had by 1900 reached a similar stage and adopted the same sort of language. Moreover they were beginning to federalize their empire—or at least the white-settler parts of it—and to project self-government for India. Liberal imperialism—the imperialism of Gladstone, Lloyd George, Churchill, and the two Roosevelts—was of course not mercantilist and made no attempt to interfere with economic laissez-faire. On the contrary, it promoted it; that was the whole point about it.

To be effective, though, this sort of penetration needed a secure home base, whence the Monroe Doctrine and other trifling departures from the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of others. Moreover, the nation-building process developed its own momentum, always threatening to spill over into annexation. This was something the British could have told their American pupils, had they been willing to listen. American expansion was national before it became imperial in the classical sense, but the borderline could be crossed even in the age of Jefferson who acquired Louisiana from France in 1803 by purchase, and then dreamed of "liberating" Canada in 1812-14. Was this mere nation-building or something else? The answer depends once more upon the signification one accords to the term "imperialism."

We have all been conditioned of late to identify it with capitalist expansion, and in the era of the Industrial Revolution that is basically what it was. But the story of Russian expansion into Siberia in the 17th century, and the current dispute between Moscow and Peking, serve as a reminder that an "empire" may be acquired by the simple process of pushing into uninhabited, or sparsely inhabited, territory and replacing the indigenous population by settlers belonging to the dominant people. The notion that an empire must necessarily consist of colonial possessions is a fantasy. This topic will be discussed later on. Here we simply note that there is no need to invoke hidden interests as the force behind continental expansion in the 19th century. The process of nation-building in North America inevitably entailed rivalry with the British and Spanish Empires. In this sense of the term, the Republic was "imperial" from the start.

IV

"SEVENTEEN SEVENTY-SIX as all know, and it is one of the few things that all know, was the year when America declared her independence (4th July) and Adam Smith published *The Wealth of Nations* (9th March).... Not so many know, or knowing remember, that on 25th August, 1776, David Hume breathed his last and that in March 1776 Canada repulsed an in-

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vasion from America."[37] Mr. C. R. Fay's irony is understandable. He is after all British, hence inevitably prejudiced against the American Republic. He even compares the American colonists to the Boer settlers who in 1899 made a stand for political independence from the British Empire (ultimately successful, since they scored in the political arena after losing their fight on the battlefields of the South African Veld). But we must attend to the theoretical core of this author's argument, since he happens to be an economic historian. The topic which concerns us is the survival of imperialism into the 19th century, when by all the standards of free-trade logic it ought to have faded away like the Cheshire cat. Why did imperialism not follow mercantilism into oblivion? Why did it revive and expand at the very peak of the liberal era, in the age of W. E. Gladstone, thus giving rise to the phenomenon known in British literature as "liberal imperialism"? These are nagging questions for liberals. They have become equally nagging for socialists ever since it began to dawn on them that socialism too was not immune to the infection. For the moment, however, we are concerned with the liberal 19th century and the system of economic organization then prevalent in the Western world.

THAT SYSTEM, as no one needs to be told, was capitalism, but what kind of capitalism? After all, mercantilism too can be included under this head. At this point, however, we must be clear what we are talking about. If by mercantilism we mean merchant capitalism, i.e., capitalism *before* the Industrial Revolution, there is no further problem: everyone can see at once in what sense the 19th century inaugurated a watershed. What mattered now was no longer colonial trade in sugar and other tropical products grown by slave labor on West Indian plantations, but the output of the new factories serviced by machines and free labor, although cotton grown by slaves for the benefit of textile manufacturers provided a link with the earlier phase down to the American Civil War. Setting aside the American South as an anomaly which somehow survived into the new age, we can draw a clear dividing line between the earlier and the later period: merchant capitalism and slave labor on the one hand, industrial capitalism and wage labor on the other. This is the standard liberal view of the subject, inaugurated by Smith and brought to perfection by Ricardo, Mill, and their successors. It is also substantially the Marxist view. Marx after all was the heir of Ricardo and the contemporary of Mill. The economic system he describes in *Capital* is the mature industrial capitalism of the later 19th century.

There exists, however, a somewhat different view of the subject, pioneered by Friedrich List (1789-1846) and brought to perfection by Gustav von Schmoller (1838-1917) and the other writers of the so-called German Historical School. List, an economic nationalist and advocate of industrialization, thought protectionism quite rational and rejected laissez-faire as unsuitable for Germany and for Britain's competitors in the 19th century generally. It was, he thought, something the British were trying to export, along with cotton, to the detriment of industrially less developed nations. Lists's arguments were echoed by his American contemporary Henry C. Carey (1793-1879), and by the latter's German admirer Eugene Dühring, another nationalist and the butt of Friedrich Engels's celebrated pamphlet (1878). Dühring, a fanatical anti-Semite, was to become a major figure in the pantheon of German National Socialism, but we are not obliged to hold List responsible for all his pupils. Most of them were quite respectable, although it is not without interest that Werner Sombart (1863-1941) ended his days as a supporter of Hitler. The early founders of the Historical School (Bruno Hildebrand, Wilhelm Roscher, and Karl Knies) were moderate liberals, and their successors—principally Schmoller Karl Bücher, and Lujo Brentano—conserved many elements of the liberal outlook, although Schmoller at least was also an enthusiastic imperialist. We shall come to that presently, but let us stay for a moment with the dispute over the meaning of mercantilism. Schmoller's main theme throughout his writings was that economic life depends on political decision-making. There was no such thing as a self-propelling market system geared to the demands of individuals. Rather, the economic process was guided by state action, and always had been:

> . . . mercantilism . . . in its inmost kernel is nothing but state-making—not state-making in a narrow sense, but state-making and national-economy-making at the same time.[38]

Schmoller did not dispute Smith's description of how the "mercantile system" actually worked: exports were artificially stimulated by bounties, imports hampered by a ban of foreign manufactures, trade was promoted by commercial treaties, and the colonies were reserved for the imperial metropolis. What was wrong with all that, he asked? It was simply a way of building up the power of one's nation. The wars of the 17th and 18th centuries had admittedly been trade wars, but then it was perfectly proper and legitimate to advance the cause of one's country at the expense of rivals:

> . . . it was precisely those Governments which understood how to put the might of their fleets and admiralties, the apparatus of customs laws, with rapidity, boldness, and clear purpose at the service of the economic interests of the nation and state, which obtained thereby the lead

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in the struggle and in riches and industrial prosperity.[39]

SCHMOLLER, who was a prominent academic in the Bismarck era, inevitably sounded rather "Prussian" to British liberals, but he was not without influence in contemporary England, where economic nationalism was reviving under the spur of German competition. William Cunningham, author of an important work entiteld *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, owed much to Schmoller. Mercantilism, he agreed, could not be dismissed as a conspiracy got up to enrich a few merchants:

> Politicians of the 16th, 17th, and the greater part of the 18th century, were agreed in trying to regulate all commerce and industry so that the *power* of England relative to other nations might be promoted, and in carrying out this aim had no scruples in trampling on private interests.[40]

This view of the subject received its theoretical summation in Professor Eli Heckscher's *Mercantilism,* first published in Sweden in 1931 and translated into English three years later. Heckscher was no admirer of what the Germans called *Merkantilismus,* not to mention *Staatsbildung* (state-making). He agreed that Schmoller and the other members of the Historical School had described the system correctly, but he condemned its purpose. It was wrong to aim at the extension of state power: the proper goal of economic policy was the creation of wealth. Mercantilism was an aberration due to the intermingling of political and economic forces. Fay's work likewise represented a reaction to the school of thought founded by Cunningham; he had no patience with *Merkantilismus* at all:

> I agree, as I have said, with Edwin Cannan that it is a misfortune that the German historical school took hold of the concept of mercantilism and so re-cast it that they provided the fatherland with a place in the mercantile sun. Schmoller's mercantilism not less than Bucher's is an economic bastard. The Germany of the 16th, 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries was, quite as much as Italy, outside the mercantile sweep, whether we are thinking of doctrine, policy, or system of trade. If Germany was mercantilist, then mercantilism is just economic nationalism, and a good word wasted.[41]

Not wasted, however, to the mind of economic nationalists who favored protectionism as against the practice of free trade, officialized with abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846 when England was at the peak of its industrial eminence and had no need to fear foreign competition. In this respect List worked out a system of ideas he had picked up in America from the followers of Alexander Hamilton. His pupils may have misused the term *Merkantilismus,* but they knew what they wanted.

The final turn of the wheel, ironically enough, is associated with the name of Keynes who in an Appendix to his *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (1936) undertook a reassessment of the mercantilists. On balance he found much to praise in their "contribution to statecraft, which is concerned with the economic system as a whole and with securing the optimum employment of the system's entire resources": an aim in whose pursuit "the methods of the early pioneers of economic thinking in the 16th and 17th centuries may have attained to fragments of practical wisdom which the unrealistic abstractions of Ricardo first forgot and then obliterated."[42]

This heresy brought down upon his head the wrath of Professor Heckscher, but Keynes was unabashed and he had the last word. In November 1946, a century after England's formal conversion to free trade and laissez-faire, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Britain's first postwar Labour Government, Mr. Hugh Dalton, laid it down that "the first principle to be adopted in our export policy [is] to export fully manufactured goods in preference to partly manufactured goods. . . . The more brains and craftsmanship we can export, the better for our balance of payments position and thus the higher our standard of living." The wheel had come full circle. Keynes's belated conversion to the view that there was no self-adjusting mechanism of foreign trade, and his statement that "we, the faculty of economists, prove to have been guilty of presumptuous error in treating as a puerile obsession what for centuries has been a prime object of practical statecraft" rang the knell of economic liberalism. It did so, in the words of a later writer, "especially as the suspicion grew that the age of laissez-faire had perhaps been an interlude between the mercantile age and what threatened to be another extended period of regulation according to principles not unlike those of the earlier period.[43]

HAVING STRESSED the parallel between the old and the new protectionism we must now emphasize the difference. Heckscher and others drew attention to the chief weakness of mercantilist theorizing: it was not merely nationalist and attuned to the idea of constant war, but obsessed by the notion that the world's total wealth formed a given quantity which could not be significantly increased. From this it followed that a nation could enrich itself only at the expense of its rivals. It was this faulty reasoning that induced the classical economists of the liberal age to treat their forerunners as imbeciles. That they were not justified in doing so was the burden of Keynes's argument in 1936, for he had by then reluctantly come around to the conclusion that the world eco-

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nomic system was not self-regulating, and that state intervention was needed to keep it in balance. This did not make him a nationalist, nor did he have to become an imperialist: for Britain already possessed the world's greatest empire.

The Germans before 1914 were in a different position. Having no significant overseas possessions —the African colonies acquired by Bismarck were barely beginning to produce a few raw materials— and feeling hemmed in at home, they came to rest their hopes on the idea of Central European hegemony. From there it was only a step to the idea of "colonizing" the Slavs: the Ukraine was to be their Africa. In this respect Hitler was merely the executor of a Pan-German program which began to take shape in the 1890's. The intellectual justification was provided by the theorists of the Historical School: the earth was about to be divided up among rival empires, and Germany must not be left out. To the classical liberal thesis that the world market was capable of indefinite expansion, there was now a counter-argument: the world's total economic resources might be unlimited, but unless action was taken in time, the great empires would shut out their rivals.

Back then to the Germans and in particular to Schmoller. We have not yet finished with this distinguished economic historian, for he leads us on to our next subject: imperialism in the age preceding the world wars of the present century. In 1890, when Caprivi—Bismarck's successor from 1890 to 1894—was trying to work out a system for linking the newly founded German *Reich* more closely to its European neighbors and satellites, Schmoller came to his aid with an article boldly forecasting a new age of imperialism, and incidentally giving everyone a foretaste of Germany's war aims in 1914:

> He who is perceptive enough to realize that the course of world history in the 20th century will be determined by the competition between the Russian, English, American, and perhaps Chinese world empires, and by their aspirations to reduce all the other smaller states to dependence on them, will also see in a central European customs federation the nucleus of something which may save from destruction not only the political independence of those states, but Europe's higher, ancient cuture itself.[44]

German writers have traditionally excelled in making gloomy forecasts, and they have done so because Hegel had taught them to think historically. As early as 1842 Hegel's pupil Bruno Bauer, writing in the liberal *Rheinische Zeitung*, then briefly edited by his friend Marx (not yet a Communist), had drawn alarming conclusions from his reading of Toqueville:

> Whoever thinks of Europe's and Germany's future must not overlook North America, for the struggle among the European states will soon give place to a greater conflict, that between continents (*dem Kampf der Welttheile*).[45]

Where then is the economic link between the old mercantilism and the new imperialism? On this topic Mr. Fay is an unimpeachable witness, being in the English liberal tradition:

> Note, first what the system was. It was a type of imperial economy, the fruit of that overseas (not overland) expansion whereby Holland and England, followed tardily by the other great powers and by Germany last of all, reached imperial stature and economic power.[46]

The system was pioneered by the Dutch. The Italian city-states and their German counterparts had missed the boat; France and Spain were too landlocked and too busy with their Counter-Reformation to give their full attention to overseas conquest. Only England was in a position to take up where the Dutch had left off. Holland soon lost its lead and England lost the American colonies but by then the break had been made: the "mercantile system," with its roots in urban commerce, had superseded the old agrarian economy of feudal Europe and laid the basis for capital accumulation in the Industrial Revolution which burst upon the global scene around 1850.

But why were the Germans first in rehabilitating the old mercantilist doctrine? The answer should by now be obvious. Nineteenth-century Germany was trying to make up for lost time, and in the process it rediscovered some elements of that "practical wisdom" to which Lord Keynes paid reluctant tribute in 1936. The Historical School was not indeed alone in stressing the importance of the state in fostering economic growth: Marx did the same in *Capital*. But Marx was a heretic, whereas Schmoller and his friends were leaders of opinion in Bismarckian and Wilhelminian Germany. All told, they laid the theoretical basis for German policy in the new age of empire-building. In this they were both helped and hindered by their intellectual heritage: helped because they had no need to inflate laissez-faire into a world-view; hindered because their political conservatism left them with nothing more entrancing to offer their countrymen than self-aggrandizement as a national goal. German imperialism got under way *without a universal idea to sustain it*. This circumstance in the end proved to be its ruin.

How did the British react to the German challenge? In the first place, by ignoring it. This was easy enough during the mid-Victorian era when industrial competition, such as it was, came chiefly from the United States, and in Europe from France and Belgium,

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who presented no direct military threat. The German Confederation was a ponderous decentralized affair, until Bismarck came along, and its rulers generally tended to side with England against France, then the most active imperial rival in Africa and Asia. No problem here, but certain troublesome undercurrents were already beginning to make themselves felt in the heyday of Cobdenite liberalism and Palmerstonian imperialism. In the first place, Cobden's free-trade gospel, while effective enough in the economic sphere, quite failed to restrain either Whigs or Tories when it was a matter of supporting Turkey against Russia by military force (1853-56) or of annexing island territories and colonies abroad. Nor was the bloody suppression of the Indian Mutiny of 1857 exactly in tune with liberal middle-class tenets. If England faced rebellion in Ireland or India, the Army had to be employed, and the Army was officered by the landed gentry, which in turn supported the Tories, as did the Anglican Church, much of the country population, and a sizable proportion of the urban working class. All very awkward, especially when in the 1870's Disraeli invented the "new Toryism": a clever mixture of imperialism abroad and inexpensive social reforms at home. The mixture proved popular, and in the 1880's Gladstone's Liberal Party felt obliged to adapt itself to the trend. By then the mid-Victorian free-trade boom was over, German and American competition was getting stiffer, and laissez-faire no longer seemed quite as convincing as it had to the generation of Cobden and Bright. Something had gone wrong. What was it?

First, there was the relative narrowness of the Empire's home base. Britain was an island, and this circumstance afforded obvious strategic advantages, but it also imposed limitations upon the growth of population and the use made of home-based resources. British surplus capital and labor could and did migrate to Canada, Australia-New Zealand, or South Africa, but in the process new and potentially rival nations came into being, even though valuable economic and cultural links were forged at the same time. The financial profit-and-loss account does not tell the whole story. British firms abroad repatriated a proportion of their earnings, and their presence helped to promote the growth of British shipping, banking, and insurance. On the other hand, the metropolis was drained of capital and technical ability for the benfit of what were ultimately foreign countries, albeit English-speaking ones. Who reaped the principal benefit from all this? The British Isles? It was difficult to strike a balance.

> In the literal sense Britain was perhaps never the "workshop of the world," but her industrial dominance was such in the middle of the 19th century that the phrase is legitimate. She produced perhaps two-thirds of the world's coal, perhaps half its iron, five-sevenths of its small supply of steel, about half of such cotton cloth as was produced on a commercial scale, and forty per cent (in value) of its hardware. On the other hand even in 1840 Britain possessed only about one-third of the world's steam power and produced probably something less than one-third of the world's total of manufactures. The chief rival state, even then, was the U.S.A. —or rather the northern states of the U.S.A.— with France, the German Confederation, and Belgium. All these, except in part little Belgium, lagged behind British industrialization, but it was already clear that if they and others continued to industrialize, Britain's advantage would inevitably shrink. . . . By the end of the 1880's the relative decline was visible even in the formerly dominant branches of production. By the early 1890's the U.S.A. and Germany both passed Britain in the production of the crucial commodity of industrialization, steel.[47]

Let us now step back and consider the long-run sequence of "what really happened," as distinct from what the participants imagined themselves to be doing. The crucial issue is the relationship between the old and the new imperialism: that which preceded the Industrial Revolution and that which followed it. After what has been said before about the role of mercantilism, it comes as no surprise to find that the latest scholarly exposition of the topic puts forward an interpretation which combines Marxian and Keynesian insights. Hobsbawm's *Industry and Empire,* like Hill's work, centers on the thesis that the earlier British Empire was crucial in promoting the industrial transformation of 1750-1850 which in turn gave rise to the second British Empire: the one that went to war against Germany in 1914 and 1939.

The theoretical core of the argument may be summarized as follows: The Industrial Revolution could not have occurred in Britain but for the possession of a colonial empire which provided outlets far in excess of anything the home market could absorb. Industrialization entailed a sudden expansion of productive capacity only possible in a country which occupied a key position within the evolving world economy. The decisive factor was a global monopoly of export markets during the difficult transition from a self-supporting economy to one dependent on world trade. This position, in its initial stages, was secured by the conquest of overseas territories in North America and India during the 18th century, principally in competition with France. The aggressive wars waged by the British oligarchy between 1702 and 1815, when Napoleon's defeat sealed the close of this chapter, established a universal trade monopoly notwithstanding the setback caused by the loss of the American colonies. After 1815 Britain ruled the waves and was becoming the world's workshop. In these circum-

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stances further major annexations were unnecessary, and economic penetration could take the place of military conquest. A country whose industries could undersell those of its competitors was favorably placed to preach the universal adoption of free trade, and did so, to the detriment of those among its rivals who lacked the wit, or the power, to set up protective barriers behind which they could themselves industrialize at a pace that suited them. The major European nations and the U.S. could not be prevented from doing so, but the modernization of India was delayed, and "honorary" dominions such as Argentina entered upon a trade relationship which satisfied their landed oligarchy at the expense of the industrialists.

The net effect was to place Britain at the center of an international web resting upon privileged relations with Europe, North and South America, and smaller industrial enclaves in other continents. The peak was reached between 1850 and 1875, when the national commitment to free trade underwrote the social dominance of the industrial bourgeoisie and the preponderance of liberalism. The subsequent grab for Africa, beginning in 1880, was a sign that liberal imperialism had begun to flag. Britain's competitors were fast catching up, and it became necessary once more to lean on the "formal" Empire—India above all, but Egypt and Africa too, so far as they could be controlled. India in particular was the key to the imperial structure: politically (because of the size of the Indian Army) and economically (because it financed two-fifths of Britain's payments deficit). Laissez-faire liberalism was not extended to India, except insofar as its home-grown textile industries were destroyed to benefit British cotton exports. In one way or another—through India's own export surplus with China, or through direct Indian payments for the privilege of being governed by Britain—this enormous country thus became the keystone of the imperial arch before 1914. But this unbalance pointed to the fact that, in stictly economic terms, British industry was no longer globally competitive. Possession of India provided a payments surplus secured by politico-military power alone.

Too narrow a home base, then, to sustain a world-wide export monopoly, once Britain's competitors had caught up with or passed her in the all-important domain of modern industry. During the earlier period Britain was able to effect the change-over from mercantilism to free-trade because the Industrial Revolution gave her a temporary monopoly of the new mode of production. Hence an abnormal reliance upon international trade at the expense of the home market. Hence also the illusion—fed by arguments supplied by the classical economists, from Smith to J. S. Mill—that mercantilism had never been anything but an aberration due to faulty reasoning and accidental political entanglements. The mid-Victorian sense of security rested upon a precarious balance of political and economic factors which enabled the British to have their cake and eat it too: possess an overseas empire while practicing free trade.

The British economy being ahead industrially, foreign trade translated itself into an exchange of manufactures and services (shipping, banking, insurance) against primary products, mainly imported food and raw materials. Most of these were not produced by the colonies properly so called, but by independent foreign countries, with the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia in the lead. The exchange benefited Britain in the measure in which it sustained the consequences flowing from the historical accident of having been first with the Industrial Revolution, but this state of affairs could not last forever. The 1880's were a period of stagnation, with the real income of British workers slowly creeping upward only because the price of imported foodstuffs fell.

By the 1890's the issue was in the open: the Americans and the Germans were moving ahead industrially. Not accidentally, this decade witnessed a deep cleavage within the Liberal party, socialist stirrings among newly unionized workers, and on the other political wing the growth of an avowedly imperialist movement: that is to say, a movement no longer content with the invisible "imperialism of free trade," but one that called for protective tariff walls to be built around the Empire. Like all such movements, imperialism went in for "protecting the British worker"—at the expense of foreigners, of course. This gave it a populist coloration, badly needed in an age of democracy and parliamentary elections; but it also supplied a rationale for Tory politicians, paternalist employers, imperial proconsuls in retirement at Bath, socially-minded clergymen, and sturdy patriots who resented foreign immigrants. They all agreed on one thing: the British worker was hard done by, and the best way to help him was to keep foreigners and their goods out of the country.[48]

THE IDEOLOGY of modern imperialism, and its critique by liberal and socialist writers from about 1900 onward, will be considered in our next section. In abstracting for the moment from this topic we do not for this reason treat it as irrelevant, or as a mere epiphenomenon of the "real" process occurring in the socio-economic sphere. Any such distinction is untenable, for it neglects the all-important connections at the level of political decision-making. Major decisions were mediated by beliefs, more or less rational, concerning the role of the government in promoting what was called "the national interest." The fact that the governing classes everywhere interpreted this interest to suit their own convenience is irrelevant. In a certain fun-

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damental sense the political ideology of every commonwealth is the ideology of its ruling class; but a truth so general as to apply to all recorded history tells us little about the special topic under discussion.

Nor can the ideology of imperialism be treated as a mere subterfuge, artfully contrived to blind democratic electorates to what was being done behind their backs. The quarrel between the mercantilists and the laissez-faire school had been fought out in the open. The debate over imperialism occupied an entire generation between 1880 and 1914, and the way in which it shaped European public opinion was itself a factor in promoting the outbreak of war in 1914. We have already seen what was involved in the political commitments of the German Historical School during the Bismarck era, and the topic will once more engage our attention when we come to the literature of imperialism properly so called. For the moment we simply conclude our brief sketch of economic development during the period under review with some observations on the Industrial Revolution and its varying impact on the competing powers of Western Europe and North America.

A fairly simple division which imposes itself from the historical viewpoint is that between the original "revolution of coal and iron" between 1750 and 1850, and the subsequent age of steel, chemicals, and electricity.[49] Technology is not the whole of economics, but it is not irrelevant that those countries which forged ahead industrially during the second half of our period were better equipped than Britain to make use of the power processes. The political unification of Germany in 1871 was made possible by military victories over Austria and France which owed something, though not everything, to the efficiency of the Prussian arms industry, symbolized by the Krupp steel works at Essen in the Ruhr. The subsequent expansion of German steel and chemical production once more reflected an advanced technology which in turn was helped along by an educational system that provided a fairly broad stratum of technically skilled workers and managers and a number of outstanding scientists. Similar considerations hold for the spectacular expansion of industry and railway-building in France during the reign of Napoleon III (1852-70), and inversely for the slowdown of French industrial development after the loss of the Lorraine iron mines in 1871.

For Britain, as noted above, the age of missed opportunities set in between 1880 and 1914, when stagnation at home was veiled by spectacular colonial acquisitions and a vast flow of investment capital to overseas areas, not all of them belonging to the Empire, but for the most part economically linked to Britain by the mechanism of exchange already mentioned earlier. The system was heavily weighted in favor of overseas trade and the "invisible" services provided by the City of London, at the expense of industry and technology, which fell behind their North American and German competitors. No simple explanation of this process is available. One cannot, for example, maintain that the German class structure was intrinsically favorable to technological modernization, although it is certainly the case that Britain's social atmosphere was no help in competing with the United States. One need only consider the case of Japan—a highly successful newcomer with a socio-political structure even more retrograde than that of Prussia—to realize that all such simple cause-and-effect explanations are invalid. There may have been something in the process of German and Japanese "nation-building" during this period which stimulated industrial enterprise, but once we are launched upon imponderables such as "national morale," we may as well admit that they represent variables not reducible to causal explanation.

What is undeniable is the retrogressive effect American, German, and Japanese competition had on Britain from the 1880's onward, when the whole liberal system underwent its first serious crisis. The system rested upon the presupposition that a global economy centered upon Britain, and secured by British control of the seas, offered all countries—developed and undeveloped alike—an optimal chance for exploiting their domestic resources and their foreign trade opportunities. The world economy was policed by British capital exports. In both respects Britain acted as the guarantor of a system from which the industrially-advanced countries profited: the United States above all, since the informal alliance with Britain after the Civil War saved the U.S. the trouble of building up a vast maritime establishment. When the system began to break down because Britain's competitors were unwilling to play the game according to the rules of free-trade logic, "imperialism" returned. Actually it had never disappeared, but now the veil was cast off. Economic preponderance was gone, and mercantilist modes of thought came back into fashion:

> In India, the formal Empire never ceased to be vital to the British economy. Elsewhere it appeared to become increasingly vital after the 1870's, when foreign competition became acute, and Britain sought to escape from it—and largely did escape from it—by a flight into her dependencies. From the 1880's "imperialism"—the division of the world into formal colonies and "spheres of influence" of the great powers . . . became universally popular among the large powers. For Britain this was a step back. She exchanged the informal empire over most of the underdeveloped world for the formal empire of a quarter of it, plus the older satellite economies.[50]

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The contrast with Britain's position at the peak of the earlier era is very marked. To cite another British author: "After the repeal of the Corn Laws, English ports were opened to the products of the whole world. Apparently, not far short of one-third of the exports of the rest of the world found their way into the United Kingdom in the 1850's and 1860's. . . . Little of this came from the Empire, less than a quarter in fact. Our largest single trading-partner was the United States, accounting for nearly a quarter of all imports and of all exports. Another quarter was accounted for by the countries of Europe, which were beginning, like the U.S., to industrialize themselves with British equipment and ideas."[51] The Empire other than India did not give much direct advantage to British exports. What it did was to supply cheap food and raw materials, mostly from lands of European settlement which were either independent or in the process of becoming so. The acquisition of African colonies after 1880 was a poor bargain when measured against the advantage of free trade in foodstuffs and industrial goods with Europe, Canada, Argentina, and the U.S. "The advantage of the strategic lines of the empire was the preservation of the world of free trade."[52]

That world endured until 1914, and then collapsed in the two global wars unchained by Germany's challenge to Britain's world position. The purely continental European factors entering into this particular reckoning were extraneous to the Anglo-German contest. In particular, the triangular conflict among Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Czarist Russia could have been fought out on land without involving Britain, even though it did involve France (because of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890's). What turned these European rivalries into a global conflagration was the Anglo-German antagonism, later supplemented by Japan's challenge to Britain and the U.S. And this antagonism had its source in the weakening of Britain's over-all position toward the end of the century. At this point, the notion of "capitalist imperialism" can at last be discriminated from the conventional employment of the term "empire" to denote overland or overseas expansion. This is not to say that such a use of the term is illegitimate: merely that one must decide what one is talking about.

There grew up in the 19th century a British Empire in India, a Russian Empire in Central Asia, and a French Empire in Africa. These Empires were not obliged to clash, and in fact never did. Their owners were satisfied with the status quo and only asked to be left in peace, so that they might digest their conquests. The trouble was started by newcomers who did *not* possess an empire: Germany and Japan. Once this has been grasped, we can stop arguing over the meaning of "empire." Imperialist powers are not by definition obliged to own large tracts of land inhabited by conquered peoples. It is quite enough for our purpose if they are animated by a political will to bring about a forcible rearrangement of the global system controlled by their rivals.

THE DUAL meaning of "imperialism" will be discussed in our next section, for one cannot understand the imperialist mentality without taking account of its roots in nationalism. Here we conclude with a few facts and figures culled at random from our sources. Down to the eve of 1914 the British-controlled system endured because "invisible" income from previously invested capital had come to fill the gap in Britain's payments balance. "As her industry sagged, her finance triumphed, her services as shipper, trader, and intermediary in the world's system of payments, became more indispensable. Indeed if London ever was the real economic hub of the world, with the pound sterling its foundation, it was between 1870 and 1913."[53]

In 1913 Britain owned about £4,000 million worth of capital invested abroad, against a total of some £5,500 million owned by the U.S., Germany, France, Belgium, and Holland put together. In financial terms, Britain was still the leading economic power, nor had her maritime empire been seriously challenged. "In the later 1850's British ships had carried about 30 per cent of the cargoes entering French or U.S. ports: by 1900 they carried 45 per cent of the French, 55 per cent of the American ones. Paradoxically, the very process which weakened British production—the rise of new industrial powers, the enfeeblement of the British competitive power—reinforced the triumph of finance and trade."[54]

The 1914-18 war upset these arrangements, and the war of 1939-45 completed the wreckage. When these two epic contests were over, Britain had ceased to be the world's leading creditor nation and indeed had run up sizable debts to her former colonies, India above all. Capital invested abroad continued to yield a growing return, but this form of income no longer sufficed to cover the historic deficit resulting from the export balance. The payments gap now had to be filled by stepping up commodity exports to industrially-developed countries, and this in turn imposed drastic rationalization measures at home. All these economic consequences flowed from the catastrophe let loose by the two world wars, and these wars in turn were precipitated by political rivalries not reducible to simple profit-and-loss calculation. The German onslaught, and later the Japanese attack, on the world system of which Britain was the guarantor, had its roots in the transformation which German and Japanese nationalism underwent as these countries completed their industrialization and thus their adaptation to the modern world. On British

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common-sense assumptions they would have done better to maximize their welfare in other ways, but utilitarianism had no place in their calculations. Or if it had, they did their sums wrong, for in the event none profited, save the United States and Russia, soon to be challenged by China. To treat this outcome as mysterious is to ignore the simple circumstance that the British Empire perished in much the same fashion as those older empires on whose ruins it had come into being.

V

THE IMPERIALIST movement in late 19th-century and early 20th-century Europe and America is too complex a phenomenon to lend itself to summary treatment. Yet something needs to be said about its role in promoting the era of global conflagrations after 1914. The collapse of the British-centered world economic system, which was the theme of our preceding section, cannot be treated in isolation from the growth of political currents adverse to political liberalism and free trade. For Britain itself this is obvious, which is why every historian of the period has found it necessary to take account of the liberal-imperialist ideology worked out by British writers between 1870 and 1914. Before turning to this topic—doubly significant because it foreshadowed similar processes at work in the U.S. a century later—something must be said about a more general matter which is frequently neglected: the relationship of imperialism as a popular movement to the theory and practice of nationalism.

The difficulty here is that the historian is swamped by a mass of factual material impossible to summarize. Yet a simple generalization can safely be risked: imperialism as a movement—or, if one prefers it, as an ideology—latched on to nationalism because no other popular base was available. But this statement can also be turned around: nationalism transformed itself into imperialism wherever the opportunity offered. It can be argued that popular patriotism of the French Revolution type was systematically corrupted when it passed into the service of the imperialist movement; but the speed with which the transformation was accomplished suggests that no deep resistance had to be overcome: not even in France, where the Revolution had given birth to a democratic and universalist faith in the essential unity of mankind. Paradoxically, it was this very universalism which became the ideological instrument of expansionist policies—"ideological" in the sense that their sponsors were at first genuinely taken in by their own rhetoric. Cynicism crept in at a later date, when the liberals no longer took their public professions quite seriously.

It was this sort of mentality that radical and socialist critics had in mind when from the 1880's onward they systematically denounced the colonizing enterprises of the Third Republic in Africa and Asia. Since the Republic had come into being in 1870 on the ruins of the Second Empire, it was natural to affirm that no true republican could have any dealings with "imperialism," meaning Bonapartism. This shows how easy it is to mistake the shadow for the substance. The Orleanist liberals who took over in 1870, and the bourgeois republicans who succeeded them a decade later, had no need to invoke the spirit of Napoleon I, let alone the lamentable caricature represented by his successor. It was quite enough to maintain that French civilization was being brought to darkest Africa, just as their British contemporaries spoke of bringing Christianity to the heathen. What is more, these writers and orators were sincere, even those they omitted to add that the civilizing process was merely a by-product of something rather less refined.

PEOPLE who imagine that modern imperialism, like mercantilism before it, was merely a conspiracy got up in secret to enrich a few monopolists, will never understand how a doctrinaire radical like Clemenceau, who in the 1880's had opposed the conquest of Indo-China, came to preside over the annexation of Morocco two decades later. If imperialism had lacked a popular following, this kind of behavior would be quite incomprehensible. The fact is that democratic politicians like Clemenceau and Lloyd George turned imperialist because that was what the voters expected of them.[55]

The voters of course were influenced by what they read in the newspapers, and the press was generally the vehicle of middle-class opinion. This is the justification for treating imperialist propaganda as an aspect of late-bourgeois civilization. So far as it goes, the estimate is sound. The trouble is that it fails to explain why liberalism went out of fashion after 1880 among bourgeois politicians and newspaper owners, to be succeeded by a concentrated barrage of propaganda in favor of tariff barriers, colonial annexation, arms expenditure, and war preparation against real or presumptive rivals. These after all were traditional conservative remedies. The question is why they became popular in the 1880's and were eventually adopted, with some reluctance, by most liberals from about 1900 onward.

There is no problem about Tory attitudes toward India: at least since the great Indian Army mutiny of 1857, everyone knew that this huge country could be held down only by force. Moreover, Indian self-government was generally regarded as impractical even by liberals, on the grounds that several millennia of Oriental despotism had created a culture to which Western standards did not apply. If there was a division of opinion, it related to a fairly distant future. The

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optimists held that British rule, plus economic development, would eventually create an Indian middle class, thus making a form of parliamentary government possible; the pessimists were convinced that East and West would never meet, and that India would have to be governed imperially forever. This was one major source of British imperialist sentiment during the period under review. It fitted neatly with Tory paternalism and distrust of foreigners. It also provided American democrats with an easy target: the British were unrepentant imperialists—the proof was that they were holding India by force. The fact that from an economic standpoint India represented an anomaly within the global system of liberal imperialism was conveniently overlooked. Had it been faced, these American critics of the British Empire would have had their noses rubbed in evidence that an American Empire was silently coming into existence.

WHETHER ANOMALOUS or not, British rule in India became the paradigm of Western imperialism in Asia. So did the racial animosity it created. Richard Burton, the explorer, had already noted Indian popular hatred of the British before 1857. The mutiny was led by local feudatories and thus had a retrogressive character, a circumstance which helps to account for its failure, the more so since the Hindu-Moslem split enabled the British to rely on the Sikh community for the newly conquered Punjab. These fierce warriors took pleasure in massacring their traditional Moslem enemies, just as they did in 1947, when the Indian Union was divided into the two independent states of India and Pakistan. Atrocities against British civilians—inevitable in a rising led by feudal rulers and religious fanatics—provided an excuse for savage reprisals and silenced liberal protests in England. They also gave rise to a "damned nigger" mentality among British officers and soldiers. Writing from London to an American newspaper, Marx cited a few typical utterances on the part of British officers, e.g., "We hold courtmartials on horseback, and every nigger we meet with we either string up or shoot."[56] He also introduced a line of thought which enabled him to place the atrocities perpetrated by Indians against English civilians in a wider historical context:

> Cruelty, like every other thing, has its fashion, changing according to time and place. Caesar, the accomplished scholar, candidly narrates how he ordered many thousand Gallic warriors to have their right hands cut off. Napoleon would have been ashamed to do this. He preferred dispatching his own French regiments, suspected of republicanism, to Santo Domingo, there to die of the blacks and the plague. The infamous mutilations committed by the Sepoys remind one of the practices of the Christian Byzantine Empire, or the prescriptions of Emperor Charles V's criminal law. . . .[57]

Sound Hegelian reasoning this. Marx had no use for Oriental despotism and cruelty; he merely wished to deflate British self-righteousness. The Europeans, he implied, were no better than their subjects, and for the rest there was an historical explanation for the more appalling acts committed by the rebellious Sepoys: "With Hindus, whom their religion has made virtuosi in the art of self-torturing these tortures inflicted on the enemies of their race and creed appear quite natural. . . ." Marx rarely missed a chance to vent his Lucretian distaste for religion, but his mode of reasoning was too complex for the simpler minds among his followers. In a later age they were to excuse every kind of bestiality committed against colonizers on the grounds that (a) these stories were not true—they were just imperialist propaganda; and (b) the imperialists had asked for it. But we must not judge either Darwin or Marx by their disciples. It was not Darwin's fault that the extermination of "lower races" became part of the imperialist creed, the excuse being that on Social-Darwinist principles their disappearance from the face of the earth proved their unfitness to inhabit its fairer portions.

Similarly, the inverted racism of "third world" propaganda against whites—allegedly imperialists by nature—proves nothing against Marx or Mill, who from their different standpoints condemned atrocities perpetrated in the name of "civilization." The 19th century was a more rational and optimistic age than ours. Its representative thinkers were united by the common bond of an as yet unchallenged faith in the power of reason to improve men's behavior. The glorification of murder, beginning with the early fascists and culminating in the abominations of Hitler and other despots, belongs to a later epoch.

IT IS likewise remarkable that the spiritual corruption wreaked by imperialist literature was to have the most disastrous effect upon those who were *not* lording it over slaves, but were yearning to do so. The actual possession of overland or overseas empires took some of the steam out of Russian, French, or British pretensions to represent the master race. Colonial armies acquired a bad reputation at home, and were generally regarded as the last refuge of scoundrels. At the other end of the scale, the poets of empire had to pay their respects to the enemy if there was to be any glory in the imperial business. At the very least, the ferocious enemies they were fighting must be allowed a few martial virtues, or there would be nothing to celebrate.

This theme runs through the popular literature of the pre-1914 age, along with a suitable stoical admiration for the legions who were defending the outposts of empire. Kipling's jingles—one can hardly describe his verse-writing as poetry—reflect the spirit in which the British officers of the Indian Army in the 1890's—the youthful Winston

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Churchill among them—viewed their role in subduing savage tribesmen along the unsettled northwestern frontier:

When you're wounded, and left on Afghanistan's plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Just roll to your rifle, and blow out your brains.
And go to your God like a soldier.

Hardly a Christian utterance but suited to the mentality of Tory gentlemen in charge of a professional army. Some of these men were later to do their duty in the 1939-45 war, in the same fatalistic spirit in which they had earlier been fighting the "natives."

FROM THE SOCIOLOGIST'S viewpoint these were pre-liberal attitudes which had survived into the bourgeois age because bourgeois society, for all its pacific talk, stood in need of armed force to defend itself: if not against the proletariat at home—by the later Victorian age this was no longer a serious preoccupation—then against conquered peoples abroad. Militarism—and along with it the more primitive, aggressive, and warlike impulses—had been expelled to the frontiers of European-American civilization, there to mount guard against external foes. The duality of militarism-pacifism reproduced itself in the party game dividing conservatives from liberals: the former appealing to archaic modes of thought traditionally dominant among the landed gentry and the rural population generally; the latter reflecting the relatively peaceful outlook of middle-class burghers and industrial workers alike. These urban citizens could be galvanized into patriotic fervor by politicians and newspapers, but their ferocity was mostly verbal: they preferred to leave the actual fighting to others. Hence the typically Anglo-American compromise whereby down to 1914-18 the dirty work was left to professionals. Conscription was regarded with disfavor. It smacked of Continental European absolutism: those military monarchies—Russia, Prussia, Austria—whose armies carried undue weight politically. But the revival of conscription in the France of the Third Republic—after Napoleon III had suffered shipwreck with his professional army in 1870—ought to have served as a warning against taking the professions of bourgeois pacifism literally. There was no neat division separating the old Empires from the new Republics. Democracy was not merely patriotic in its origins: it could become imperialist too. The French made this discovery after 1870, the Americans somewhat later. Both took pains to hide the truth from themselves.

The case of France is of special interest in our context because after 1870 the French Republic stood almost alone in a monarchical Europe. The military defeat of 1870 was in part due to reliance upon professional soldiers trained in endless colonial fighting. Whereas Prussia had universal military service, the government of Napoleon III relied upon a standing army eked out by what was known as the "blood tax." To cite a well-known historian: "All Frenchmen might be called upon to serve—if France insisted on using all the healthy men who came of military age each year. But she did not, and so most of the annual 'contingent' was exempted. By means of a lottery, the necessary number of recruits, nominally 100,000, was chosen from the total of the annual 'class,' and those who drew 'bad numbers' had to serve, unless they found someone to take their place. This meant in effect that poor men with bad numbers served; richer men bought substitutes."[58] After 1871 the Republic did away with this iniquitous system—especially when the Radical Republicans got control in the 1880's. Universal service was introduced, with no exceptions allowed for the propertied classes. This was sound democratic practice. It was also a foretaste of 1914-1918, when millions of men were enrolled to die in the trenches. Meantime a colonial army—part Foreign Legion, part native levies officered by Frenchmen—remained in being alongside the conscript force in the motherland. The officers of course were professionals. Largely drawn from the traditionally royalist landed gentry which despised the Republic, they gave their loyalty to France's growing Empire in Africa and Asia. Thus was imperialism reborn—on a solid republican-democratic foundation. The only people who thought this odd were the Socialists, and after 1914 they came to terms with the system, much as the Communists did in 1945.

Imperialist thinking transcended nationalism, inasmuch as the more far-sighted theorists and practitioners of the new creed realized that the nation-state was on the way out: it was too small to contain the forces let loose by the Industrial Revolution. To this esoteric wisdom, then still confined to general staffs and German professors brought up on Hegel and Clausewitz, conservative statesmen and thinkers added another subversive notion: democratic government was likewise doomed, for a democracy could not govern an empire. This was sound classical doctrine, certified by the great Roman historians on whom the ruling elites of Europe and America had been brought up. It was not contradicted by Anglo-American experience, for the British parliamentary system was oligarchic, and the American Republic did not (as yet) have an empire to administer.

The seeming exception to the rule was France, for the French colonial empire expanded rapidly after the French Empire of Napoleon III had made way for a Republic. But the Republic was bourgeois, proclaimed by middle-class lawyers in September 1870, and saved from the proletariat in May 1871, when the Army slaughtered the Parisian

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Communards. From this circumstance most Socialists derived the comforting doctrine that colonial imperialism was inherently class-bound, a minor aspect of capitalist expansion, and not likely to survive the coming of true republican democracy, with Socialists in control. This amiable illusion, like many others, did not outlive the shock of 1914. Meantime most Frenchmen, but especially Frenchmen of the Left, drew moral sustenance from the fact that their country had resurrected the famous symbols of 1792, when the Convention challenged the kings of Europe. So delighted were they with their new Republic that many of them did not mind when in the 1890's France became the ally of Czarist Russia: a necessary counterweight (it was explained) to the growing might and menace of imperial Germany.

THE GERMANS faced a different problem. Bismarck's *Reich* was an empire by definition, but confined to Central Europe, specifically to the territory of the ancient Holy Roman Empire. Pan-Germanism—the strongest emotional force within the middle class from the 1890's onward—centered upon racial affiliations which pointed obscurely to a coming slowdown with the Slavs in general and Russia in particular. On the other hand, competition with Britain led to the acquisition of colonies in Africa, and ultimately to a naval race which ruined whatever chance there was of coming to terms with the British government over Germany's claim to hegemony in continental Europe. A more rational policy would have postponed the Anglo-German conflict in the interest of getting the support of Great Britain against the Franco-Russian combination.

But Anglophiles who advocated such a course encountered a formidable argument: without a navy Germany would be dependent on British goodwill, and thus hampered in the pursuit of her ambitions in the Balkans and the Middle East. For the prime goal of German foreign policy during the Wilhelminian era after 1890 was not Africa but Central Europe and more distantly Turkey. The African colonies were merely counters in a diplomatic game. Turkey, on the other hand, represented an enormous prize. The decrepit Ottoman Empire straddled southeastern Europe and the Middle East with its growing oil resources. Control of Turkey, in addition to Austria-Hungary, would give Germany the kind of territorial and economic base to which naval strategists like Tirpitz, and economic historians like Schmoller, looked forward when they envisaged the coming age of intercontinental rivalries. The handful of African colonies could be lost without altering the balance of power. The Ottoman Empire was another matter. If Germany got control of it, there was an end to Pan-Slav hopes of Russia acquiring Constantinople. But there was also an end to British control of the East. Thus Germany's bid for empire united Russia and Britain against her.[59]

None of this poses any particular theoretical problem, whatever it may have contributed to the headaches suffered by diplomatists and general staffs. What does at first sight look odd is the ease with which nationalism could be transmuted into imperialism: not as a conspiratorial scheme pursued by governments and their advisors, but as a popular movement. For as to its popularity there is really no doubt at all: it could even draw upon working-class support, thus giving rise to the phenomenon later described as "social-imperialism" by its Marxist critics. The explanation clearly has to do with the familiar time-lag in the assimilation of new concepts. The two most powerful political movements in the 19th century were nationalism and democracy, both descended from the French Revolution and thus associated with the political Left until they were harnessed by the Right. This changeover was rendered possible by the fact that in the last resort both parties appealed to the peasantry and the lower middle class.

These strata could move in either direction. If in France the Left was generally able to drape itself in Jacobin colors, thereby associating the sentiment of patriotism with the course of the Republic, the Right could appeal to "eternal France." German and Russian conservatives likewise fell back on patriotic slogans, already crystallized in the doctrines of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism before they became political catchwords. In each case, the popular consciousness absorbed national sentiments which were then converted into imperialist aims by the governing classes. The transition from patriotism to nationalism, let alone imperialism, was not perceived by peasants who traditionally thought in terms of defending "the homeland": a simple mental construct derived from the ordinary man's loyalty to his village or plot of land. Nationalism, unlike peasant patriotism, was an urban doctrine, the creation of schoolmasters and journalists who preached it to the middle class. Imperialism was the esoteric faith of the governing elite. These doctrines fused among intellectuals and army officers who staffed the various "pan" movements, and subsequently the fascist movements. The masses hardly noticed the transformation until its consequences were brought home to them by the 1914-18 war.[60]

If modern imperialism was not at first distinguished from ordinary nationalism, neither did anti-imperialism at the outset concern itself with anything in the economic sphere. An unimpeachable witness to the truth of this statement is Friedrich Engels who, from the 1850's until his death in 1895, devoted much of his energy to the struggle against Pan-Slavism. Any reader of his numerous articles on this topic must be struck by Engels's indifference to all but strictly national and racial considerations. Take the following typical

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passage from an article written for a liberal-democratic German journal in 1855, at a time when the Crimean war had inflamed the ancient democratic fear of Czarist Russia and its expansionist tendencies:

> The Slavic race, long divided by internal rivalries, driven back towards the East by the Germans, subjugated in part by Germans, Turks, and Hungarians, quietly reassembling its branches after 1815 through the gradual rise of Pan-Slavism, now for the first time affirms its unity and in so doing proclaims war to the death with the Romano-Celtic and Germanic races hitherto preponderant in Europe. Pan-Slavism is not simply a movement for national independence. It is a movement which seeks to undo what has been created by a thousand years of history; which cannot realize itself without wiping Turkey, Hungary, and half of Germany from the map of Europe; a movement which, having attained this aim, cannot assure its permanence otherwise than through the subjugation of Europe. From being a political credo, Pan-Slavism has transmuted itself into a political program, with 800,000 bayonets at its disposal. It leaves Europe with only one alternative: subjugation by the Slavs or permanent destruction of the center of their offensive strength —Russia.[61]

Substitute "China" for "Russia," and "Chinese chauvinism" for "Pan-Slavism," and you have the theme-song of a thousand speeches and newspaper articles in the USSR for the past few years. Engels did not trouble to search for economic causes of Slav aggression; neither do his pupils in Moscow. They know, as he did, that nationalism is a force in its own right.

IN THE CASE of Russia and Germany alike, the transition from patriotism to nationalism was effected in the ideological sphere long before governments and general staffs had adopted the new ideology. So far from being state-sponsored, these movements were demagogic and subversive before becoming conservative and respectable. *Volkstum* and *narodnost* were radical slogans which terrified the autocratic rulers in Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg out of their wits, before and after 1848. In the end, the governments reluctantly came to terms with them, and the more conservative nationalists in turn abandoned their radicalism. The classical case is Dostoevsky, a one-time rebel reconciled to the Orthodox faith and transformed into a conservative upholder of the Czarist autocracy. But Pan-Slavism also retained its revolutionary wing, typified by Bakunin who in 1873 composed an entire book on the theme that only a popular revolution could regenerate Russia and render it capable of confronting the newly created German *Reich*. Not to mention the Yellow Peril, for Bakunin was convinced that the Chinese would one day drive across the Urals and down to the Volga! Population pressure alone made it inevitable, and unfortunately the Czarist government was quite incompetent to deal with this very grave menace. Thus Bakunin in 1873. One can see why the authorities in Petersburg did not think highly of his advice. One can also see why those West European Socialists who were familiar with his Pan-Slav agitation thought they detected a certain lack of consistency in his anarchist utterances.[62]

British, German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman policies in the three decades before 1914 centered upon what was vaguely known as "the Oriental question": a catch-phrase invented to describe the dissolution of the Turkish Empire and the maneuvering of the powers around this increasingly dangerous piece of territory. There had already been a military contest over Turkey once before (the Crimean war), and another confrontation between Britain and Russia was very narrowly averted in 1878 when the British seemed ready to draw the sword on Turkey's behalf. Peace was preserved on that occasion, with Bismarck casting himself in the role of honest broker; in actual fact he sided with Britain, a circumstance not overlooked in Petersburg. Had his successors stuck to this line, an Anglo-German alliance might have come into being. Instead they rashly decided to challenge France, Britain, and Russia at once, and for good measure in 1917 they took on the United States as well. This was rather too much for Germany to cope with, and military defeat resulted in 1918, with consequences that worked themselves out in 1939-45.

In essentials both wars were fought to decide whether or not Germany was to become the hegemonial power in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. This was generally recognized and in itself raises no problem: Louis XIV or Napoleon would have understood every move in the game. The new phenomenon was the infusion of popular nationalism in the shape of the various "pan" movements which mediated the transition from one age to another. These movements were populist and at times even managed to give themselves a revolutionary coloration, a circumstance very disturbing to the ruling elites, until they discovered that nationalism could be harnessed to the support of traditional institutions. This is just what makes "imperialism" such a chameleon: the term changed its meaning with the passage from the age of the old absolute monarchies (all officially styled "Empire") to the new world of the nation-state, and then to the specifically modern era in which nationalism was sacrificed to the real or fancied needs of supra-national entities adapted to global changes in the technological sphere.

BAKUNIN'S reflections on the topic are worth citing at some length, and this for two reasons: they are intrinsically interesting, and they had an enormous impact upon the nascent populist

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movement in Russia—a movement that was patriotic as well as socialist, and whose ideologists reserved for the Slav peoples the leading role within the coming world revolution. With the evident exhaustion of Marxism-Leninism in its official form, one may expect populist currents to regain their former prominence in the USSR, especially since the Sino-Soviet conflict renders increasingly questionable the image of a global socialist "camp" organized around the USSR. Populism makes no such demands upon the imagination, being well integrated with the national Russian tradition and acceptable to patriots of all classes. It also carries unflattering implications for the Western labor movement—a movement the USSR can no longer hope to control. For Bakunin had two strings to his bow: a grand vision of the coming racial conflict between the Germans and the Slavs—amply confirmed by the two European wars of our century—and a firm belief that the socialist revolution was unlikely to come first in Germany, or in any developed industrial country: only the truly poor and destitute (the "wretched of the earth" in later parlance) could be trusted to possess the revolutionary faith.

One must read Bakunin if one wants to understand the passion Lenin half a century later put into his indictment of the corrupt labor aristocracy (a doctrine, incidentally, which neither Rosa Luxemburg, nor Trotsky, Bukharin, Gramsci, or any other important Marxist writer of the time thought it worth mentioning, let alone confuting). Lenin did not cite Bakunin, but in some respects he was his heir nonetheless. Consider the following passage from Bakunin's *Gossudarstvennost i Anarkhia* ("Statehood and Anarchy") in 1873:

> In Italy as in Russia there are a considerable number of such people [who have left the bourgeois world]. . . . But what is infinitely more important is the existence in Italy of a vast proletariat gifted with extraordinary intelligence but in large part illiterate and profoundly miserable; composed of two or three million workers in the towns and factories, as well as small artisans and some twenty million peasants who own nothing at all. . . . Nowhere perhaps is the social revolution closer than in Italy, not even in Spain. . . . In Italy the entire people awaits the social revolution. . . . There is not in Italy, as in many other European countries, a separate layer of workers in part already privileged thanks to high wages, proud even of a certain literary knowledge, and to such a degree impregnated with bourgeois ideas, aspirations, and vanities that those belonging to this stratum differ from the bourgeois only by their condition, not by their tendency. Such people exist in large number particularly in Germany and Switzerland, whereas in Italy there are only very few of them. . . . What predominates in Italy is that *lumpenproletariat* of which Marx and Engels, and with them the entire German socialist-democratic school, speak with such profound and unmerited contempt, for it is only within this proletariat, and not within the bourgeoisified layer of the working masses, that there resides in totality the spirit and the force of the future social revolution.[63]

Bakunin did not require a theory of imperialist super-profits to explain why the German workers, unlike the Italians, were non-revolutionary in temper: by his standards they were already past hope in 1873. Engels for his part told Vera Zasulich in 1885 that in his view "the Russians are approaching their 1789."[64] This was a perfectly sound and reasonable conjecture, grounded in sociological considerations, not on crude nonsense about the rebellious temper of the *Lumpenproletariat*. Engels based his forecast on the internal strains of a developing society whose internal contradictions and strains were "held in check by an unexampled despotism, a despotism which is becoming more and more unbearable to a youth in whom the dignity and intelligence of the nation are united—there, when 1789 has once been launched, 1793 will not be long in following." No nonsense about the leading role of the working class: Engels knew perfectly well that in a backward country such as Russia the fight against Czarist absolutism came first, and that the push would come from the radical intelligentsia. On this point at least the more sensible populists and the Marxists were in agreement.

IF ONE now turns to Bakunin's apocalyptic vision of a coming showdown between Russia and China, one finds that the old Slavophile had simply transferred his attention from Russia's western frontier to its Siberian possessions. *Gossudarstvennost i Anarkhia* is largely devoted to the German-Slav antagonism, the German threat to Russia's preponderance in the Baltic, the historic Russian longing for Constantinople, the follies of Czarist diplomacy, and other topical concerns. By contrast, the Chinese menace is dealt with briefly, but what Bakunin has to say about it is still worth reading after almost a century:

> China alone counts 400 million, or according to others 600 million, inhabitants, who are evidently cramped within the frontiers of the Celestial Empire and in ever growing numbers transplant themselves in an irresistible current, some to Australia, others across the Pacific to California; other masses may finally displace themselves towards the north and northeast. And what then? Then, in the twinkling of an eye, Siberia, the entire territory extending from Tartary to the Ural mountains and the Caspian Sea will cease to be Russian. . . . How is one to arrest the irruption of the Chinese masses who will not only invade the whole of Siberia, including our new possessions in Central Asia, but will also expand beyond the Urals down to the Volga!

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> Such is the danger which menaces us all but fatally from the eastern side. One does wrong to despise the Chinese masses. They are dangerous simply by virtue of their numbers, dangerous because their excessive proliferation renders virtually impossible their future existence within the frontiers of China. . . . Let us also note that of late they have begun to familiarize themselves with modern arms and European discipline, that latest official fruit of our statist civilization. Just ally this discipline, the acquirement of new arms and modern tactics, with the primitive barbarism of the Chinese masses, with their total lack of any idea of human protest, of all instinct of liberty, with their habit of servile obedience . . . consider the monstrous enormity of the Chinese population . . . and you will understand how great is the peril which menaces us from the side of the East. . . .[65]

The author of these lines was a better prophet than those among his Leninist pupils who after 1917 thought they had exorcized the specter by helping the Chinese revolution to attain its goals. For these goals were *national*, hence in the last resort incompatible with the hegemony of a rival empire in Asia.

Notes

1. Richard Koebner, *Empire* (Grosset & Dunlap, 1965), p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 9.
3. Ronald Syme, *Tacitus* (Clarendon Press, 1958, 1963), Preface; see also Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Clarendon Press, 1939, 1952, 1956), pp. 11-12: "The political life of the Roman Republic was stamped and swayed, not by parties and programs of a modern and parliamentary character, not by the ostensible opposition between Senate and People, *Optimates* and *Populares, nobiles* and *novi homines,* but by the strife for power, wealth and glory. The contestants were the *nobiles* among themselves, as individuals or in groups, open in the elections and in the courts of law or masked by secret intrigue. As in its beginning, so in its last generation, the Roman Commonwealth, 'res publica populi Romani,' was a name; a feudal order of society still survived in a city-state and governed an empire. Noble families determined the history of the Republic, giving their names to its epochs."
4. Koebner, op. cit., p. 2.
5. Henry Furneaux, ed., *The Annals of Tacitus* (Clarendon Press, 1st edition 1883, reprinted 1896, 1934, 1956, 1962, 1965), pp. 81-83.
6. Syme, *The Roman Revolution,* pp. 313 ff. The impact of the Punic wars on Roman society is described at great length by Arnold Toynbee, *Hannibal's Legacy: The Hannibalic War's Effects on Roman Life* (Oxford University Press, 1965), two vols., *passim*. For an analysis of the earlier Greek maritime empire and its social foundations see M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Greeks* (Chatto & Windus, 1963), pp. 45 ff.; A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Basil Blackwell, 1964), *passim*.
7. Koebner, op. cit., p. 19.
8. Henri Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne* (Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 75 ff.
9. Pirenne. op. cit., pp. 147 ff.; Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 16 ff.
10. Geoffrey Barraclough, *European Unity in Thought and Action* (Blackwell, 1963), p. 5. For details see Pirenne, op. cit., pp. 45 ff.; Heinz Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke* (C. H. Beck, 1964), *passim*; Dieter Groth, *Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas* (Luchterhand, 1961), *passim*.
11. Koebner, op. cit., p. 19.
12. Ibid., p. 24.
13. Ibid., p. 28.
14. Ibid., p. 55.
15. Ibid., p. 58. For the general background see Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England* (Secker & Warburg, 1964; Mercury Books, 1966), *passim*. Also the same author's *Puritanism and Revolution* (Secker & Warburg, 1958), pp. 123 ff.; H. R. Trevor-Roper, *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change* (Macmillan, 1967), pp. 46 ff.
16. Koebner, op. cit., p. 60.
17. Barraclough, op. cit., p. 28.
18. Koebner, op. cit., pp. 61 ff; Christopher Hill, *Reformation to Industrial Revolution: A Social and Economic History of Britain 1530-1780* (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), pp. 20 ff.
19. Christopher Hill, *Oliver Cromwell 1658-1958* (Routledge, 1958), *passim*.
20. Hill, *Reformation to Industrial Revolution,* p. 123.
21. Ibid., p. 124.
22. Koebner. op. cit., pp. 65 ff. James Harrington, who during Cromwell's reign stood on the left wing of the republician coalition, was among the prophets of the new age. His "Commonwealth of the Oceans" was the rhetorical counterpart of Cromwell's attempt to found a maritime empire, even though Harrington was no Puritan and his political ideas were derived from Bacon and Machiavelli. See his *Oceana and Other Works* (1656). It is irrelevant that, to cite Koebner once more, "the name of the British Empire had no place in the Puritan Commonwealth" (op. cit., p. 67). What matters is that the Cromwellians overcame their scruples to the point of fighting Holland for control of the seas, when in the name of religion they ought to have shrunk from such a godless enterprise. Once the break was made, the "Empire of the Sea," for which Harrington strove, encountered no further ideological resistance, save from those religious radicals who had already broken with Cromwell on the issue of democracy.
23. Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (Collins, 1969), pp. 23 ff.; V. G. Kiernan, "State and Nation in Western Europe," *Past & Present* (Oxford), No. 31, July 1965, pp. 20 ff. For a critique of Max Weber's well-known thesis concerning the relationship of Calvinism to capitalism, see Gabriel Kolko, "Max Weber on America: Theory and Evidence," in *Studies in the Philosophy of History,* ed. George H. Nadel (Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 180 ff.
24. Kiernan, loc. cit., p. 23. The statement applies to India and the Islamic world with greater exactitude than to China and Japan, the last-mentioned country at least

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having developed a genuine feudalism and the notion of personal property in land that commonly goes with it. In China, and still more in India and the Middle East, this development was strangled at birth by the system of government usually described as Oriental despotism. The realization that capitalism could sprout from feudalism in Europe (and subsequently in Japan) only because private property was beyond the reach of a despotic central power, forms the connecting link between Marx's and Max Weber's theorizing. See among others Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations,* tr. Jack Cohen, ed. E. J. Hobsbawm (Lawrence & Wishart, 1964), *passim.*

25. Cobban, op. cit., p. 29.
26. For Hobbes's contribution to this topic see Richard Peters, *Hobbes* (Penguin Books, 1956, 1967), pp. 178 ff; Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago University Press, 1952, 1963), *passim*; C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 87 ff.; K. C. Brown, ed., *Hobbes Studies* (Basil Blackwell, 1965), *passim.* It has often been pointed out that Hobbes is "modern"—that is to say, bourgeois—in his approach to politics: he counterposes a mass of atomized individuals to the sovereign state. What is rather more relevant is his failure to make a convincing transition from psychological atomism to political absolutism. On his general assumptions about human nature, if taken seriously, it is by no means apparent why free individuals should contract to establish an absolute power suspended like a sword over their heads. Locke's solution was more closely attuned to the sentiments of the propertied classes in England and America, and he succeeded where Hobbes had failed. But the *Leviathan* did mark the decisive break with political theology: God was expelled from history and replaced by the individual's fear of death.
27. Koebner, op. cit., pp. 88-9. The reference is to Franklin's *Observations concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries etc. (1751).*
28. *The Wealth of Nations* (Random House, 1937), pp. 402-3: "That foreign trade enriched the country, experience demonstrated to the nobles and country gentlemen, as well as to the merchants; but how, or in what manner, none of them well knew. The merchants knew perfectly well in what manner it enriched themselves; it was their business to know it. But in what manner it enriched the country, was no part of their business. This subject never came into their consideration, but when they had occasion to apply to their country for some change in the laws relating to foreign trade. It then became necessary to say something about the beneficial effects of foreign trade, and the manner in which those effects were obstructed by the laws as they then stood." Smith's virtuous indignation was perfectly genuine, and perfectly adapted to the situation of a country which had outgrown the swaddling-clothes of mercantile protection and become able to trade on equal terms with all the world. His American pupils two centuries later added nothing to his argument, while subtracting something from his style.
29. Pieter Geyl, *Orange and Stuart 1641-72* (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969); translated from the Dutch original, *Oranje en Stuart,* 1939.
30. Second edition (St. Martin, 1961). See also his earlier *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III.*
31. *England in the Age of the American Revolution,* pp. 281-82.
32. Richard W. Van Alstyne, *The American Empire: Its Historical Pattern and Evolution* (Routledge, 1960), p. 5.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
35. Ibid., p. 7.
36. Ibid., p. 10.
37. C. R. Fay, *English Economic History* (Heffer, 1940, 1948), p. 3.
38. Cited in Charles Wilson, *Mercantilism* (Routledge, 1958), p. 6. For the Historical School, see J. A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 504 ff., 808 ff.
39. Wilson, op. cit., p. 6.
40. Ibid., p. 7.
41. Fay, op. cit., p. 12.
42. *General Theory* (MacMillan, 1947), p. 340.
43. Wilson, op. cit., p. 9.
44. Gustav Schmoller, *Gesammelte Aufsätze,* pp. 20 ff.; cited by Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (Norton, 1967), p. 9. Professor Fischer needs no introduction. His eminence in his chosen field is such that even his German academic colleagues have reluctantly abandoned the attempt to revert to their traditional silence on the topic of German war aims.
45. Cited in Groh, *Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas,* p. 264.
46. Fay, op. cit., p. 10.
47. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 110.
48. Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men; Studies in the History of Labour* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), pp. 179 ff.; Henry Pelling, *The Origins of the Labour Party 1880-1900* (Clarendon Press, 1965), *passim.*
49. W. O. Henderson, *The Industrialization of Europe 1780-1914* (Thames & Hudson, 1969), *passim.*
50. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire,* pp. 123-4.
51. Michael Barratt Brown, *After Imperialism* (Heinemann, 1963), p. 63.
52. Ibid., p. 65.
53. Hobsbawm, op. cit., p. 125.
54. Ibid., pp. 125-26.
55. For the general topic see Heinz Gollwitzer, *Europe in the Age of Imperialism* (Thames and Hudson, 1969), *passim;* for the literature of the period see V. G. Kiernan, *The Lords of Human Kind: European attitudes towards the outside world in the Imperial Age* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), *passim;* for the ideology of Social Darwinism and its various offshoots, see Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperialist Thought 1895-1914* (Allen and Unwin, 1960), *passim;* for the Fabian contribution to this murky stream see A. M. McBriar, "The Fabians, Imperialism, Tariff Reform, and War" in McBriar, *Fabian Socialism and English Politics 1884-1918* ([Cambridge] University Press, 1962, 1966), pp. 119 ff.; for an eloquent exposition of British imperialist ideology at the peak of the movement, see A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power* (St. Martin's Press, 1959), *passim;* for an attempt to show that the partition of the globe among rival powers after 1880 had no rational economic motivation, see J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review,* vol. VI, no. I, 1953. The theme is discussed at greater length in J. A. Schumpeter's essay collection entitled *Imperialism and Social Classes,* ed. Paul M. Sweezy (Blackwell, 1951), *passim.* The standard liberal critique of British imperialism was initiated by J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (first published in 1902; revised edition Allen and Unwin, 1948), *passim.* Socialist authors will be considered later. The imperialist literature itself is virtually coterminous with conservative and ruling-class thought in the age of Theodore Roosevelt, Joseph Chamberlain, and William II. Amidst this flood, A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783* (Sagamore Press, 1957) is a distinctly superior specimen and can also claim to have altered the current of affairs inasmuch as it became the Bible of American, British, Japanese, and German rulers, politicians, and admirals from the day of its publication in 1890 down to the outbreak of war in 1914, and perhaps down to Pearl Harbor and the Japanese-American conflict of 1941-45.
56. Article of September 4, published in the *New York Daily Tribune* of September 16, 1857; reprinted in K. Marx and F. Engels, *The First Indian War of Independence*

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(Moscow, 1959), p. 93; and in S. Avineri, ed., *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization* (Doubleday, 1968), p. 213. For the general effect of the 1857 bloodbath on British-Indian relations, see Kiernan, op. cit., pp. 46 ff.

57. Marx, ibid.
58. D. W. Brogan, *The Development of Modern France (1870-1939)* (Hamish Hamilton, 1940), p. 16.
59. Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War,* pp. 9 ff., 31 ff., 46 ff., 98 ff. Once war had broken out in 1914, Germany's imperial appetite began to encompass the creation of a Central African colonial empire as well, but domination of *Mitteleuropa* always remained at the core of it. A customs union with Austria-Hungary, and annexations in Russia, were necessary features of this program which had already been worked out before 1914 by leading industrialists such as Walter Rathenau, subsequently one of the more prominent figures of the short-lived Weimar Republic. Expansion into the Near East followed as a matter of course.
60. Gollwitzer, pp. 42 ff. But it does not follow that imperialism was unpopular. The notion that it never had a mass following is on a par with the belief that fascism was the conscious creation of a few demagogues and never attracted anyone but ruined shopkeepers. Such beliefs, firmly held by the more simple spirits on the Left after 1919, were responsible for major political disasters during the inter-war period.
61. Friedrich Engels, "Deutschland und der Panslawismus," *Neue Oder-Zeitung,* no. 185 of April 21, 1855; reprinted in Marx-Engels *Werke* (East Berlin, 1961, vol. 11, pp. 193-94); see also Engels' article in the same journal of April 24, where Austrian Pan-Slavism is distinguished from its Russian branch, and Metternich is given some credit for having perceived the Russian menace. His repressive measure failed (Engels observes) because his regime could not permit that "free development of the German and Hungarian spirit which was more than sufficient to exorcise the Slav specter." This line of thought went back to 1848 and eventually came to rank among the treasured possessions of all but a handful of German and Austro-Hungarian Social Democrats. For obvious reasons, Leninist writers have never been eager to emphasize this embarrassing circumstance which makes nonsense of the assertion that the German and Austrian Socialists in 1914 betrayed their spiritual heritage. It would be truer to say that they remained faithful to it after it had ceased to be relevant. For Marx's views on the subject, which did not differ fundamentally from Engels' except that he was friendlier to the Poles, see the two pamphlets respectively entitled *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century* and *The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston,* both originally published in British and American journals between 1853 and 1857, and now available in book form (Lawrence and Wishart, 1969); also Karl Marx, *Manuskripte über die polnische Frage (1863-1864)* (Mouton & Co., 1961).
62. Marx, *Konspekt von Bakunins "Staatlichkeit und Anarchie,"* in *Werke,* vol. 18, pp. 599 ff., especially p. 622. Written in 1874-75, but not published at the time, this critique of Bakunin's curious mixture of anarchism and Pan-Slavism claims a certain topical interest.
63. Translated from the French version, *Etatisme et Anarchie,* in *Archives Bakounine* (E. J. Brill, 1967), p. 206. For the Russian original see *Gossudarstvennost i Anarkhia* (1873), reprinted in the same volume, ed., Arthur Lehning. For the subsequent fortunes of this work and the post-revolutionary reprints of 1919 and 1922, see the Introduction. The pamphlet had a profound impact upon the Russian Populists, a circumstance confirmed in 1876 by the Blanquist writer Peter Tkachev, who differed radically from Bakunin on the issue of "spontaneity" versus centralized organization. It was of course the student youth who took up these ideas and transmitted them to later generations of revolutionaries, Lenin's contemporaries among them. For the rest, one has only to peruse *State and Revolution* (1917) to realize that Lenin—while carefully citing Marx and Engels in support of his theses—had effected a fusion of the Bakuninist and the Blanquist inheritance.
64. Marx-Engels, *Selected Correspondence* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 459.
65. *Etatisme et Anarchie,* op. cit., pp. 282-83.

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Discourses of the Rabbis

Chaim Raphael

Is it the mark of a good book that it forces the reader to share the author's absorption with the subject matter, or—on the contrary—that it is stimulating enough to take him beyond these immediate questions? I hope that the second can be admitted as at least a partial criterion, for this is (to me) the unexpected consequence of plunging for some hours into the minutiae of rabbinic discussion as set out in a new work on the Midrash by Rabbi Braude.* Rabbi Braude showed his expertise and devotion to this subject some years ago in a two-volume study of the Midrash on Psalms. The new book, on the Pesikta Rabbati, is equally monumental, running to almost 1,000 pages. Perhaps by its very nature it is not a book to generate a unified broad theme if read in straight sittings, since the rabbinic discussions it records are linked to special occasions stretching over the whole cycle of a year. But there are other factors, too, in this work which open up some extraneous, or at least wandering, thoughts.

One special aspect of the book is that it is the latest title—the eighteenth—in the Yale Judaica Series. This series has covered so much ground in the 25 years since it began that this seems a good moment to take stock. If the general conclusion must be that the series has been extremely successful in what it set out to do, one can still be prompted by the latest title to ask, in no carping spirit, if some of the intense scholarly effort behind the series could not now be bent for our benefit into a somewhat different channel.

It was in 1955 that Professor Julian Obermann, editor of the series until his death in the following year, said in an Introductory Note to one of the volumes that it was then ten years "since Judaism Research was founded at Yale University for the purpose of promoting studies and publications in the various fields of Hebrew lore and literature." The aim of the series has been to edit and put into modern idiomatic English some important—or at least significant—Jewish writings not otherwise available in this form, translating these writings from a variety of languages—Hebrew (of various styles and periods), Arabic, Aramaic, and Ethiopic. It was never thought that the books emerging would be very "popular" in content. Professor Obermann thought that they would "assume the nature of textbooks or works of reference," of particular value as source material for historians, theologians, philosophers, or jurists without expertise in Semitics. Yet he also hoped that they would be of some service to the general reader; and it is perhaps with the general reader in mind that one asks for a slightly broader content to "Hebrew lore and literature."

The series was initiated with great appropriateness by a translation of the classical philosophic work *Beliefs and Opinions* by the 10th-century Gaon Saadia. With the next volume, the editors got down to what has been their central preoccupation—the translation of the great fourteen-volume *Code* ("Mishneh Torah") of the 12th-century Maimonides. Of the eighteen titles so far, eleven have been translations of individual books of the *Code*. Two of the remaining titles are by Rabbi Braude—the present work and his Midrash on Psalms. In addition the series has included translations of two special rabbinic works (on ethics and mourning) and two anthologies, of Falasha and Karaite writings.

Each volume has been produced with the most meticulous care and elegance. If the books are "primarily intended" (to quote Professor Obermann) for non-Semitists and the general reader, the editing is of a standard which also makes them essential for the experts. In the present work, for example, Rabbi Braude explains that the basic Prague printed edition of the book, which appeared in 1654, has been collated with the 13th-century Parma manuscript, with the two sets of marginal annotations in the copy of the Prague edition owned by the library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, and with the 17th-century Casanata manuscript; and use has been made of glosses and commentaries by a variety of later editors of the work, above all of Friedmann's classic edition of 1880, in which his remarkable "instinct for the right reading" was supplemented also by fragmentary manuscripts made available to him by other scholars. In Braude's view, the original compilation of this collection of Midrash took place in Palestine, possibly in the 6th but more probably in the 7th century. We can feel sure, given the care which has been taken, that we now have a sound version of this original book. Is there any need to question the validity of a labor of love of this kind? Perhaps not: the intensity of Jewish study over the ages, and the interrelationship of scholars and ideas as demonstrated here, are forces which have kept the Jews distinct and alive until today. A university press is the perfect medium for the projection of such scholarship. Yet something seems lacking. In work of such exactitude and scale, one

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* *Pesikta Rabbati. Discourses for Feasts, Fasts, and Special Sabbaths,* translated by William G. Braude. Yale University Press, 2 volumes, 995 pp., $25.00.

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hopes for fresh illumination: documentation is not enough.

THIS IS not a criticism which applies to all the translations. In some cases a book, when it has been Englished, carries its own message. The Saadia volume, for example, can be opened and read for its direct, gentle but authoritative appeal. Saadia was, of course, a giant—the first Jew to speak with a "modern" voice, in which an unsurpassed knowledge of (and respect for) Jewish learning was transfused by a quite original and creative approach to philosophy and literature. He was a man, also, who came out of his study to apply his work to the needs of the man in the street, as evidenced by his great translation of the Bible into Arabic, or his unremitting struggle against what he saw as the diversionary influence (both religious and social) of the Jewish "heresy" of Karaism. His book, *Beliefs and Opinions*, is a distillation of Judaism in this human sense.

Saadia takes up questions that puzzle us all—the nature of God, creation in time, duty, suffering, guilt, "reward"—and talks patiently but firmly. We are at one with him in being exposed, as he was, to a vibrant secular culture which challenges us to assess our own tradition in its context. His answers are both traditional and personal.

The same kind of direct communication comes through in the *Code* of Maimonides, to which the Yale Series has given such overwhelming attention. The subject matter of this *Code* might seem more limited or "internal," since it was intended as an authoritative listing of the positive and negative commandments of the Law, with explanations drawn from the entire talmudic tradition. But in the hands of a Maimonides, the discussion is luminous. If the aim is practical—to provide a guide which, with the Bible itself, is all that the man in the street needs to know—the style lifts it far above "popularization." The subject matter is systematized, logically and historically: where the opportunity offers, Maimonides probes beneath the ordinances for motivation, in the light of science or philosophy. Pervading every volume, whether he is discussing the law of cleanliness or torts, is a profound moral feeling, in which conscience, reason, and faith are all given play, as harmonized in his own character. If Saadia and Maimonides were men of their time, they were also men for all time.

IT WOULD BE hard for the other books in the series to reach this height, but they mostly carry a special flavor which is their own justification. Of the two shorter rabbinic works, one—*The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan*—links up naturally with the familiar *Ethics of the Fathers* of which it is an elaboration. The two anthologies are exactly right, and there is a double interest in following the Karaite collection because of its indirect connection with the Saadia volume. Karaism was a strange intellectual—or social—aberration, reflecting, in its growth period, the turbulent conditions at the time of the Arab conquests, which, among their minor results, encouraged a migration of Jews from Iraq toward the sparsely populated provinces to the North and East, in the wake of the new "overlords." The rabbinic tradition of Babylonia, led by the learned and often wealthy "upper classes," has come down to us with such force as "normal" that we rarely think of a populace in the background to whom the niceties of rabbinic lore and literature might have carried a "class" connotation, stimulating them to turn instead to a literal, non-rabbinic interpretation of the Bible. If Saadia, from his position of intellectual power, had not launched an all-out attack on the heresy, the Karaites might never have felt the need to spell out their ideas in the various persistent forms—prayer, argument, poetry—reflected in this anthology. It is good for us to be shaken up by a reminder that normative Judaism has been subject to more than one type of "heresy": if rabbinism, in its various guises, survived, it had to do so, in the ebb and flow of social circumstances, by conscious intellectual and religious rededication.

It is perhaps because the Midrash, as represented in the *Pesikta Rabbati*, fails to rise to any vibrant argument of this kind, that its place in the series raises a question, despite the fact that is has been edited and translated so splendidly. *Pesikta* is a plural of *piska* ("section"), the term applied to a biblical passage read in synagogue, and hence to the rabbinic discussion based on it. *Rabbati* ("long") was used to distinguish this compilation from shorter ones (e.g., *Pesikta d'Rab Kahana*). The process of "midrash"—which indicates any kind of biblical exposition—allowed the rabbis who engaged in it to take off in almost any direction, starting usually from an halakhic (legal) dictum or question, but then wandering discursively into history, anecdote, ethics, or folklore. Given that the "discourses" collected here are for special occasions—feast days, fast days, and special Sabbaths—one might have expected them to be pointed and correspondingly engrossing. To one reader, at least, they do not seem so; and the reason may be that the character of the book should perhaps be envisaged differently from the way presented.

Rabbi Braude has clearly found it immensely satisfying (as any scholar would) to establish a good text for translation; but he is also at pains to demonstrate what he considers the rich variety of his subject matter. He claims in his Introduction that these discourses give us "numerous items about the lives and personalities" of the rabbis, and many allusions "to events in Jewish biblical and post-biblical history" with "a medley of fable and legend as well as authentic tradition" and "considerations of a number of special matters." Following up these indications is, however, rather bleak. A "vivid account of Jeremiah's imprisonment during the siege of Jerusalem" describes how the princes of Judah threw him into a dungeon in the house of Jonathan the Scribe, who, sneering at Jeremiah, said to him: "Behold the honor which your Friend has given you. Life is more pleasant—is it not?—in the dungeon you are in than in the apartment given to

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high officials like me." An item "enlarging upon biblical narrative" is that after Adam sinned, his physical height was diminished and he became only one hundred cubits tall. A passage (from a "discourse" on the Sabbath of Hanukkah) on the building of the Tabernacle interprets the verse "Moses' strength had all but given out" (Numbers 7:1) as meaning that he had to take the Tabernacle down and put it up again twice (or perhaps three times) every day, with not one member of the tribe of Levi willing to give a helping hand. Even the morally satisfying arguments can be a little crude. God does not desire the destruction of the wicked pagans, because they, as much as the Jews, "are all His creatures and the work of His hands"; but He judges them differently. The heathens are judged at night when they are asleep, the one time that they are innocent; the Jews are judged by God during the day (at night "they are idle"; during the day, they are busy with good deeds —praying and listening to the exposition of the Law).

THE STYLE of these discourses is also rather fragmented, with the constant bandying of verses and authorities that can be very satisfying in the Talmud, when a genuine argument is taking place, but is out of key in what should be a moral exhortation. One really expects something more sustained and elevated in a book of "sermons for special occasions." Is the answer, perhaps, that these are not, as Braude claims, "discourses," but merely notes: a compilation of references *for use* in sermons? With men of such intellectual power and moral fervor as the early rabbis, one must assume that a discourse had some rhetoric in it; that the preacher would seek some higher or broader pattern out of the innumerable verse interpretations; that he would be led by "the special occasion" into a state of exaltation which would communicate to his audience. The great preachers of all times have done this: there is no reason to think that the rabbis were less inspired.

Assuming that such full-bodied discourses were actually given, the factual references from them, in all their detail, would be collected and passed on in classes—and valuable raw material it is. For it to be effective for us today, however, it needs to be re-presented through some broadening process, either of comparative scholarship or poetry. In the first, the scholars get behind these ancient interpretations, folk-memories, and echoes of contemporary life to show us how they link up with the myths, religious ideas, and historic experiences of other peoples. Rabbi Braude gives us an occasional brief hint—as when he says that this or that interpretation could be an argument against a Christian view—but one would like much more. The Midrash cannot be pursued as if the Jewish people existed in a vacuum. The paradox is that the more we learn about comparable experiences outside our own, the more deeply we feel the values in our own tradition which are special to us.

Stepping warily, as an Englishman, in mentioning Yale's sister-university in this connection, one might nevertheless cite as an illustration the "comparative" treatment of "Hebrew lore and literature" which is such a marked feature of some of the books in the Harvard Semitic Series. There could not, for example, be a more extreme case of a really "interior" Jewish subject than the life and work of the 12th-century Provençal Talmudist Rabbi Abraham ben David, as presented in *Rabad of Posquières* by Isadore Twersky.* We are brought face to face here with a man for whom not merely the practice of the Halakhah but the complete absorption in its study was the *sine qua non* of Jewish existence. The *Code* of Maimonides was to him lacking—or indeed heretical—precisely because of its rational and magisterial authority. To Rabad, the logic of Halakhah becomes evident not in a summation—even by a mind of the power of Maimonides'—but in the constant re-examination of the sources and opinions out of which new living concepts of Halakhah flow endlessly. To most of us this would indicate a pretty remote figure; but as presented in this remarkable book by Twersky, Rabad emerges as part of the extraordinary civilization of Provence, stirred in his day by the 12th-century renaissance. We see the social and feudal background; the Jewish communities of Narbonne, Lunel, Carcassonne, and Montpelier spring to life; the movements of Jewish and secular scholarship from Spain and into other parts of France, with Provence as the linchpin, are constantly reflected in the sources uncovered; and above all Rabad himself—dry and irascible in argument—is shown in human terms as warm and generous, a key figure (with other interesting characters) in the social life of the communities in which he lived. One could wish that some of this kind of historical approach had been brought in to illuminate the somewhat suspended dicta of Rabbi Braude's midrashists.

IS IT possible that the "discourses" of the *Pesikta*, if presented this way as part of a vibrant background, might stimulate our preachers of today—the heirs of the midrashists—to use them as the basis for a new approach to the Jewish sermon? To some of us, it would be a consummation devoutly to be wished. In exchange for some plodding analysis of the current political situation or the problems of youth, we would gladly surrender to the poetry and authority of the tradition if it could speak to us in the synagogue with the eloquence and vivacity that surely once informed it.

There is a hint of some spontaneity of this kind in one of the discussions in the *Pesikta*. It was the practice in rabbinic times for someone to stand by the man who read from the Scroll and provide a running translation from it into the language which the man in the street understood, which was then Aramaic. *Piska* 5 here says that "our Masters taught" that the reader in Hebrew must never lift his eyes from the Scroll and recite from memory, and that by the same token the interpreter must not look at the Scroll (or at a written translation) but must trans-

* Harvard University Press, 1962.

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late by ear—presumably with all the freedom and spontaneity which this implies. If it would seem revolutionary to introduce this system into synagogues today, it would in fact be only a return to a hallowed—and significant—tradition.

Is there perhaps another way to stimulate the "genuine" preaching spirit, by the recovery—or re-creation—of some of the full-scale discourses, combining learning, devotion, and rhetoric, which the rabbinic tradition seems to imply? In modern times, one has heard great halakhic sermons by distinguished rabbis, and emotional ones by this or that *maggid*. Are any texts available? Perhaps they could be brought into the series, with a lively introduction and commentary on the social background.

IF THERE were to be a revival of Jewish preaching, one would hope that it would reach out, in this way, beyond the discourses of the *Pesikta* toward a Jewish equivalent of the great sermons that are reflected in English literature. Indeed, many of these sermons are so Hebraic in character that one wonders if some of them could not be drawn on directly. I have often thought that at the *Minhah* service on Yom Kippur, when the Book of Jonah is read, some rabbi (he would have to have a great voice) could rise in the pulpit to read Father Mapple's great oration from *Moby Dick*:

> Shipmates, this book, containing only four chapters—four yarns—is one of the smallest strands in the mighty cable of the Scriptures. Yet what depths of soul does Jonah's deep sea-line sound! . . . We sound with him to the kelpy bottom of the water. . . . Jonah thinks that a ship made by man will carry him into countries where God does not reign, but only the captains of this earth. He skulks about the wharves of Joppa and seeks a ship that's bound for Tarshish—as far from Joppa as Jonah could possibly have sailed in those ancient days. . . . See ye not, then, shipmates, that Jonah sought to flee world-wide from God? Miserable man! With slouched hat and guilty eye, skulking from his God. . . .

If this is too nautical, one could turn for a different emotion to John Wesley, meditating on the wanderings in the wilderness as a clue to the "wilderness state" in all our souls. But the ultimate would be John Donne, probing the essentially Jewish paradox of man's weakness and strength:

> David asks the question with a holy wonder: *Quid est homo?* What is man that God is so mindful of him? But I may have his leave to say, since God is so mindful of him, since God hath set his mind upon him: What is *not* Man? Man is all.

The text of this sermon (from Psalm 62) was: "Surely men altogether, high and low, are lighter than vanity." Perhaps Donne's answer is too humanist; but is there a rabbi in the house who will rise to the same poetry:

> Absolutely, unconditionally, we cannot annihilate man to the vanity and nullity of this text. For man is not only a contributary Creature but a total Creature: he does not make one, but is all. He is not a piece of the world, but the world itself; and next to the glory of God, the reason why there is a world.

Paranoia at the Movies

Myron Magnet

They Shoot Horses, Don't They? is a terrible and pretentious movie. But it expresses—precisely through its pretensions and vulgarity—a vision of reality which, if not entirely new in American consciousness, is only now beginning to operate as a central and alarming unspoken assumption in American political life.

The film, directed by Sydney Pollack and based on a 1935 novel by Horace McCoy, is about a marathon dancing contest held in 1932—in the depths, we are reminded, of the depression. Young couples will dance continuously, with ten-minute rest periods every two hours, until, all other contestants having dropped of exhaustion, one couple remains—the winners—still "dancing," to be rewarded with the prize of Fifteen Hundred Silver Dollars.

The film follows the marathon along its inexorable and brutal month-long course: exhaustion, madness, and death eliminate the contestants pair by pair. Toward the end, when only a handful of couples remains, the master of ceremonies tells the protagonists, Jane Fonda and Michael Sarrazin, that he wants them to be married publicly during the marathon. It would be good for business, and they would get money for it. Jane Fonda protests; she and Sarrazin expect to win the contest. The announcer doubts that; besides, he says, after he deducts expenses for laundry and so on, very few of the Fifteen Hundred Silver Dollars will remain for the winners to carry away. At this news, Jane Fonda and Sarrazin pack their bags and leave. They go outside and look at the ocean.

"What are you going to do now?" Sarrazin asks. Jane Fonda has no plans. She feels that whatever one does, "they" have it sewed up, "they" have arranged the rules so that one will always lose in the end. Producing a revolver, she announces that she is going to kill herself, but cannot then bring herself to pull the trigger. Will Sarrazin help her? "Yes," he says obligingly, and takes the revolver and shoots her. The police come and take him away. "Why did he do it?" they ask. "She asked me to," he explains.

I should mention, too, that the spatial unity and the time sequence of the action are broken in two very peculiar ways. As the titles and credits are shown, we see a very brief and totally separate drama. An aging man and a boy

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are walking together over endless and beautiful wheat fields, watching their horse run freely and gracefully through the exhilarating landscape. Suddenly the horse falls and breaks his leg. The old man, without hesitation or explanation, raises his rifle and shoots the fallen horse, as the boy looks on in shock and grief.

The director calls the second device used in the film a "flash-forward" (as opposed to a flashback): during the course of the film, we see three or four very brief scenes which seem to us, at that moment, incomprehensible. Only at the end do we realize that these are the events immediately following Sarrazin's arrest. These "flash-forwards" seem to me, as I shall explain, to deserve so awkward and unlikely a name.

The tableau of the crippled horse, which gives this film its title, is presented as an allegory—a dumb show—of the film itself, just as, in the same way, we are meant to understand the dance marathon story as an allegory of contemporary American society. The moral, crudely put (as indeed the film puts it), is that if one falls by the wayside one is dead and is better off dead. And, as society is arranged, one is bound to fall by the wayside.

In this formulation, society is a game or race or contest, like the dance marathon, and one must obey the rules, even though those rules guarantee one's own ultimate failure and humiliation. In earlier works which see society as a game with rules—Kipling's *Kim*, for example—the idea of sportsmanship is therefore extended to apply to social behavior, so that fair play and gracefulness become values; victory is not of ultimate importance. But in the dance marathon, victory, though unattainable, is the only value, under whose glare any ideal simply evaporates. The rules are only the letter, disinfected of any spirit. The war of all against all, though now submerged and ritualized, still rages.

And so the film sees that the American ethic of "getting ahead" results in the "rat race"; one gets ahead by running over the backs of one's fallen competitors, to find nothing waiting at the end. The contest, like society, is the only place there is—and hence the overwhelmingly claustrophobic atmosphere of the film. And, like society, the marathon never stops—there is no rest. Nor is there any privacy or any leisure, for one must compete, in public, almost all the time. One has a partner because the rules of the contest require it, as in society one gets married for public, rather than private, reasons. It is all meaningless, all a charade. But, in terms of the film, entering the contest, where one is given free meals, is the only way to get something to eat through one's own efforts; no other employment is available. The contest then is not a game—it is work—and one enters it (though unconsciously) not for the nonexistent prize but merely to stay alive. The ethic is not "may the best man win," it is the survival of the fittest. Victory is mere survival; there are no higher human possibilities.

Thus, the very professional medical staff, in constant attendance on the contestants, are there to keep the dancers dancing; to keep them healthy would require putting a stop to the marathon itself. The same assumption underlies the shooting of the horse at the beginning of the film. If horses live only to be useful to men, then men are right to shoot horses who can no longer fulfill their function. One implication is that even the American obsession with health is itself an artifact of the need to compete in the social marathon. Health is instrumental and thus does not represent any abstract, narcissistic ideal of physical well-being. The body—indeed, the self—is a machine which fulfills a certain function and must, as such, be maintained in smooth and efficient running order.

This is a very different idea from, for example, the triumphant survival of Brecht's Mother Courage, who gives up everything to keep her body alive in a deadly murderous world, which is in a state of unmediated universal war. To survive, for her, is to defeat the energies of annihilation which assail her at every moment, and, in so doing, to establish and preserve an intact self—a center of resistance—distinct from the all-dissolving medium through which she moves. In *They Shoot Horses*, however, while the self has also been reduced to the body, the body survives only while it attaches itself to the forces which are effecting its inevitable destruction. The self, that is, has become the instrument and the process of its own dissolution; it conspires in its own disintegration and, in identifying with the mechanism of that disintegration, becomes its own opponent. That is why, if one glimpses this hopeless, meaningless dilemma at the heart of society and chooses not to participate, one can only lie down and die—one can kill oneself. But this is hardly a vindication of one's humanity, of one's ultimate inviolability. It is a recognition that one has already been violated, that one has become identical with the forces most alien to the self.

This film, then, seems to me to be a radical rejection of the traditional, official American attitude toward life in society—an attitude which sees the self as an independent agent moving in the medium of society and acting upon it, but remaining distinct from it and untouched by it. The individual organizes his social experience according to certain inner and personal criteria, more real and more fundamental to him than the society which he views as a set of means essential for achieving his private ends. He enters society, which he despises, only to transcend it, to go beyond its restrictions and his need of it. But *They Shoot Horses* suggests that these ideas are appropriate to a social reality which no longer exists. In the new social situation which the dance marathon represents, the relationship between individuals and society has been reversed. Society is no longer a set of institutions and abstract relations which are instrumental to individual ends; it has become an end in itself, to which individual activity is now instrumental. Moreover, the persistence of the old individualist fantasy contributes to the maintenance of the new social structure; our central national assumptions have been turned to the service of a reality wholly opposed to them. For individuals, continuing to function in society in pursuit of

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their private ends, do not become conscious of the impossibility of success until society, which has achieved an autonomous existence, has swallowed them up.

THE VISION the film presents thus has, it seems to me, a number of characteristics we usually associate with an "advanced" or "developed" consciousness and with political radicalism as well. Chief among these is the claim to have seen through official mythology into the true nature of society, to have seen that society is oppressive and inhumane, that it is antithetical to the highest aspirations and ideals. And the film claims, moreover, to have confronted the possibility of the radical meaninglessness of human life—to have looked, as it were, into "the abyss." I think, however, that *They Shoot Horses* has relentlessly vulgarized the insights it claims to embody, and has in so doing transformed them into something neither "advanced" nor radical, but quite the reverse.

Let me return here to the two breaks in the film's time-sequence. The film seems to me to suffer from an indefiniteness, or even a confusion, of tenses. The "flash-forwards," if they are to mean anything, can only be seen as an attempt to comment on present action in terms of its future consequences. To invoke the future in this way is an act of interpretation; it is a hypothetical projection of the past and the present—it remains, that is, a historical statement. But the film, in interjecting the "flash-forwards," makes no distinction between present and future—the future exists in the present. This confusion about time is embedded in the structure of *They Shoot Horses* on every level. The film unpacks rather than develops its hypotheses. The hypothesis implies and contains its development—they are one and the same thing. What this notion ultimately means is that reality is not historical—it never changes, but is stable, eternal, objective, and therefore independent of consciousness.

The emblematic title-sequence expresses the same assumption. The horse episode is not a flashback to an event in the life of any of the characters, although that is perhaps what it is trying to be. A flashback is, after all, an essentially historical statement, a structural device which attempts to explain the essence of the present in terms of its origin in the past. It assumes that the meaning of the present is imbedded in its history. But the title sequence is, as I say, allegorical and emblematic. It is a movement outside of history, into an abstract realm free from the exigencies of time, place, and personal identity. We see ideal Boyhood and ideal Old Manhood, placed in ideal Nature in the (timeless) ideal Past, acting out an Eternal Truth. The abstract formulation is Reality; one need only plug in the values to understand any particular exemplary case.

And yet *They Shoot Horses* presents itself as a "realistic," historical film, an exploration of the peculiarly American past as an implicit comment on the present. But the realism and the history, it seems to me, are largely matters of costume and decor. In trying to distill the Universal American Experience, the Eternal Truth about America, the film simply evaporates its historical context. Its "universality" is wholly mendacious; the film encompasses all experience only by separating it from its circumstances. Where, for example, does the dance marathon take place? We are not told (although, late in the film, the sun sets over the ocean, so we must be on the West Coast. The camera, like history, has rather uncomfortable relations with the Universal). Where exactly in America did the competitors grow up? In the country or the city? To what classes do they belong? Were they always without money, or are they now in reduced circumstances because of the depression? With what expectations and goals did they grow up? What did their education and experience prepare them to do? In short, how has the particular American experience of each individual contributed to making him what he is, and what common factors in these individual experiences have brought them all together in this particular place at this particular time? We don't know. The only character with a past is Jane Fonda, and from her experience (with brutal men) she has drawn the conclusion that experience itself is dangerous. It is better to separate yourself from your experience—it is better to ward it off. It is better to be dead—*that* is universal.

Moreover, the world of the dance marathon, as it is imagined in the film, lacks certain fundamental characteristics of the American society which it represents. First, there are no social classes or class distinctions—which is not, in reality, even a necessary consequence of the fact that nobody has any money. Second, everybody has a single social role—competitor, announcer, or nurse, for example—and no one can have two roles at once. And, finally, economic categories do not apply: nothing is produced, no value is created, money is not exchanged or circulated, and there are neither employers nor employees. Thus we have a society to which none of the usual categories of social analysis applies. Why then is society so oppressive and deadly? It cannot be a result of class conflict, for there are no classes and therefore, in effect, no politics. Nor does society, by forcing us into a multiplicity of simultaneous roles, create internal conflicts which we cannot resolve, for we have only one role. Nor can economic exploitation be the cause of our discontent and suffering—there is no economy. Therefore, neither political nor social nor economic activity is the cause or the cure of our misery. We must all live in society—that is a fact of nature. And life in society is misery—that is the universal human condition. There is nothing we can do about it.

How does this notion differ from Freud's view that discontent is inevitable in civilization? Freud, of course, says "discontent" rather than "misery," but the real difference seems to me one of kind, not of mere degree. Discontent, for Freud, is an artifact of the willful and rational act or process which brings civilization into existence. Before that act, men lived in a condition void of, or contrary to, civilization—and, in postulating that precivilized condition, Freud places himself in a long tradition of moralists who, like Hobbes, define civilization by contrasting it with its imagined opposite, the hypotheti-

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cal state of nature, for which civilization was a conscious replacement. Freud sees the state of nature as a sexualized version of the Hobbesian war of all against all, a condition of ultimate horror resulting from the unlimited license of each man to commit every conceivable act of aggression which—*because such is his instinct and his precivilized human nature*—he is bound to commit. To put an end to this state of war, in which every man is in fear and danger of falling victim to the same aggressive instincts of others which he recognizes in himself, each man enters into a contract with other men to give up his unlimited freedom of aggression. He agrees not to kill, in effect, to prevent himself from being killed. And every murderous impulse henceforward awakens guilt and the fear of being murdered oneself. The guilt and the fear, that is, which derive their energy from our own aggressive and anti-social instincts, establish and maintain society and are, at the same time, the sources and the modes of our discontent.

Freud believes that the state of nature and the social contract are not mere myths but historical events. I believe so, too, in the sense that the early life history of every individual is precisely a progression from the state of nature to the state of civilization, from the condition of unlimited aggression to that of repressed and redirected aggression. And we are, in our identification with the objects of our aggression (or to be more precise, in our love for our fathers), the active agents in the processes of our own civilization; it is not something that is done *to* us. If we are discontent, we are the authors of our own discontent, and it is a price we are willing to pay—"we all conspire in our own objective fate."

But, according to *They Shoot Horses*, society has no positive function, nor did we make it. Now this sort of radical alienation from society is central to a very venerable tradition of American films.* Many Westerns, for example, characteristically concern themselves with the Westerner's noble and ultimately unsuccessful efforts to maintain his independent, individualistic, and heroic style of life at a time when the westward advance of effete and town-based society into territory which the Westerner had himself tamed was making his life-style obsolete. His larger-than-life heroism could exist only beyond the frontiers of civilization, and it was his tragedy that civilization rapidly overwhelmed him. And if the Westerner is the hero outside society and in opposition to it, the gangster is the hero who makes active war on society from within the cities at its very center. What fascinates us about the gangster in films is precisely his singleminded, almost obsessional opposition to, and rejection of, society; the gangster himself is not interested so much in the material fruits of his criminal activities as in the independent self he creates and cherishes. But if a strong anti-social current runs through the American cinema (and, indeed, the American individualistic sensibility, having been unwilling to deal with its aggressive instincts, has never been comfortable with the idea of any kind of organic society at all), if some of the most potent American myths have expressed opposition to the very *idea* of society, the new form of these myths, which *They Shoot Horses* represents, seems to me particularly malignant. For, while this new myth realizes that one can neither escape nor destroy society, it keeps alive in an aggravated form the central notion that any kind of society is alien to our humanity. It assumes that society exists by divine fiat and is anti-human, and it passes off this assumption as tragedy.

So "tragedy" becomes a new politics of non-participation, for the adversary is not a particular social system, but society itself. No distinction is made. And society is not, according to this new myth, something we can change—it is impenetrable by human will. "They" made it; "they" run it—just as "they," and not we, shoot horses, don't they? I would be the last to deny that American society now is indeed exceedingly inhuman and makes people instrumental to things in a wholesale fashion. But if one does not actively oppose inhumanity, it seems to me one acquiesces in it and must take responsibility for it. Society is not an eternal machine. As Hobbes says, we are governed not by laws but by men. To view the current state of affairs in America as an act of God, or of Nature, or of some mysterious and invisible "them" strikes me as not only mistaken but immoral.

If *They Shoot Horses* descends from the tradition of Westerns and gangster movies, it has still more in common with certain horror films, in that it is intensely paranoid. In *The Invasion of the Body Snatchers* for example, mysterious alien beings, or forces, for some unknown reason, take over the bodies of men and rob them of their humanity. They are rendered unable to have those experiences they most value—to feel, to sympathize, and to love. That, in essence, is the fantasy at the center of *They Shoot Horses*, as well, and society is here the alien, mysterious invading force. That paranoia is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the individualist ideal, which finally sees the self as threatened and opposed by all reality. And involved in the paranoia is a kind of grandiose masochism, which cherishes humiliation and turns every (real or imagined) assault on the self into a proof that the self is sufficiently powerful and unique to merit the attention and hostility of the whole world. Each man views himself as the last human being, on a lonely eminence, assailed and hunted by a society of alien and mechanical creatures disguised as men, who hate and fear the superiority of his dauntless humanity (as in *Easy Rider*, the most successful of the new paranoid films, in which the crowd of inhuman aliens destroys the few beautiful, free, good people). Thus each individual becomes an armed garrison, perpetually defending the humanity which only he represents against the inexorable forces of dehumanization. The emphasis has changed; the war of all against all still rages, but each man is now on the defensive. And, as usual, no one is winning.

*As Robert Warshow has established in his exemplary essays on American popular culture, collected in *The Immediate Experience*.

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

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

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Black History

THE AMERICAN NEGRO: HIS HISTORY AND LITERATURE. General Editor, WILLIAM LOREN KATZ. *Arno Press. 141 volumes in all. Series I: 45 volumes, $485.00. Series II: 66 volumes, $604.00. Series III: 30 volumes, $322.00.*

Reviewed by DAVID DONALD

IN 1887 the Reverend William J. Simmons, president of the State University at Louisville, Kentucky, published a book which raises virtually all the problems involved in writing the history of black men in the United States. *Men of Mark*, Simmons's fat, 1,314-page volume, consists of 177 biographical sketches of Negroes who achieved distinction as "lawyers, doctors, authors, editors, divines, lecturers, linguists, scientists, college presidents, and such." In chronology the subjects ranged from Olaudah Equiana, an 18th-century Virginia slave who secured his own freedom and then labored to aid other black men, to Booker T. Washington. Some of Simmons's biographical portraits were of figures as familiar as Frederick Douglass; others were of obscure worthies like Wiley Jones, Esq., of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, who owned a street-car railroad, a race track, and a park. Inexplicably, Simmons also included biographies of Toussaint L'Ouverture, Alexandre Dumas, President Alexander Petion of Haiti, and a few other Negroes who had no direct connection with the United States. His purpose was to prove "that the Negro race is still alive, and must possess more intellectual vigor than any other section of the human family, or else how could they be crushed as slaves in all those years since 1620, and yet today stand side by side with the best blood in America?"

Like all other serious historians of the Negro, Simmons had difficulty in finding reliable sources. During the first two centuries of American history most Negroes, held in slavery, were forbidden to learn how to read and write, and even in the century since emancipation most have been so poor, so inadequately educated, and so oppressed that they have preserved few of the diaries and letters and autobiographies upon which historians usually base their narratives. It is true, of course, that in every age—even in the oppressive decades of slavery—there were some black men who overcame the incredible odds and recorded their life experiences. *My Bondage and My Freedom* (1855) by Frederick Douglass is unquestionably one of the major 19th-century American autobiographies, and almost certainly *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* will hold a similar rank in 20th-century literature. These are, however, highly exceptional, and for most of the black man's history in America the documentation is pitifully limited.

Because of the recent explosion of interest in Negro history, publishers have tried to remedy this deficiency by reissuing virtually everything, regardless of merit, that has been written by or about black men in America. Of the several valuable series of reprints, the most ambitious, extensive, and useful is that called *The American Negro: His History and Literature*, published by the Arno Press under the general editorship of William Loren Katz, which now reaches a total of 141 volumes. Aided by a well-informed advisory board of professional historians and librarians, Mr. Katz has selected basic works on black history, including both first-hand accounts and out-of-print general histories—such as Simmons's *Men of Mark*. Though the editorial introductions are unfortunately brief and offer little assistance in evaluating the books, the Arno Press has performed a public service by reprinting authentic texts of these sources for Negro history, and any serious student will find the series invaluable.

JUST BECAUSE the Arno Press series is so comprehensive, it painfully reminds us how very scarce the sources for black history are. In all these books only the useful, but necessarily thin and outdated, chapters in George W. Williams's general *History of the Negro Race in America* (1883) deal with the colonial period. The series includes no first-hand accounts written by Negroes in the 17th and 18th centuries. The one work on the slave trade, *Captain Canot; or Twenty Years of an African Slaver* (1854) is misleading, because that jovial and impenitent captain really believed he was helping his involuntary passengers by transporting them from barbarous Africa to civilized America.

Even for the decades of slavery in the 19th century the sources remain thin. Mr. Katz has included twelve autobiographical works by men who were at one time slaves, but, important and useful as these are, they have to be used with care and skepticism. Black men who fled from slavery and lived to write their life histories came mostly from the upper South; for instance, of the brief autobiographies Mr. Katz has collected under the title *Five Slave Narratives*, two were written by North Carolina fugitives, one by a Kentucky escapee, one by a Maryland black, and one by a South Carolinian. Such accounts can tell us only about the best-informed segment of the Negro population in areas where slavery was least oppressive. From them we cannot judge how burdensome the peculiar institution was in the Black Belt of the deep South or imagine how crushing were its consequences to the human spirit. Moreover, many of these slave narratives are not genuine autobiographies, for often they were dictated to or ghost-

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written by Northern abolitionists. It is not easy to tell which passages represent the slave's experiences and which reflect the interests and attitudes of the whites who recorded them.

INDEED, much of the material on Negro history during the 19th century suffers from having been written by whites. One does not have to subscribe to the historical heresy that only black men can write black history to understand how seriously the story of the Negro could be distorted when presented through the eyes either of the abolitionist or of the slaveholder. Books like William Lloyd Garrison's *Thoughts on African Colonization* (1832) and Mrs. Lydia Maria Child's *An Appeal in Favor of that Class of Americans Called Africans* (1836)—both reprinted in the Arno Press series—were polemics designed to influence Northern opinion and as such they contribute more to our understanding of the abolitionist movement than to our knowledge of black history.

Even when whites tried objectively to report on the condition of the Negro, their books were frequently deficient in understanding. *First Days among the Contrabands* (1893), Elizabeth Hyde Botume's account of her efforts to teach the freedmen in Beaufort, South Carolina, during the Civil War, illustrates some of the difficulties. Eager to help the Negroes, Miss Botume was frustrated by the fact that, to her, the black students "all looked alike." She was further baffled when her pupils seemed to respond to one name when she called the roll on the first day and to another on the next; she had no way of knowing that under slavery Negroes frequently went by two names—one public, the other private, known only to other blacks. Like Thomas Wentworth Higginson's *Cheerful Yesterdays* (1898) and other volumes of reminiscences reprinted in the series, Miss Botume's memoir tells something of what Negroes achieved during the Civil War and unconsciously reveals something of white racial attitudes, even among New England reformers, but it does not contribute much to our understanding of what black people themselves thought and felt.

BESIDES HAVING to work from inadequate sources, President Simmons faced the problem—which all subsequent historians of the Negro have also encountered—of trying at once to write objective history and to extol the achievements of his race. He resolved it by discussing only those black men who achieved success—any kind of success. His heroes were as varied as the Reverend Matthew Campbell, who married two thousand couples; Troy Porter, the Illinois plumber and gas fitter; Rufus Perry, Ph.D., who read Greek, Latin, and Hebrew; and Thomas Bethune, better known as "Blind Tom," the wizard of the piano keyboard. Simmons's tone of indiscriminate eulogy is one which has characterized most black history. For instance, when Joseph T. Wilson published his valuable *Black Phalanx* (1890), he was not content to show that Negroes often made good soldiers but tried to prove that during the American Revolution "the Negro, as in all conflicts since, sought every opportunity to show his patriotism, and his unquenchable thirst for liberty" and that in the Civil War his valor was "excelled by no troops in the field."

This eulogistic approach was probably inevitable and socially desirable to counteract the general indifference or hostility with which most American historians treated the role of the Negro, but Simmons found that it seriously limited his subject matter. Books like his had no room for failure. They avoided the less happy aspects of Negro life. They did not attempt to face the fact that—despite brilliant accomplishments by exceptional individuals—most Negroes throughout our history have lived in desperate degradation, first in slavery, then in Southern peonage, now in Northern ghettos. If the scholar can only discuss Negro "men of mark," then the bulk of black history is out of bounds.

Simmons's third basic difficulty derived from the ambivalence with which Negroes have always regarded American society, in which they are at once members and outcasts. Unable to decide whether the Negro "man of mark" should ape the whites—who, after all, had "the best blood in America"—or should rebel against white supremacy, Simmons eclectically favored both courses of action. If he had praise for the slaves who loyally supported their masters during the Civil War, "humbly feeding the wives and children of those who went to battle to rivet their chains," he also admired Robert Smalls, the South Carolina slave who coolly stole the steamboat *Planter* from under the Confederate guns in Charleston harbor and piloted it out to join the Union blockading fleet. Only five pages separate Simmons's biography of that "progressive giant," Booker T. Washington, from one of Nat Turner, whose bloody insurrection stemmed from "the upheaval of an honest heart to break in any way possible the chains which bound his people."

Later historians have been less content to live with these ambiguities and contradictions in Negro history. A generation ago scholars were certain that the mainstream of black history led toward integration and ultimate assimilation into white society. From this viewpoint Booker T. Washington's ideas seemed eminently sensible, and the handful of black rebels and dissidents throughout our history were clearly crackpots. More recently, however, militancy has become the only socially acceptable attitude for Negroes, and black history has been turned topsy-turvy to prove that the slaves were in a state of constant insurrection, that black soldiers had a major share in defeating the Confederacy, and that, even in the most oppressive decades after Reconstruction ended, Negroes made constant, if generally fruitless, efforts to battle for their rights. So imperative is the need to include all black men in the tradition of resistance that even Booker T. Washington has recently been transformed from the perfect Uncle Tom into a secret supporter of civil rights. It would seem, then, that black history is propaganda, to be rewritten at will to meet the political and psychological needs of each generation.

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Since these obstacles to the writing of Negro history are so formidable, it is not surprising that some American historians do not consider it an intellectually defensible enterprise. They argue that by singling out the black experience for study the seamless web of history is broken. Marxists claim that writing and teaching black history obscures the fact that class, not race, conflict is the true dynamic of the American social system. Other scholars feel that courses in black history, which are frequently on a deplorably low intellectual level, serve mainly to give Negro students a sense of racial pride and to permit white liberals to wallow in their guilt feelings. Still others ask why, if Afro-American studies are offered in our high schools and colleges, Jewish-American or Irish-American history should not also be part of the standard curriculum.

VALID AS some of these objections seem and real as the difficulties are, the arguments in favor of black history are stronger. The paucity of sources should challenge, rather than discourage, the historian. If he cannot write Negro history from letters, autobiographies, and memoirs—such as those in the Arno Press series—he has to devise a new methodology. Three-quarters of a century ago W.E.B. Du Bois recognized that the true history of black folk would have to draw heavily upon the findings of sociology, economics, and social psychology, and in a path-breaking series of monographs which he edited and largely wrote for the *Atlanta University Publications*—fortunately included in the Arno Press reprints—showed how it could be done. Few historians of the Negro have followed Du Bois's example, however, and even fewer have gone beyond his work to use linguistic analysis, folklore, and depth psychology as methods for recapturing the Negro past. Here is the perfect opportunity for our young radical historians, who have been talking of the need to write the history of the inarticulate in America. Innovation and experimentation in the study of black history could even lead to a general renaissance in the historical pro-

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fession, now in the doldrums of dullness and inconsequence.

An even more important reason for seriously studying black history is that it requires us to rethink white history. For nearly a generation, the prevailing mode of thought among American historians has been that of consensus—the emphasis on, and usually the glorification of, shared ideas and values that have made the United States the good society. But if the American experiment has proved a failure for every tenth man who happens to have a black skin, it is time for us to cease celebrating our success, and to start asking just where this country went wrong. Through studying the Negro past, then, the historian resumes his essential, if neglected, role as social critic.

The writing of Negro history, therefore, poses an intellectual challenge of the first order. It involves a great deal more than the black-facing of our history textbooks. It is not enough to substitute a picture of Phyllis Wheatley for one of Ann Bradstreet or to replace a paragraph on William Lloyd Garrison with one about Frederick Douglass. Nor is it of consequence—though Mr. Katz would have us think so—to stress the achievements of black worthies, such as the Negro who accompanied Peary to the North Pole or the Negro who invented the potato chip. Instead, the study of black history, properly conceived, requires the raising of radical questions about the nature and functioning of American society. It is not a work for hacks and mediocrities but for scholars of sensitivity, imagination, and courage.

P.M.

TIDES OF FORTUNE. By HAROLD MACMILLAN. *Harper & Row. 729 pp. $15.00.*

Reviewed by ROBERT G. HAZO

HAROLD MACMILLAN, Britain's Prime Minister from 1956 to 1962 (the period bracketed by Suez and Profumo), was without doubt the most important and influential figure in British politics since Churchill. The record he left behind is, by all counts, an impressive one. Among other things, he rescued the Tories after the Suez debacle and kept them in power for many years thereafter. Moreover, despite the obstacles placed in the way by John Foster Dulles, he was able to reestablish Britain's special relationship with the United States and to strengthen that entente through both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. He was also responsible for reversing the emphasis of his "tepid European" predecessor, the ill-fated Anthony Eden, and he set Britain on the path of closer economic association with Europe. He recast the economic thinking of both his party and his nation so solidly that subsequent governments have had little choice but to follow the main outlines he set forth.

But despite these considerable achievements, Macmillan is not given much credit, or if he is, he is accorded it reluctantly or thoughtlessly. His detractors, particularly those on the Left, tend to attribute his success to luck—an analysis that has the sole virtue of brevity. The theory behind this reading of Macmillan's career is that all but the most extraordinary of political figures these days are janitors, and that their primary function is maintenance. Macmillan just happened to be minding the establishment when historical forces moved his party and nation in the right direction.

THAT Macmillan has always been in harmony with his society lends some plausibility to this interpretation. Born into the favored environment of the upper class at a time when its preeminence was unquestioned, Macmillan stayed true to its values and traditions. Never a maverick—he did however, quietly refuse both the Garter and a peerage after his retirement—he embodies many, if not all, of his class's virtues and wholeheartedly has pursued its aspirations. Though he was something of a late bloomer in the Conservative party, his career, once begun, was one of continual movement upward, with no major setbacks and few extended plateaus. He was so closely identified with his privileged background and he adhered to its patterns so diligently that, even if one sees him as more than a stuffed shirt who stumbled into prominence, one is hard-pressed to resist the conclusion that Macmillan is in every way a most conventional man. The same might be said of his multi-volumed memoirs, which seem to go on and on, weighted down by a mass of detail that omits little yet often seems to say nothing. (We are, for example, treated to a discussion of how, during his tenure as Minister of Housing, he dealt with an invasion of flies after a local flood.) The present volume, which takes up the postwar period, is the third in the series, but Macmillan, not to be hurried, has still not arrived at his account of his Premiership after about 2,000 pages! One is inclined here to think of him as a pedant whose main characteristic is the inability to see the difference between exhaustiveness and thoroughness.

Nevertheless, to dismiss Macmillan as a pedestrian politician and writer is to make the fundamental error of mistaking lack of content for lack of perception. The best way to understand him is to accept the fact that he is essentially enigmatic. One should therefore approach his political career, as well as his published account of it, as one would a mystery story, alert to hints, suggestions, and clues. For the fact is that Macmillan was a remarkably able and—what is even more important—devious politician who knew that his devices would be all the more successful if concealed behind a façade of candor.

Thus, I believe, he actually cultivated the image of amiable mediocrity the better to gain ascendancy. His favored polemical method was to invite attack by feigning vulnerability, and then to strike back. This strategy was never used with greater success than during his encounters with Hugh Gaitskell. I was fortunate to witness one such clash early in their association; it resulted, as did so many, in Gaitskell suddenly and mysteriously finding himself defeated. On this particular occasion the Labour leader launched into an attack on

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the government that obviously required an energetic rebuttal from the Prime Minister. Macmillan started off with a few desultory observations designed to give the impression that he specialized in the obvious. He followed with some homilies that evoked only impatient noises from Labour. Then, with the full effect of the shaggy brows, there was a sort of plea for fair play and gentlemanly conduct coupled with an expression of mild indignation. Gaitskell, sensing weakness and confusion, pressed the attack, encouraged just enough to overstep his limits. Then it came, the decisive thrust, cruelly accurate, not only wounding but humbling; Gaitskell's blood had been drawn. For one whose graciousness was endemic, there were variations on the theme, e.g., amiability followed by the dagger, but the result was most often the same. It was produced with regularity by a refined awareness of the proper mixture of atmosphere, amenities, and polite brutality.

Macmillan was also a master of the use of silence as rhetoric. On many occasions he would simply ignore the direct affront or, if required to answer, would dismiss it with a brief and deliberate (and no doubt infuriating) pomposity. The *New Statesman* once complained that mannered archness was no substitute for answering questions. Actually, its editors were angry because Macmillan had been defeating their party and its leader for years. What Churchill called the severest test of a man, the House of Commons, Macmillan mastered with apparent ease and reserve.

Indeed, Macmillan's career owed much to Churchill, who recognized the younger man's talents and created opportunities for his advancement. No one knows for sure, but Churchill may really have preferred Macmillan to Eden as his successor; there is no doubt that he backed Macmillan against Butler when Eden resigned. The association between the two men began to deepen during the war after Churchill commissioned Macmillan to serve as his political representative in North Africa, a seminal assignment that Macmillan carried off with aplomb. He was a great success, too, in his next major step up the political ladder, as Minister of Housing after the fall of the postwar Labour government. When Macmillan took on this job he publicly professed ignorance of all matters that fell within his new sphere of responsibility. But he was in fact quite knowledgeable about economic issues—what he calls "the meat of politics in the twenty years between the wars." Unlike Eden and others in the Conservative party, Macmillan foresaw that economic affairs would become of central concern, and he made them his area of special expertise (an early Keynesian, he wrote a book on the mixed economy in 1938). At the higher Tory levels, there was probably no one more qualified than he to assume the task of administering the construction of 300,000 housing units. And by making good on the government's promise, Macmillan found himself thrust into the front rank of Tory leadership—this, after having held only two administrative posts. The movement to wider responsibility was fairly quick, but the ability, and the point of view to match, had been there all along.

It is reasonable to assume that when a man with Macmillan's background and qualities comes to write the story of his political life he will do so in the same indirect way that he lived it, and for the same reasons: to keep his opponents off balance and to protect himself, his reputation, and his party's interests. Significantly, Macmillan repeats in his memoirs Disraeli's advice about surrounding something one wants to conceal with a "long and tedious" account. He also goes out of his way in the present volume to note that when a Minister said to Churchill, "I have tried to put the case fairly," Churchill replied: "A very dangerous thing to do." How else but by contrivance are we to explain the long stretches of chronology unrelieved by wit, interpretation, even gossip, or the brief and unsatisfying accounts of such major events of the time as the Palestine crisis and the British withdrawal from India—especially when these are contrasted with the many parts of *Tides of Fortune* that glow with refinement and insight?

Notable among the latter is the section on the Labour party, wherein Macmillan affirms the high regard in which he held the members of the first postwar Labour government. His portrait of Attlee is deeper and kinder than the one drawn by Churchill; that of Bevin, a minor masterpiece. He adds important human dimensions to our comprehension of Morrison and Dalton; dismisses Churchill's judgment of Bevan as a "squalid nuisance"; and plausibly makes Cripps out to be a mixture, if one can imagine it, of the devil and Lloyd George. On the Conservative side, where Macmillan has a great deal more to lose, the pickings are deliberately meager. The only really convincing description of Eden occurs in a passage where Macmillan writes with genuine sympathy of Eden's poignant maneuvering as Churchill kept postponing his resignation. What Macmillan has to say about Churchill himself adds little to what is already known.

Patterned as they are, Macmillan's choices of emphases and of objects on which to lavish his attention and style are unlikely to be accidental. More probably, they represent the approach of a man who is writing an exoteric account with an esoteric message, and who, like any good teacher employing this classical approach, does not cross all the t's or dot all the i's.

The Critical Moment

Literature and the Sixth Sense. By Philip Rahv. *Houghton Mifflin. 445 pp. $10.00.*

Reviewed by John P. Sisk

Literature and the Sixth Sense is Philip Rahv's selection from thirty years of his literary criticism. He has included much material from the earlier books, *Image and Idea* and *The Myth and the Powerhouse*, as well as a dozen or so pieces not hitherto collected, but has omitted several essays on Dostoevsky's novels, which are planned as chapters in

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John P. Sisk *is professor of English at Gonzaga University. Mr. Sisk's essay, "The Future of Prediction," appeared in our March issue.*

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a future book, and essays dealing directly with politics. Some titles have been changed; two or three updating postscripts have been added; otherwise few changes have been made in the material. The pieces are arranged chronologically in two sections, one for longer and generally synoptic essays, the other for shorter reviews. The reviews come last but they do not let the book down. Rahv is one of the few living critics whose reviews are collectible.

"Collection," however, is a misleading term for a book that is as much a coherent whole as Arnold's *Essays in Criticism* or T.S. Eliot's *Selected Essays*. Rahv indicates in his Foreword that the prime integrating source upon which he has drawn is that historical insight which Nietzsche identifies as "virtually a new faculty of the mind, a sixth sense . . . [that] functions both as an analytic instrument and as a new bracing resource of the modern sensibility." It is the sixth sense in Rahv that has made him, to use the distinction he develops in "Criticism and the Imagination of Alternatives" (1956), a prospective rather than retrospective critic: one who "conceives of literature as something actual and alive in his own time and relates himself to it by trying to affect its course of development here and now." It is the lack of this sense in our age, he points out in a 1950 essay, that is in large part responsible for the "abrupt swings in consciousness from one demoralizing extreme to another."

THOSE abrupt swings in consciousness have produced the various kinds of excess against which Rahv has done battle over this thirty-year span: in the socially-oriented 30's, the excess that stuffed "the creativity of the Left into the sack of political orthodoxy"; in the 40's and 50's, the excess of the traditional-formalist New Critics and of the myth- and symbol-mongers; in the "swinging" 60's, the excesses of the mind- and consciousness-fearing neo-romantics who have confused manic verbalization with excellence of style and who are bemused with the prospect of salvation through sex.

To put it another way, Rahv's sixth sense has functioned since the mid-30's as a distant early warning system against the false promises of ideology—ideology understood as a natural enemy of historical insight. He has had the good fortune of discovering early in life that the ideologue's inevitable impulse in the presence of literature is to use it in the service of a "higher" cause. His early efforts as a *Partisan Review* editor to resist this impulse are well known. In effect, however, he has never stopped resisting it, for what he has objected to in the traditionalists, the mythomaniacs, the religionists, the formalists, the amateur Freudians, the vulgar Marxists, the sociologizers, and the swingers is the attempt to reduce literature by making it subservient to the needs of some cult, piety, or orthodoxy. Observing in "Religion and the Intellectuals" how many gifted writers are "plunging from one debauch of ideology into another without giving themselves time to sober up," he recommends "a dose of skepticism so strong as to make them stand fast against the solicitations of ideologies." This was written in 1950, but as Rahv views the ensuing years he finds little reason to alter the prescription. At times, it seems to me now, it has been stronger than the symptoms warranted (as administered against the New Critics and the myth critics, for instance); nevertheless, it has been prescribed for the right ailments and at the right time.

The sixth sense in Rahv has made him especially sensitive to the dichotomy between experience and consciousness in American writing. The opening essay, the familiar "Paleface and Redskin" (1939), functions like a prelude, the interrelated themes of which sound throughout the book. "The Cult of Experience in American Writing" (1940), "The Dark Lady of Salem" (1941), "The Heiress of All the Ages" (1943), and "The Native Bias" (1957) are concerned with this dichotomy in a major way, but it is an important factor also in Rahv's assessment of such writers as Hemingway, Henry Miller, William Carlos Williams, Arthur Miller, Leslie Fiedler, Allen Ginsberg, and Norman Mailer. One of Rahv's great services to American literature is that he helps us to see why Mailer's neo-primitivist "yea-saying to experience" in his recent fiction is no less crippling to the writer than Hawthorne's isolation from experience. James, who "learned how to nourish his gifts and grew to full maturity," was not so crippled, nor is Saul Bellow, "the most intelligent novelist of his generation" as well as "the most consistently interesting in point of growth and development."

A BOOK of this kind, ranging as it does over a period in our cultural life so marked by change at all levels, could be a useful record even if its insights and judgments were no longer especially relevant. Rahv himself accedes to this record-value in his decision to reprint his essays without substantial changes, and so delivers himself to the whimsies of the *Zeitgeist*. But what continually struck me as I reread pieces I had not read for years was how well they stand up despite the fact that they carry the imprint of their particular times and occasions. This is especially true of the spendid synoptic essays on Hawthorne (1941), Henry James's heroines (1943), and the introductions to the short fiction of Tolstoy (1946) and Kafka (1952). It is hard to imagine an America in which "The Cult of Experience in American Writing" (1940) will not be a prime critical resource. It takes little imagination to transpose "Proletarian Literature: A Political Autopsy" (1939) into terms the beginning 70's can understand and profit from—consider this remark, for instance: "At that time the party saw the revolution as an immediate possibility, and its literature was extreme in its Leftism, aggressive, declamatory, prophetic." The earliest piece in the book, the 1936 review of Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral*, is still a model of critical procedure for those who because of passionate commitments are unable to distinguish between poetry and belief—or are unable to see that one of the greatest services a critic can perform for politics is to curb its tendency to acquire literature.

Rahv has continued over the years to see in Eliot (as he puts it in his 1966 review of Eliot's post-

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humous essays) "one of the principal educators of the imaginative life of his age, a uniquely great shaping influence both as poet and critic." To be for Eliot, even with Rahv's qualifications, is to court conspicuous enemies. He swells their ranks by referring to Jean Genet as a moral idiot, by admiring Orwell, and by refusing to accept F. R. Leavis's estimate of D. H. Lawrence, or Hugh Kenner's estimate of Pound's *Cantos*, or John Aldridge's estimate of Norman Mailer, or Maxwell Geismar's estimate of Henry James, or Leslie Fiedler's estimate of William Burroughs. No doubt for many Rahv is simply a once-influential critic who is no longer with it, who has missed the wave of the future. And they would be correct after their fashion. He is, I suspect, as little impressed with wave-of-the future notions as Orwell was, having gotten his dose of skepticism from the same medicine cabinet. To be with it, to swing, as he makes clear in his 1965 piece on Mailer, is to take the fickle moods of a permissive and self-deluded time at their own evaluation —an assignment for a publicist, not a critic. If he sometimes seems unduly pessimistic in his estimation of the swinging 60's, the reason is not the conservatism of age, and certainly not failure of nerve, but moral seriousness combined with that tragic sense that once led him to quote with approval Freud's conviction that "renunciation and suffering are not to be eluded by the race of men." Such sentiments are unacceptable in many quarters, especially to those who, entranced with the vision of an outward-bound counter-culture, want their Freud filtered through Norman O. Brown.

IN ANY EVENT, opponents anxious to find signs of deterioration in this critic had best avoid his 1968 essay "On F. R. Leavis and D. H. Lawrence." Here, it seems to me, the intellectual vigor, the discriminate generosity, and the ability to keep a firm grasp on the line of argument while ranging over great expanses of literature were never more impressively on display. Criticism of this sort is exciting to read even when one does not agree with it, and not least because it demon-

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strates the possibility of redeeming the time with meaning, but without underestimating or belittling the forces that threaten it.

Rahv has always demonstrated this possibility in a style that does not lend itself to quotation. Consider a sentence from "The Myth and the Powerhouse." "True, in the imaginative act the artist does indeed challenge time, but in order to win he must be able to meet *its* challenge; and his triumph over it is like that blessing which Jacob exacted from the angel only after grappling with him till the break of day." This is superb in its strong precision, in its tact, in its unostentatious balance and climax, in its harmony of idea and structure. But one becomes conscious of it only through an effort of the will that might isolate countless other sentences no less admirable. The style itself discourages such attention; like the book of which it is a proper model, it exists only as an instrument of clarification.

The Surviving Word

A TREASURY OF YIDDISH VERSE. Edited by IRVING HOWE and ELIEZER GREENBERG. *Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 378 pp. $10.00.*

Reviewed by DAN JACOBSON

OF ALL literary forms, poetry is notoriously the most difficult to translate from the language in which it is written. Of all the languages of Europe, Yiddish—for reasons of its very structure and origins—is notoriously the one which least lends itself to translation. *A Treasury of Yiddish Verse* in English would thus appear to be a doubly doomed enterprise.

Theoretically, the conclusion may be irresistible. The book under review disproves it decisively. Indeed, it does more. It suggests that the singularity of Yiddish literature is so extreme that Yiddish poetry in translation is actually *more* directly available and comprehensible to the reader who doesn't know the language than the classics of Yiddish prose.

How can this be? Well, it is relatively easy to point out that while the three greatest figures of Yiddish prose—Peretz, Mendele Moicher Sforim, and Sholem Aleichem—had all died before the end of the First World War, much of the best poetry in this collection is of a later date, and a few of the most impressive poets represented in it are still at work today. (One of the surprises of the anthology for me was to realize just how much of an American rather than European affair Yiddish poetry always has been, from the earliest days of the radical "sweatshop poets" onward.) Simply in being our contemporaries, or near contemporaries, the poets have an advantage over their prose predecessors. Again, it is tempting to remark that lyrical-reflective verse (and there is practically no other kind in the anthology) is always intended in its original language of composition to come straight from the writer to the reader. It is "from the heart," as people used to say; whereas any work of prose, whether in fiction or autobiography, is bound to be clumsier and less direct in its expression of emotion, burdened with a mass of more or less external detail.

But of course we know quite well that it is in large part the relative indirection and dilution of prose, its necessary preoccupation, whatever its ultimate concerns might be, with social and material facts—of dress, furniture, manners, social institutions, and the rest—which enable it to "carry" so much better in translation than poetry. Usually, when we read a novel or story in translation, it is just because of these aspects of the work that we are able to find our way about it; in their similarity to what we already know, they provide us with our first footing into the author's private, inward world. Except in the case of Yiddish. For the society which the classic Yiddish prose writers present to us—that of a community which had all the most important and distinctive attributes of peoplehood, but none of its privileges or powers, and no hope of ever acquiring them—is so unlike any we know today, that it becomes in itself a source of strangeness, a further obstacle to our understanding; what we should most easily recognize turns into a source of puzzlement and distance.

If that were all! But, strange in its living forms, a terrible and incomprehensible fate overtook the world of Eastern European Jewry. In the face of so complete a catastrophe, one might be all the more inclined to feel that only the poet could still find words, could still make an utterance—but to whom? For now we see what the "advantage" of being more contemporary has portended for the Yiddish poets. The survivors among them have not only had to endure, like so many others of all nationalities in our century, the traumas of war, revolution, migration, and political terror; they have had to witness the literal doing to death of the community which produced them and their language and contained its memories. The poets have been left only to say *Kaddish*, as it were, for all that has been murdered—their own past and future among the rest. To write poetry in the language is to evoke the dead, to speak of the dead and to them; not to us, who hear the poets' words only in translation.

THESE PAINFUL general considerations will, I hope, do something to indicate just how large is our debt to the editors of the present anthology, and to their band of devoted translators, whose names include many well-known contemporary American poets. Perhaps the simplest and most effective praise one can give to the anthology as a whole is to say that in its intelligence and seriousness of conception it fully measures up to the standards set by the *Treasury of Yiddish Stories* which Messrs. Howe and Greenberg presented to us more than ten years ago. Like the earlier anthology, this one is preceded by a long, informative, and passionately written introduction, in which, having briefly evoked the circumstances of the Yiddish-speaking communities in Eastern Europe and the United States at the time when poetry in the language first began to be seriously written, the authors then go on to describe the swift, successive emergence of schools of poetry in

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DAN JACOBSON, *the English novelist, critic, and essayist, is a regular contributor to these pages.*

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GUIDES TO THE JEWISH FESTIVALS



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the different countries, and to analyze the characteristic styles and subject matter of many of the individual poets.

In reading an anthology of almost any kind, and still more in reviewing it, one is always inclined to look for similarities and common themes among the contributors, and thus fail to do justice to their individuality. I can only plead that there are special reasons in this case which warrant such an approach. Though the subjects of the poems vary as widely as their forms, rhythms, and tone, it is also true that there are several themes which wind inseparably in and out of one another and which recur insistently from poet to poet. As one might expect, they can all ultimately be considered explorations of one inevitable, inescapable theme: that of the tragic uniqueness and mystery of the Jewish fate in this century and those which preceded it.

Which is to say (and it's as well to be quite explicit about this, in order to ward off the sort of misunderstanding common among those who combine a total lack of intellectual curiosity about Jewish social and cultural history with the belief that they are nevertheless authorities on the subject)—a characteristic stance of the poets, however grief-stricken it may be, is one of challenge and anger. These emotions are directed in part against history and mankind in general, and in part against the Jews themselves for having allowed so much suffering to have happened to them; frequently they are turned into a fierce argument with the God of Israel. As the editors eloquently put it: "In the desolation of memory, Yiddish poets find themselves turning back to the old Jewish God, not so much the God of orthodoxy, or even the God their fathers had worshipped, but a God inseparable from Jewish fate, a God with whom one pleads and quarrels. It is as if, in a depopulated world, there must at least be someone to talk with: some figure or force, even if projected through images of denial and in accents of reproach, in whom the sheer possibility of meaning continues to reside."

Let one example suffice of the dignity and directness with which the quarrel can be conducted. Here is a short poem, entitled "Smoke," by Jacob Glatstein:

From the crematory flue
A Jew aspires to the Holy One.
And when the smoke of him
is gone,
His wife and children filter
through.

Above us, in the height of sky,
Saintly billows weep and wait.
God, wherever you may be,
There all of us are also not.

(Translated by Chana Faerstein)

It is perhaps hardly surprising that an image which is almost obsessive in the anthology is that of the boy Isaac bound to the altar—bound and not redeemed. There must be more than a dozen poems by various hands, many of them written well before the final catastrophe, which either touch upon the story or treat it directly and at length. They range in manner from Itzik Manger's folk-like song which portrays the father and son and their servant making their way across the landscapes of Poland to Mount Moriah:

"Daddy, where are we going now?"
"To Lashkev—to the Fair."
"Daddy, what are you going to
buy
At Lashkev—at the Fair?"

"A soldier made of porcelain,
A trumpet and a drum;
A piece of satin to make a dress
For mother who waits at home."

* * *

Eliezer sits on the driver's seat
And casts an anxious look.
"Sad and lovely," the poet says
"Are the roads of the Holy
Book."

(Translated by Leonard Wolf)

—from that, to the impassioned dialogue of H. Leivick's "The Book of Job" in which even the sheep that is substituted for Isaac finds its voice:

Why did you leap so lightly from
the altar
And thrust me on it with such
violence?
Why? One victim dragging the
other to
His death. Why are you dumb?
Speak.
Forget that I'm a sheep. Tonight's
The kind of night when even
a sheep
No less than man is privileged to
speak;
To murmur against death and call
For justice.

(Translated by Leonard Wolf)

But the lesser or subsidiary quarrels, too, are given memorable expression. Both before and after the Holocaust the poets rebel against "the crippled Jewish life" that Eastern Europe had represented.

I speak:
"Dear fly,
Sing something of your far-off
land."
I hear her weep—She answers:
May her right leg wither
If she plucks a harp
By strange waters,
Or forgets the dear dung heap
That had once been her
homeland.

(Moishe Leib Halpern, translated by Nathan Halper)

They rebel against their separateness as Jews from the triumphant and powerful cultures open to others.

I am ailing, Mademoiselle.
Like the century, I'm ailing.
I who once made an amazing
Leap from my father's threshold.
Daring, young rage, impudence.

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Bits of Blok, Schopenhauer,
Cabbala, Peretz, Spinoza,
Rootlessness and sorrow, sorrow.
(M. Kulbak, translated by Nathan Halper)

They rebel, in the words of the editors, "against the domination of the national-social theme."

Heir of Shakespeare, knights and shepherds,
Gentile poet, you are fortunate.
Yours is the earth the fat pig walks on,
Giving pasture to him and your Muse.
If you but pause on a branch, your twitter
Will gain replies from all the far places.

* * *

I—unneeded, a poet among Jews,
Growing, like wild grass, from a soil not ours,
My sires, wanderers with dusty beards,
Who feed on the grit of fairs and old tomes.
(Mani Leib, translated by Nathan Halper)

They rebel against a world whose physical beauty appears to have no moral correlative.

No matter how beautiful this tree,
How beautiful the plow—
The quiet glitter of the steel,
The supple branch, the rocking bough—
Beauty is only for the eye!
Let Him really show a miracle.
Let Him hand out justice.
(Jacob Glatstein, translated by Nathan Halper)

But, as the reader of the quotations given above will doubtless already have noticed, the anger of the poets, their demand for a justice that is never granted, does not exclude an unforced, unillusioned tenderness which the anger can never finally overwhelm. The created world of plants and animals; the narrow, poverty-stricken lanes and alleyways of townlets in Eastern Europe, and the roaring streets of the Lower East Side of New York; the memories of past generations; the once-despised and now-vanishing language in which the poets write; the unforgiven God—all these are lyrically and sometimes humorously evoked, brooded over with affection and intimacy, celebrated with a due degree of both modesty and pride. A striking feature of the anthology as a whole, however, is the absence from it of those uneasy, shifty ironies of mood we find in so much other verse of our time in other languages. The poets bring tenderness and anger together, yearning and despair, but relatively few attempts are made to pass off a violent alternation or see-saw between them as a sign of maturity. In qualification it must be added that the unity of tone of many of these poems is achieved at the cost of an over-explicitness of comment or questioning inside the poetic structure, with a resulting loss of rapidity and force, and a noticeable conventionality in the use of metaphor.

FOR MANY Jewish intellectuals, much of the time, it is not so much hard to be a Jew, as the old Yiddish saying went; it is merely embarrassing. And the embarrassment springs less directly from their relationship as Jews to the world at large, than from their relationship to themselves, to what is still Jewish within them. They have no religion, they don't speak Yiddish, their connection with Jewish institutions of any kind is altogether marginal. And they are hardly able to imagine themselves wishing it were otherwise. They have much more important and exciting things to think about; bigger issues to engage them; other, bolder identities and more compellingly central traditions to wrestle with. Jews, Jewishness, the Jewish past are small, provincial, parochial concerns; the smallest and the most arbitrary with which they can be accused of having any connection.

Yet the terrible Jewish fate of a generation ago remains an unexpungeable fact—no, not of their consciousness, but of their unconscious. They refrain from thinking about it, from reading about it, the historians among them zealously refrain from studying it;* but it remains revelatory of what they most dread about the nature of that "larger" society in which they are so anxious to participate as fully as anyone else. (But not as their kins-

* See Lucy S. Dawidowicz, "Toward a History of the Holocaust," COMMENTARY, April 1969.

A profile of the native-born Israelis

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

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folk finally did in Europe!) Furthermore, as if to show them just how intricate and never-ending are the corridors of history, they are now confronted with the drama of the Jewish fate in Israel today: a drama which involves the destinies of many peoples and which raises some of the profoundest questions it is possible to ask about the bonds which keep men together in communities in the modern world.

Hence the embarrassment. How can they bring their meager, formless Jewishness into relationship with such tragic and far-reaching events? Why does the world insist on taking so much notice of what they know to be inconsequential and devoid of interest? The felt disproportion is intolerably awkward —intellectually, morally, emotionally, in every way.

The anthology will not diminish embarrassments of this kind among those who feel them. (And I don't exclude myself from their company.) But the book should suggest that the terms in which we pose such questions to ourselves are utterly beside the point; that the most provincial thing about us is not what is left of our attachment to the Jews, but our desire to be at that "center" which, in the end, only Jews (and perhaps colonials) imagine to be a possible or desirable place of habitation. In this connection readers of COMMENTARY may remember the tormented reflection of the Yiddish poet-protagonist in the story, "Envy; or, Yiddish in America"* by Cynthia Ozick (herself one of the translators in the present volume): "Suppose it turns out that the destiny of the Jews is vast, open, eternal, and that Western Civilization is meant to dwindle, shrivel, shrink into the ghetto of the world—what of history then?"

The truth is, we simply cannot tell; and it is the crassest philistinism to suppose otherwise. The poets in this anthology, writing in their murdered "Jargon," show us irresistibly that the world is indeed that unimaginable sphere of which Pascal spoke, whose center is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere.

* November 1969.

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

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